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Message-Id: <20170724200303.12197-16-brijesh.singh@amd.com>
Date: Mon, 24 Jul 2017 15:02:52 -0500
From: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@....com>
To: linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org, x86@...nel.org, kvm@...r.kernel.org
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@...utronix.de>, Borislav Petkov <bp@...e.de>,
Joerg Roedel <joro@...tes.org>,
"Michael S . Tsirkin" <mst@...hat.com>,
Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@...hat.com>,
\"Radim Krčmář\"
<rkrcmar@...hat.com>, Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@....com>,
Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@....com>
Subject: [RFC Part2 PATCH v3 15/26] KVM: SVM: Add support for SEV LAUNCH_START command
The command is used to bootstrap SEV guest from unencrypted boot images.
The command creates a new VM encryption key (VEK) using the guest owner's
policy, public DH certificates, and session information.
Signed-off-by: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@....com>
---
arch/x86/kvm/svm.c | 165 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
1 file changed, 165 insertions(+)
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/svm.c b/arch/x86/kvm/svm.c
index 72f7c27..3e325578 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/svm.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/svm.c
@@ -329,6 +329,8 @@ static unsigned int max_sev_asid;
static unsigned long *sev_asid_bitmap;
static int sev_asid_new(void);
static void sev_asid_free(int asid);
+static void sev_deactivate_handle(struct kvm *kvm, int *error);
+static void sev_decommission_handle(struct kvm *kvm, int *error);
static bool svm_sev_enabled(void)
{
@@ -1565,6 +1567,12 @@ static void sev_vm_destroy(struct kvm *kvm)
if (!sev_guest(kvm))
return;
+ /* release the firmware resources for this guest */
+ if (sev_get_handle(kvm)) {
+ sev_deactivate_handle(kvm, &error);
+ sev_decommission_handle(kvm, &error);
+ }
+
sev_asid_free(sev_get_asid(kvm));
sev_firmware_uninit();
}
@@ -5635,6 +5643,159 @@ static int sev_guest_init(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_sev_cmd *argp)
return ret;
}
+static int sev_issue_cmd(struct kvm *kvm, int id, void *data, int *error)
+{
+ int fd = sev_get_fd(kvm);
+ struct fd f;
+ int ret;
+
+ f = fdget(fd);
+ if (!f.file)
+ return -EBADF;
+
+ ret = sev_issue_cmd_external_user(f.file, id, data, error);
+ fdput(f);
+
+ return ret;
+}
+
+static void sev_decommission_handle(struct kvm *kvm, int *error)
+{
+ struct sev_data_decommission *data;
+
+ data = kzalloc(sizeof(*data), GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!data)
+ return;
+
+ data->handle = sev_get_handle(kvm);
+ sev_guest_decommission(data, error);
+ kfree(data);
+}
+
+static void sev_deactivate_handle(struct kvm *kvm, int *error)
+{
+ struct sev_data_deactivate *data;
+ int ret;
+
+ data = kzalloc(sizeof(*data), GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!data)
+ return;
+
+ data->handle = sev_get_handle(kvm);
+ ret = sev_guest_deactivate(data, error);
+ if (ret)
+ goto e_free;
+
+ wbinvd_on_all_cpus();
+
+ sev_guest_df_flush(error);
+e_free:
+ kfree(data);
+}
+
+static int sev_activate_asid(struct kvm *kvm, unsigned int handle, int *error)
+{
+ struct sev_data_activate *data;
+ int asid = sev_get_asid(kvm);
+ int ret;
+
+ wbinvd_on_all_cpus();
+
+ ret = sev_guest_df_flush(error);
+ if (ret)
+ return ret;
+
+ data = kzalloc(sizeof(*data), GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!data)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+
+ data->handle = handle;
+ data->asid = asid;
+ ret = sev_guest_activate(data, error);
+ if (ret)
+ goto e_err;
+
+ sev_set_handle(kvm, handle);
+e_err:
+ kfree(data);
+ return ret;
+}
+
+static int sev_launch_start(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_sev_cmd *argp)
+{
+ struct sev_data_launch_start *start = NULL;
+ struct kvm_sev_launch_start params;
+ void *dh_cert_addr = NULL;
+ void *session_addr = NULL;
+ int *error = &argp->error;
+ int ret;
+
+ if (!sev_guest(kvm))
+ return -ENOTTY;
+
+ ret = -EFAULT;
+ if (copy_from_user(¶ms, (void *)argp->data,
+ sizeof(struct kvm_sev_launch_start)))
+ goto e_free;
+
+ ret = -ENOMEM;
+ start = kzalloc(sizeof(*start), GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!start)
+ goto e_free;
+
+ /* Bit 15:6 reserved, must be 0 */
+ start->policy = params.policy & ~0xffc0;
+
+ if (params.dh_cert_length && params.dh_cert_address) {
+ ret = -ENOMEM;
+ dh_cert_addr = kmalloc(params.dh_cert_length, GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!dh_cert_addr)
+ goto e_free;
+
+ ret = -EFAULT;
+ if (copy_from_user(dh_cert_addr, (void *)params.dh_cert_address,
+ params.dh_cert_length))
+ goto e_free;
+
+ start->dh_cert_address = __sme_set(__pa(dh_cert_addr));
+ start->dh_cert_length = params.dh_cert_length;
+ }
+
+ if (params.session_length && params.session_address) {
+ ret = -ENOMEM;
+ session_addr = kmalloc(params.session_length, GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!session_addr)
+ goto e_free;
+
+ ret = -EFAULT;
+ if (copy_from_user(session_addr, (void *)params.session_address,
+ params.session_length))
+ goto e_free;
+
+ start->session_address = __sme_set(__pa(session_addr));
+ start->session_length = params.session_length;
+ }
+
+ start->handle = params.handle;
+ ret = sev_issue_cmd(kvm, SEV_CMD_LAUNCH_START, start, error);
+ if (ret)
+ goto e_free;
+
+ ret = sev_activate_asid(kvm, start->handle, error);
+ if (ret)
+ goto e_free;
+
+ params.handle = start->handle;
+ if (copy_to_user((void *) argp->data, ¶ms,
+ sizeof(struct kvm_sev_launch_start)))
+ ret = -EFAULT;
+e_free:
+ kfree(dh_cert_addr);
+ kfree(session_addr);
+ kfree(start);
+ return ret;
+}
+
static int svm_memory_encryption_op(struct kvm *kvm, void __user *argp)
{
struct kvm_sev_cmd sev_cmd;
@@ -5650,6 +5811,10 @@ static int svm_memory_encryption_op(struct kvm *kvm, void __user *argp)
r = sev_guest_init(kvm, &sev_cmd);
break;
}
+ case KVM_SEV_LAUNCH_START: {
+ r = sev_launch_start(kvm, &sev_cmd);
+ break;
+ }
default:
break;
}
--
2.9.4
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