linux-kernel - Re: [PATCH v2] integrity: track mtime in addition to i

lists.openwall.net		lists / announce owl-users owl-dev john-users john-dev passwdqc-users yescrypt popa3d-users / oss-security kernel-hardening musl sabotage tlsify passwords / crypt-dev xvendor / Bugtraq Full-Disclosure linux-kernel linux-netdev linux-ext4 linux-hardening linux-cve-announce PHC
Open Source and information security mailing list archives

Hash Suite: Windows password security audit tool. GUI, reports in PDF.

[<prev] [next>] [<thread-prev] [day] [month] [year] [list]

Message-ID: <20170719212353.GB5449@fieldses.org>
Date:   Wed, 19 Jul 2017 17:23:53 -0400
From:   Bruce Fields <bfields@...ldses.org>
To:     Mimi Zohar <zohar@...ux.vnet.ibm.com>
Cc:     jlayton@...hat.com, Jeff Layton <jlayton@...nel.org>,
        "Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@...lyn.com>,
        Dmitry Kasatkin <dmitry.kasatkin@...il.com>,
        linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org,
        linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org,
        linux-fsdevel <linux-fsdevel@...r.kernel.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v2] integrity: track mtime in addition to i_version for
 assessment

On Wed, Jul 12, 2017 at 01:56:50PM -0400, Mimi Zohar wrote:
> On Wed, 2017-07-12 at 10:35 -0400, Bruce Fields wrote:
> > On Wed, Jul 12, 2017 at 08:20:21AM -0400, Mimi Zohar wrote:
> > > Right, currently the only way of knowing is by looking at the IMA
> > > measurement list to see if modified files are re-measured or, as you
> > > said, by looking at the code.
> > 
> > Who's actually using this, and do they do any kind of checks, or
> > document the filesystem-specific limitations?
> 
> Knowing who is using it and how it is being used is the big question.
>  I only hear about it when there are problems.
> 
> Over the years, there have been a number of Linux Security Summit
> (LSS) talks, which have been mostly about embedded systems or locked
> down systems, not so much for generic systems.
> 
> Examples include:

Thanks, I skimmed a couple.  Hard to tell, but it sounds like they need
this to work.  I wonder if they're getting this right.  It'd be easy
enough to test for.

--b.

> 
> - Design and Implementation of a Security Architecture for Critical
> Infrastructure Industrial Control Systems - David Safford, GE 2016
> 
> - IMA/EVM: Real Applications for Embedded Networking Systems - Petko
> Manolov, Konsulko Group, and Mark Baushke, Juniper Networks 2015
> 
> - CC3: An Identity Attested Linux Security Supervisor Architecture
>  - Greg Wettstein, IDfusion 2015
> 
> - The Linux Integrity Subsystem and TPM-based Network Endpoint
> Assessment - Andreas Steffen, HSR University of Applied Sciences
> Rapperswil, Switzerland 2012
> 
> Mimi