linux-kernel - Re: [PATCH v7 24/26] x86: Enable User-Mode Instruction Prevention

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Message-ID: <20170727135709.GD28553@nazgul.tnic>
Date:   Thu, 27 Jul 2017 15:57:09 +0200
From:   Borislav Petkov <bp@...e.de>
To:     Ricardo Neri <ricardo.neri-calderon@...ux.intel.com>
Cc:     Ingo Molnar <mingo@...hat.com>,
        Thomas Gleixner <tglx@...utronix.de>,
        "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@...or.com>,
        Andy Lutomirski <luto@...nel.org>,
        Peter Zijlstra <peterz@...radead.org>,
        Andrew Morton <akpm@...ux-foundation.org>,
        Brian Gerst <brgerst@...il.com>,
        Chris Metcalf <cmetcalf@...lanox.com>,
        Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@...ux.intel.com>,
        Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@...hat.com>,
        Masami Hiramatsu <mhiramat@...nel.org>,
        Huang Rui <ray.huang@....com>, Jiri Slaby <jslaby@...e.cz>,
        Jonathan Corbet <corbet@....net>,
        "Michael S. Tsirkin" <mst@...hat.com>,
        Paul Gortmaker <paul.gortmaker@...driver.com>,
        Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@...e.cz>,
        Chen Yucong <slaoub@...il.com>,
        Alexandre Julliard <julliard@...ehq.org>,
        Stas Sergeev <stsp@...t.ru>, Fenghua Yu <fenghua.yu@...el.com>,
        "Ravi V. Shankar" <ravi.v.shankar@...el.com>,
        Shuah Khan <shuah@...nel.org>, linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org,
        x86@...nel.org, linux-msdos@...r.kernel.org, wine-devel@...ehq.org,
        Tony Luck <tony.luck@...el.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v7 24/26] x86: Enable User-Mode Instruction Prevention

On Tue, Jul 25, 2017 at 05:44:08PM -0700, Ricardo Neri wrote:
> On Fri, 2017-06-09 at 18:10 +0200, Borislav Petkov wrote:
> > On Fri, May 05, 2017 at 11:17:22AM -0700, Ricardo Neri wrote:
> > > User_mode Instruction Prevention (UMIP) is enabled by setting/clearing a
> > > bit in %cr4.
> > > 
> > > It makes sense to enable UMIP at some point while booting, before user
> > > spaces come up. Like SMAP and SMEP, is not critical to have it enabled
> > > very early during boot. This is because UMIP is relevant only when there is
> > > a userspace to be protected from. Given the similarities in relevance, it
> > > makes sense to enable UMIP along with SMAP and SMEP.
> > > 
> > > UMIP is enabled by default. It can be disabled by adding clearcpuid=514
> > > to the kernel parameters.

...

> So would this become a y when more machines have UMIP?

I guess. Stuff which proves reliable and widespread gets automatically
enabled with time, in most cases. IMHO, of course.

> Why would static_cpu_has() reply wrong if alternatives are not in place?
> Because it uses the boot CPU data? When it calls _static_cpu_has() it
> would do something equivalent to

Nevermind - I forgot that static_cpu_has() now drops to dynamic check
before alternatives application.

-- 
Regards/Gruss,
    Boris.

SUSE Linux GmbH, GF: Felix Imendörffer, Jane Smithard, Graham Norton, HRB 21284 (AG Nürnberg)
--