linux-kernel - [RFC Part2 PATCH v3 17/26] KVM: SVM: Add support for SEV LAUNCH

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Date:   Mon, 24 Jul 2017 15:02:54 -0500
From:   Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@....com>
To:     linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org, x86@...nel.org, kvm@...r.kernel.org
Cc:     Thomas Gleixner <tglx@...utronix.de>, Borislav Petkov <bp@...e.de>,
        Joerg Roedel <joro@...tes.org>,
        "Michael S . Tsirkin" <mst@...hat.com>,
        Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@...hat.com>,
        \"Radim Krčmář\" 
        <rkrcmar@...hat.com>, Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@....com>,
        Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@....com>
Subject: [RFC Part2 PATCH v3 17/26] KVM: SVM: Add support for SEV LAUNCH_MEASURE command

The command is used to retrieve the measurement of memory encrypted
through the LAUNCH_UPDATE_DATA command. This measurement can be used
for attestation purposes.

Signed-off-by: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@....com>
---
 arch/x86/kvm/svm.c | 52 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 1 file changed, 52 insertions(+)

diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/svm.c b/arch/x86/kvm/svm.c
index 91b070f..9b672eb 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/svm.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/svm.c
@@ -5957,6 +5957,54 @@ static int sev_launch_update_data(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_sev_cmd *argp)
 	return ret;
 }
 
+static int sev_launch_measure(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_sev_cmd *argp)
+{
+	struct sev_data_launch_measure *data = NULL;
+	struct kvm_sev_launch_measure params;
+	void *addr = NULL;
+	int ret;
+
+	if (!sev_guest(kvm))
+		return -ENOTTY;
+
+	if (copy_from_user(&params, (void *)argp->data,
+				sizeof(struct kvm_sev_launch_measure)))
+		return -EFAULT;
+
+	data = kzalloc(sizeof(*data), GFP_KERNEL);
+	if (!data)
+		return -ENOMEM;
+
+	if (params.address && params.length) {
+		ret = -EFAULT;
+		addr = kzalloc(params.length, GFP_KERNEL);
+		if (!addr)
+			goto e_free;
+		data->address = __psp_pa(addr);
+		data->length = params.length;
+	}
+
+	data->handle = sev_get_handle(kvm);
+	ret = sev_issue_cmd(kvm, SEV_CMD_LAUNCH_MEASURE, data, &argp->error);
+
+	/* copy the measurement to userspace */
+	if (addr &&
+		copy_to_user((void *)params.address, addr, params.length)) {
+		ret = -EFAULT;
+		goto e_free;
+	}
+
+	params.length = data->length;
+	if (copy_to_user((void *)argp->data, &params,
+				sizeof(struct kvm_sev_launch_measure)))
+		ret = -EFAULT;
+
+e_free:
+	kfree(addr);
+	kfree(data);
+	return ret;
+}
+
 static int svm_memory_encryption_op(struct kvm *kvm, void __user *argp)
 {
 	struct kvm_sev_cmd sev_cmd;
@@ -5980,6 +6028,10 @@ static int svm_memory_encryption_op(struct kvm *kvm, void __user *argp)
 		r = sev_launch_update_data(kvm, &sev_cmd);
 		break;
 	}
+	case KVM_SEV_LAUNCH_MEASURE: {
+		r = sev_launch_measure(kvm, &sev_cmd);
+		break;
+	}
 	default:
 		break;
 	}
-- 
2.9.4