[<prev] [next>] [<thread-prev] [thread-next>] [day] [month] [year] [list]
Message-ID: <CAGXu5jK9Gio6kYmmSsUA2uJ4qhqFRVqsed+CibtqnZd2ETGGaQ@mail.gmail.com>
Date: Tue, 18 Jul 2017 21:40:03 -0700
From: Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>
To: Andy Lutomirski <luto@...nel.org>
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@...ux-foundation.org>,
David Howells <dhowells@...hat.com>,
John Johansen <john.johansen@...onical.com>,
Paul Moore <paul@...l-moore.com>,
Stephen Smalley <sds@...ho.nsa.gov>,
Casey Schaufler <casey@...aufler-ca.com>,
James Morris <james.l.morris@...cle.com>,
"Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@...ssion.com>,
"Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@...lyn.com>,
Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@...ove.sakura.ne.jp>,
Linus Torvalds <torvalds@...ux-foundation.org>,
Linux FS Devel <linux-fsdevel@...r.kernel.org>,
LSM List <linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org>,
"linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org" <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v3 02/15] exec: Rename bprm->cred_prepared to called_set_creds
On Tue, Jul 18, 2017 at 6:06 PM, Andy Lutomirski <luto@...nel.org> wrote:
> On Tue, Jul 18, 2017 at 3:25 PM, Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org> wrote:
>> The cred_prepared bprm flag has a misleading name. It has nothing to do
>> with the bprm_prepare_cred hook, and actually tracks if bprm_set_creds has
>> been called. Rename this flag and improve its comment.
>>
>> Cc: David Howells <dhowells@...hat.com>
>> Cc: John Johansen <john.johansen@...onical.com>
>> Cc: Paul Moore <paul@...l-moore.com>
>> Cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@...ho.nsa.gov>
>> Cc: Casey Schaufler <casey@...aufler-ca.com>
>> Cc: James Morris <james.l.morris@...cle.com>
>> Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>
>> ---
>> fs/binfmt_flat.c | 2 +-
>> fs/exec.c | 2 +-
>> include/linux/binfmts.h | 8 ++++++--
>> security/apparmor/domain.c | 2 +-
>> security/selinux/hooks.c | 2 +-
>> security/smack/smack_lsm.c | 2 +-
>> security/tomoyo/tomoyo.c | 2 +-
>> 7 files changed, 12 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)
>>
>> diff --git a/fs/binfmt_flat.c b/fs/binfmt_flat.c
>> index 2edcefc0a294..a722530cc468 100644
>> --- a/fs/binfmt_flat.c
>> +++ b/fs/binfmt_flat.c
>> @@ -885,7 +885,7 @@ static int load_flat_shared_library(int id, struct lib_info *libs)
>> * as we're past the point of no return and are dealing with shared
>> * libraries.
>> */
>> - bprm.cred_prepared = 1;
>> + bprm.called_set_creds = 1;
>
> WTF is this? It's not, strictly speaking, a bug in this patch, but
> it's nonsensical. Is it fixed (presuably deleted) later?
binfmt_flat looks crazy, but I haven't seen any distros that enable it.
> Otherwise looks good.
Thanks!
-Kees
--
Kees Cook
Pixel Security
Powered by blists - more mailing lists