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Message-ID: <c081688e-3d88-c6c2-f53f-e2b10641e8f1@oracle.com>
Date: Tue, 1 Aug 2017 11:23:52 -0400
From: Boris Ostrovsky <boris.ostrovsky@...cle.com>
To: Stefano Stabellini <sstabellini@...nel.org>
Cc: xen-devel@...ts.xen.org, linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org,
jgross@...e.com, Stefano Stabellini <stefano@...reto.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v2 11/13] xen/pvcalls: implement release command
On 07/31/2017 06:34 PM, Stefano Stabellini wrote:
> On Thu, 27 Jul 2017, Boris Ostrovsky wrote:
>>> +int pvcalls_front_release(struct socket *sock)
>>> +{
>>> + struct pvcalls_bedata *bedata;
>>> + struct sock_mapping *map;
>>> + int req_id, notify;
>>> + struct xen_pvcalls_request *req;
>>> +
>>> + if (!pvcalls_front_dev)
>>> + return -EIO;
>>> + bedata = dev_get_drvdata(&pvcalls_front_dev->dev);
>>> + if (!bedata)
>>> + return -EIO;
>> Some (all?) other ops don't check bedata validity. Should they all do?
> No, I don't think they should: dev_set_drvdata is called in the probe
> function (pvcalls_front_probe). I'll remove it.
>
>
>>> +
>>> + if (sock->sk == NULL)
>>> + return 0;
>>> +
>>> + map = (struct sock_mapping *) READ_ONCE(sock->sk->sk_send_head);
>>> + if (map == NULL)
>>> + return 0;
>>> +
>>> + spin_lock(&bedata->pvcallss_lock);
>>> + req_id = bedata->ring.req_prod_pvt & (RING_SIZE(&bedata->ring) - 1);
>>> + if (RING_FULL(&bedata->ring) ||
>>> + READ_ONCE(bedata->rsp[req_id].req_id) != PVCALLS_INVALID_ID) {
>>> + spin_unlock(&bedata->pvcallss_lock);
>>> + return -EAGAIN;
>>> + }
>>> + WRITE_ONCE(sock->sk->sk_send_head, NULL);
>>> +
>>> + req = RING_GET_REQUEST(&bedata->ring, req_id);
>>> + req->req_id = req_id;
>>> + req->cmd = PVCALLS_RELEASE;
>>> + req->u.release.id = (uint64_t)sock;
>>> +
>>> + bedata->ring.req_prod_pvt++;
>>> + RING_PUSH_REQUESTS_AND_CHECK_NOTIFY(&bedata->ring, notify);
>>> + spin_unlock(&bedata->pvcallss_lock);
>>> + if (notify)
>>> + notify_remote_via_irq(bedata->irq);
>>> +
>>> + wait_event(bedata->inflight_req,
>>> + READ_ONCE(bedata->rsp[req_id].req_id) == req_id);
>>> +
>>> + if (map->active_socket) {
>>> + /*
>>> + * Set in_error and wake up inflight_conn_req to force
>>> + * recvmsg waiters to exit.
>>> + */
>>> + map->active.ring->in_error = -EBADF;
>>> + wake_up_interruptible(&map->active.inflight_conn_req);
>>> +
>>> + mutex_lock(&map->active.in_mutex);
>>> + mutex_lock(&map->active.out_mutex);
>>> + pvcalls_front_free_map(bedata, map);
>>> + mutex_unlock(&map->active.out_mutex);
>>> + mutex_unlock(&map->active.in_mutex);
>>> + kfree(map);
>> Since you are locking here I assume you expect that someone else might
>> also be trying to lock the map. But you are freeing it immediately after
>> unlocking. Wouldn't that mean that whoever is trying to grab the lock
>> might then dereference freed memory?
> The lock is to make sure there are no recvmsg or sendmsg in progress. We
> are sure that no newer sendmsg or recvmsg are waiting for
> pvcalls_front_release to release the lock because before send a message
> to the backend we set sk_send_head to NULL.
Is there a chance that whoever is potentially calling send/rcvmsg has
checked that sk_send_head is non-NULL but hasn't grabbed the lock yet?
Freeing a structure containing a lock right after releasing the lock
looks weird (to me). Is there any other way to synchronize with
sender/receiver? Any other lock?
BTW, I also noticed that in rcvmsg you are calling
wait_event_interruptible() while holding the lock. Have you tested with
CONFIG_DEBUG_ATOMIC_SLEEP? (or maybe it's some other config option that
would complain about those sorts of thing)
-boris
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