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Message-ID: <1660806.HVQ9M7P8eN@positron.chronox.de>
Date: Wed, 19 Jul 2017 08:25:55 +0200
From: Stephan Müller <smueller@...onox.de>
To: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@....edu>
Cc: Sandy Harris <sandyinchina@...il.com>,
Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@...uxfoundation.org>,
"Jason A. Donenfeld" <jason@...c4.com>,
Arnd Bergmann <arnd@...db.de>,
Linux Crypto Mailing List <linux-crypto@...r.kernel.org>,
LKML <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>
Subject: Re: [RFC PATCH v12 3/4] Linux Random Number Generator
Am Mittwoch, 19. Juli 2017, 03:51:33 CEST schrieb Theodore Ts'o:
Hi Theodore,
> If the real unpredictability is really coming from the interrupts
> changing the state of the CPU microarchitecture, the real question is
> how many interrupts do you need before you consider things
> "unpredictable" to an adequate level of security? Arguing that we
> should turn down the "interrupts per bit of entropy" in
> drivers/char/random.c is a much more honest way of having that
> discussion.
Please answer on the concerns given in [1] which explains that we cannot allow
turning that knob in the current implementation.
[1] https://www.spinics.net/lists/linux-crypto/msg26316.html
Ciao
Stephan
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