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Message-ID: <2a30f7bf-601b-f442-9664-7de5a1501206@linux.com>
Date: Tue, 25 Jul 2017 12:42:12 +0300
From: Alexander Popov <alex.popov@...ux.com>
To: Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@...ux-foundation.org>,
Christoph Lameter <cl@...ux.com>,
Pekka Enberg <penberg@...nel.org>,
David Rientjes <rientjes@...gle.com>,
Joonsoo Kim <iamjoonsoo.kim@....com>,
"Paul E. McKenney" <paulmck@...ux.vnet.ibm.com>,
Ingo Molnar <mingo@...nel.org>,
Josh Triplett <josh@...htriplett.org>,
Andy Lutomirski <luto@...nel.org>,
Nicolas Pitre <nicolas.pitre@...aro.org>,
Tejun Heo <tj@...nel.org>, Daniel Mack <daniel@...que.org>,
Sebastian Andrzej Siewior <bigeasy@...utronix.de>,
Sergey Senozhatsky <sergey.senozhatsky@...il.com>,
Helge Deller <deller@....de>, Rik van Riel <riel@...hat.com>,
linux-mm@...ck.org, Tycho Andersen <tycho@...ker.com>,
linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org, kernel-hardening@...ts.openwall.com,
alex.popov@...ux.com
Subject: Re: [v3] mm: Add SLUB free list pointer obfuscation
>From 86f4f1f6deb76849e00c761fa30eeb479f789c35 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Alexander Popov <alex.popov@...ux.com>
Date: Mon, 24 Jul 2017 23:16:28 +0300
Subject: [PATCH 2/2] mm/slub.c: add a naive detection of double free or
corruption
On 25.07.2017 00:17, Alexander Popov wrote:
> On 06.07.2017 03:27, Kees Cook wrote:
>> This SLUB free list pointer obfuscation code is modified from Brad
>> Spengler/PaX Team's code in the last public patch of grsecurity/PaX based
>> on my understanding of the code. Changes or omissions from the original
>> code are mine and don't reflect the original grsecurity/PaX code.
>>
>> This adds a per-cache random value to SLUB caches that is XORed with
>> their freelist pointer address and value. This adds nearly zero overhead
>> and frustrates the very common heap overflow exploitation method of
>> overwriting freelist pointers. A recent example of the attack is written
>> up here: http://cyseclabs.com/blog/cve-2016-6187-heap-off-by-one-exploit
>>
>> This is based on patches by Daniel Micay, and refactored to minimize the
>> use of #ifdef.
>
> Hello!
>
> This is an addition to the SLAB_FREELIST_HARDENED feature. I'm sending it
> according the discussion here:
> http://www.openwall.com/lists/kernel-hardening/2017/07/17/9
In my previous message my email client wrapped one line and corrupted the patch.
Excuse me for that. See the fixed patch below.
-- >8 --
Add an assertion similar to "fasttop" check in GNU C Library allocator
as a part of SLAB_FREELIST_HARDENED feature. An object added to a singly
linked freelist should not point to itself. That helps to detect some
double free errors (e.g. CVE-2017-2636) without slub_debug and KASAN.
Signed-off-by: Alexander Popov <alex.popov@...ux.com>
---
mm/slub.c | 4 ++++
1 file changed, 4 insertions(+)
diff --git a/mm/slub.c b/mm/slub.c
index c92d636..f39d06e 100644
--- a/mm/slub.c
+++ b/mm/slub.c
@@ -290,6 +290,10 @@ static inline void set_freepointer(struct kmem_cache *s, void *object, void *fp)
{
unsigned long freeptr_addr = (unsigned long)object + s->offset;
+#ifdef CONFIG_SLAB_FREELIST_HARDENED
+ BUG_ON(object == fp); /* naive detection of double free or corruption */
+#endif
+
*(void **)freeptr_addr = freelist_ptr(s, fp, freeptr_addr);
}
--
2.7.4
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