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Message-ID: <20170726200306.GB2692@obsidianresearch.com>
Date: Wed, 26 Jul 2017 14:03:06 -0600
From: Jason Gunthorpe <jgunthorpe@...idianresearch.com>
To: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@...uxfoundation.org>
Cc: Ben Hutchings <ben.hutchings@...ethink.co.uk>,
linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org, stable@...r.kernel.org,
Stefan Berger <stefanb@...ux.vnet.ibm.com>,
Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@...ux.intel.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH 4.4 40/57] tpm: Provide strong locking for device removal
On Wed, Jul 26, 2017 at 12:56:37PM -0700, Greg Kroah-Hartman wrote:
> On Tue, Jul 25, 2017 at 11:56:01PM +0100, Ben Hutchings wrote:
> > On Wed, 2017-07-19 at 13:12 +0200, Greg Kroah-Hartman wrote:
> > > 4.4-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
> > >
> > >
> > > From: Jason Gunthorpe <jgunthorpe@...idianresearch.com>
> > >
> > > commit 4e26195f240d73150e8308ae42874702e3df8d2c upstream.
> > >
> > > Add a read/write semaphore around the ops function pointers so
> > > ops can be set to null when the driver un-registers.
> > [...]
> > > @@ -49,10 +99,10 @@ struct tpm_chip *tpm_chip_find_get(int c
> > > if (chip_num != TPM_ANY_NUM && chip_num != pos->dev_num)
> > > continue;
> > >
> > > - if (try_module_get(pos->dev.parent->driver->owner)) {
> > > + /* rcu prevents chip from being free'd */
> > > + if (!tpm_try_get_ops(pos))
> > [...]
> >
> > But an RCU read-side critical section is an atomic context, and
> > semaphore operations can block! Fixed upstream by:
> >
> > commit 15516788e581eb32ec1c50e5f00aba3faf95d817
> > Author: Stefan Berger <stefanb@...ux.vnet.ibm.com>
> > Date: Mon Feb 29 08:53:02 2016 -0500
> >
> > tpm: Replace device number bitmap with IDR
>
> Ugh, that's a big patch.
>
> Jason, Stefan, and Jarkko, what do you think? Should I also take this
> for 4.4-stable?
15516 is part of the series that included 4e26, I wouldn't take that
series piecemeal, as Ben observes..
I think it would be safer to avoid all these backport patches and
instead restructure the important TPM shutdown patch so that it is
'less safe'. This would mean there is a chance that the another TPM
user could send a command after shutdown, but realistically that is
not likely to happen.
Jason
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