linux-kernel - Re: [PATCH v2 1/3] kvm: svm: Add support for additional SVM NPF error codes

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Message-ID: <661faa8a-87af-743f-d3ea-b95ada0d7677@amd.com>
Date:   Tue, 1 Aug 2017 08:36:09 -0500
From:   Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@....com>
To:     Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@...hat.com>
Cc:     brijesh.singh@....com, kvm@...r.kernel.org,
        thomas lendacky <thomas.lendacky@....com>, rkrcmar@...hat.com,
        joro@...tes.org, x86@...nel.org, linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org,
        mingo@...hat.com, hpa@...or.com, tglx@...utronix.de, bp@...e.de
Subject: Re: [PATCH v2 1/3] kvm: svm: Add support for additional SVM NPF error
 codes



On 07/31/2017 03:05 PM, Paolo Bonzini wrote:
> 
>>> There can be different cases where an L0->L2 shadow nested page table is
>>> marked read only, in particular when a page is read only in L1's nested
>>> page tables.  If such a page is accessed by L2 while walking page tables
>>> it will cause a nested page fault (page table walks are write accesses).
>>>    However, after kvm_mmu_unprotect_page you will get another page fault,
>>> and again in an endless stream.
>>>
>>> Instead, emulation would have caused a nested page fault vmexit, I think.
>>
>> If possible could you please give me some pointer on how to create this use
>> case so that we can get definitive answer.
>>
>> Looking at the code path is giving me indication that the new code
>> (the kvm_mmu_unprotect_page call) only happens if vcpu->arch.mmu_page_fault()
>> returns an indication that the instruction should be emulated. I would not
>> expect that to be the case scenario you described above since L1 making a page
>> read-only (this is a page table for L2) is an error and should result in #NPF
>> being injected into L1.
> 
> The flow is:
> 
>    hardware walks page table; L2 page table points to read only memory
>    -> pf_interception (code =
>    -> kvm_handle_page_fault (need_unprotect = false)
>    -> kvm_mmu_page_fault
>    -> paging64_page_fault (for example)
>       -> try_async_pf
>          map_writable set to false
>       -> paging64_fetch(write_fault = true, map_writable = false, prefault = false)
>          -> mmu_set_spte(speculative = false, host_writable = false, write_fault = true)
>             -> set_spte
>                mmu_need_write_protect returns true
>                return true
>             write_fault == true -> set emulate = true
>             return true
>          return true
>       return true
>    emulate
> 
> Without this patch, emulation would have called
> 
>    ..._gva_to_gpa_nested
>    -> translate_nested_gpa
>    -> paging64_gva_to_gpa
>    -> paging64_walk_addr
>    -> paging64_walk_addr_generic
>       set fault (nested_page_fault=true)
> 
> and then:
> 
>     kvm_propagate_fault
>     -> nested_svm_inject_npf_exit
> 

maybe then safer thing would be to qualify the new error_code check with
!mmu_is_nested(vcpu) or something like that. So that way it would run on
L1 guest, and not the L2 guest. I believe that would restrict it avoid
hitting this case. Are you okay with this change ?

IIRC, the main place where this check was valuable was when L1 guest had
a fault (when coming out of the L2 guest) and emulation was not needed.

-Brijesh