linux-kernel - Re: [Xen-devel] [PATCH v1] xen: get rid of paravirt op adjust_exception

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Date:   Wed, 26 Jul 2017 07:09:03 -0700
From:   Andy Lutomirski <luto@...capital.net>
To:     Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@...rix.com>
Cc:     Juergen Gross <jgross@...e.com>, X86 ML <x86@...nel.org>,
        "linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org" <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>,
        Ingo Molnar <mingo@...hat.com>,
        "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@...or.com>,
        "xen-devel@...ts.xenproject.org" <xen-devel@...ts.xenproject.org>,
        Boris Ostrovsky <boris.ostrovsky@...cle.com>,
        Thomas Gleixner <tglx@...utronix.de>
Subject: Re: [Xen-devel] [PATCH v1] xen: get rid of paravirt op adjust_exception_frame

On Wed, Jul 26, 2017 at 7:01 AM, Andrew Cooper
<andrew.cooper3@...rix.com> wrote:
> On 26/07/17 14:48, Andy Lutomirski wrote:
>>
>>>  /* Runs on exception stack */
>>> -ENTRY(nmi)
>>> -       /*
>>> -        * Fix up the exception frame if we're on Xen.
>>> -        * PARAVIRT_ADJUST_EXCEPTION_FRAME is guaranteed to push at most
>>> -        * one value to the stack on native, so it may clobber the rdx
>>> -        * scratch slot, but it won't clobber any of the important
>>> -        * slots past it.
>>> -        *
>>> -        * Xen is a different story, because the Xen frame itself overlaps
>>> -        * the "NMI executing" variable.
>>> -        */
>> I would keep this comment.  The Xen frame really is in the way AFAICT.
>
> (For reasons best explained by the original authors) there is only ever
> a single stack which a PV guest registers with Xen, which functions
> equivalently to tss.sp0.  There is no support for stack switching via
> task switch or IST.
>
> Therefore, nested NMIs won't clobber the top of this stack.
>

Does that mean that nested NMIs on Xen just nest normally without
clobbering each other?  If so, that's neat, although I wonder how we
don't get crashes due to this:

/* Normal 64-bit system call target */
ENTRY(xen_syscall_target)
        undo_xen_syscall
        <-- NMI right here
        jmp entry_SYSCALL_64_after_swapgs
ENDPROC(xen_syscall_target)

I think it would be nice if Xen could instead enter the native syscall
path a bit later like this:

ENTRY(entry_SYSCALL_64)
        /*
         * Interrupts are off on entry.
         * We do not frame this tiny irq-off block with TRACE_IRQS_OFF/ON,
         * it is too small to ever cause noticeable irq latency.
         */
        SWAPGS_UNSAFE_STACK
        /*
         * A hypervisor implementation might want to use a label
         * after the swapgs, so that it can do the swapgs
         * for the guest and jump here on syscall.
         */
GLOBAL(entry_SYSCALL_64_after_swapgs)

        movq    %rsp, PER_CPU_VAR(rsp_scratch)
        movq    PER_CPU_VAR(cpu_current_top_of_stack), %rsp

        TRACE_IRQS_OFF

        /* Construct struct pt_regs on stack */
        pushq   $__USER_DS                      /* pt_regs->ss */
        pushq   PER_CPU_VAR(rsp_scratch)        /* pt_regs->sp */
        pushq   %r11                            /* pt_regs->flags */
        pushq   $__USER_CS                      /* pt_regs->cs */
        pushq   %rcx                            /* pt_regs->ip */

<-- Xen enters here

then we wouldn't have all this funny business.  And Xen could
completely skip the nmi nesting code.