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Message-Id: <20170718150441.fe789a065bd97d7dd67e8b36@linux-foundation.org>
Date: Tue, 18 Jul 2017 15:04:41 -0700
From: Andrew Morton <akpm@...ux-foundation.org>
To: Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@...tuozzo.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@...ux-foundation.org>,
Dave Jones <davej@...emonkey.org.uk>,
Alexander Potapenko <glider@...gle.com>,
Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@...gle.com>, kasan-dev@...glegroups.com,
Linux Kernel Mailing List <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>,
Chris Metcalf <cmetcalf@...hip.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH] lib/strscpy: avoid KASAN false positive
On Wed, 19 Jul 2017 00:31:36 +0300 Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@...tuozzo.com> wrote:
> On 07/18/2017 11:26 PM, Linus Torvalds wrote:
> > On Tue, Jul 18, 2017 at 1:15 PM, Andrey Ryabinin
> > <aryabinin@...tuozzo.com> wrote:
> >>
> >> No, it does warn about valid users. The report that Dave posted wasn't about wrong strscpy() usage
> >> it was about reading 8-bytes from 5-bytes source string. It wasn't about buggy 'count' at all.
> >> So KASAN will warn for perfectly valid code like this:
> >> char dest[16];
> >> strscpy(dest, "12345", sizeof(dest)):
> >
> > Ugh, ok, yes.
> >
> >> For strscpy() that would mean making the *whole* read from 'src' buffer unchecked by KASAN.
> >
> > So we do have that READ_ONCE_NOCHECK(), but could we perhaps have
> > something that doesn't do a NOCHECK but a partial check and is simply
> > ok with "this is an optimistc longer access"
> >
>
> This can be dont, I think.
>
> Something like this:
> static inline unsigned long read_partial_nocheck(unsigned long *x)
> {
> unsigned long ret = READ_ONCE_NOCHECK(x);
> kasan_check_partial(x, sizeof(unsigned long));
> return ret;
> }
>
(Cc Chris)
We could just remove all that word-at-a-time logic. Do we have any
evidence that this would harm anything?
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