linux-kernel - Re: [PATCH v5 3/3] KVM: nVMX: Emulate EPTP switching for the L1 hypervisor

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Message-ID: <20170801145531.GB302@flask>
Date:   Tue, 1 Aug 2017 16:55:31 +0200
From:   Radim Krčmář <rkrcmar@...hat.com>
To:     David Hildenbrand <david@...hat.com>
Cc:     Bandan Das <bsd@...hat.com>, kvm@...r.kernel.org,
        pbonzini@...hat.com, jmattson@...gle.com,
        linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH v5 3/3] KVM: nVMX: Emulate EPTP switching for the L1
 hypervisor

2017-08-01 13:40+0200, David Hildenbrand:
> On 31.07.2017 21:32, Bandan Das wrote:
> > David Hildenbrand <david@...hat.com> writes:
> >>> +	/* AD, if set, should be supported */
> >>> +	if ((address & VMX_EPT_AD_ENABLE_BIT)) {
> >>> +		if (!enable_ept_ad_bits)
> >>> +			return false;
> >>> +		mmu->ept_ad = true;
> >>> +	} else
> >>> +		mmu->ept_ad = false;

This block should also set the mmu->base_role.ad_disabled.

(The idea being that things should be done as if the EPTP was set during
 a VM entry.  The only notable difference is that we do not reload
 PDPTRS.)

> >> I wouldn't expect a "check" function to modify the mmu. Can you move
> >> modifying the mmu outside of this function (leaving the
> >> enable_ept_ad_bits check in place)? (and maybe even set mmu->ept_ad
> >> _after_ the kvm_mmu_unload(vcpu)?, just when setting vmcs12->ept_pointer?)
> >>
> > 
> > Well, the correct thing to do is have a wrapper around it in mmu.c
> > without directly calling here and also call this function before
> > nested_mmu is initialized. I am working on a separate patch for this btw.
> 
> Sounds good. Also thought that encapsulating this might be a good option.

Seconded. :)

> >>> +	if (vmcs12->ept_pointer != address) {
> >>> +		if (!check_ept_address_valid(vcpu, address)) {
> >>> +			kunmap(page);
> >>> +			nested_release_page_clean(page);
> >>> +			return 1;
> >>> +		}
> >>> +		kvm_mmu_unload(vcpu);
> >>> +		vmcs12->ept_pointer = address;
> >>> +		/*
> >>> +		 * TODO: Check what's the correct approach in case
> >>> +		 * mmu reload fails. Currently, we just let the next
> >>> +		 * reload potentially fail
> >>> +		 */
> >>> +		kvm_mmu_reload(vcpu);
> >>
> >> So, what actually happens if this generates a tripple fault? I guess we
> >> will kill the (nested) hypervisor?
> > 
> > Yes. Not sure what's the right thing to do is though...

Right, we even drop kvm_mmu_reload() here for now and let the one in
vcpu_enter_guest() take care of the thing.

> Wonder what happens on real hardware.

This operation cannot fail or real hardware.  All addresses within the
physical address limit return something when read.  On Intel, this is a
value with all bits set (-1) and will cause an EPT misconfiguration VM
exit on the next page walk (instruction decoding).

Thanks.