Message-Id: <1501714334.27872.38.camel@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Date:   Wed, 02 Aug 2017 18:52:14 -0400
From:   Mimi Zohar <zohar@...ux.vnet.ibm.com>
To:     Thiago Jung Bauermann <bauerman@...ux.vnet.ibm.com>
Cc:     linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org,
        linux-ima-devel@...ts.sourceforge.net, keyrings@...r.kernel.org,
        linux-crypto@...r.kernel.org, linuxppc-dev@...ts.ozlabs.org,
        linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org,
        Dmitry Kasatkin <dmitry.kasatkin@...il.com>,
        James Morris <james.l.morris@...cle.com>,
        "Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@...lyn.com>,
        David Howells <dhowells@...hat.com>,
        David Woodhouse <dwmw2@...radead.org>,
        Jessica Yu <jeyu@...hat.com>,
        Rusty Russell <rusty@...tcorp.com.au>,
        Herbert Xu <herbert@...dor.apana.org.au>,
        "David S. Miller" <davem@...emloft.net>,
        "AKASHI, Takahiro" <takahiro.akashi@...aro.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v3 7/7] ima: Support module-style appended signatures
 for appraisal

On Wed, 2017-08-02 at 14:42 -0300, Thiago Jung Bauermann wrote:
> Mimi Zohar <zohar@...ux.vnet.ibm.com> writes:
> 
> > On Thu, 2017-07-06 at 19:17 -0300, Thiago Jung Bauermann wrote:
> >> --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c
> >> +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c
> >> @@ -200,18 +200,40 @@ int ima_read_xattr(struct dentry *dentry,
> >>   */
> >>  int ima_appraise_measurement(enum ima_hooks func,
> >>  			     struct integrity_iint_cache *iint,
> >> -			     struct file *file, const unsigned char *filename,
> >> -			     struct evm_ima_xattr_data *xattr_value,
> >> -			     int xattr_len, int opened)
> >> +			     struct file *file, const void *buf, loff_t size,
> >> +			     const unsigned char *filename,
> >> +			     struct evm_ima_xattr_data **xattr_value_,
> >> +			     int *xattr_len_, int opened)
> >>  {
> >>  	static const char op[] = "appraise_data";
> >>  	char *cause = "unknown";
> >>  	struct dentry *dentry = file_dentry(file);
> >>  	struct inode *inode = d_backing_inode(dentry);
> >>  	enum integrity_status status = INTEGRITY_UNKNOWN;
> >> -	int rc = xattr_len, hash_start = 0;
> >> +	struct evm_ima_xattr_data *xattr_value = *xattr_value_;
> >> +	int xattr_len = *xattr_len_, rc = xattr_len, hash_start = 0;
> >> +	bool appraising_modsig = false;
> >> +	void *xattr_value_evm;
> >> +	size_t xattr_len_evm;
> >> +
> >> +	if (iint->flags & IMA_MODSIG_ALLOWED) {
> >> +		/*
> >> +		 * Not supposed to happen. Hooks that support modsig are
> >> +		 * whitelisted when parsing the policy using
> >> +		 * ima_hooks_supports_modsig.
> >> +		 */
> >> +		if (!buf || !size)
> >> +			WARN_ONCE(true, "%s doesn't support modsig\n",
> >> +				  func_tokens[func]);
> >
> > ima _appraise_measurement() is getting kind of long. Is there any
> > reason we can't move this comment and test to ima_read_modsig()?
> 
> I didn't do that because then I would need to pass func as an argument
> to ima_read_modsig just to print the warning above. But it does simplify
> the code so it may be worth it. I'll make that change in v4.

Makes sense.

> >> @@ -229,8 +251,24 @@ int ima_appraise_measurement(enum ima_hooks func,
> >>  		goto out;
> >>  	}
> >> 
> >> -	status = evm_verifyxattr(dentry, XATTR_NAME_IMA, xattr_value, rc, iint);
> >> -	if ((status != INTEGRITY_PASS) && (status != INTEGRITY_UNKNOWN)) {
> >> +	/*
> >> +	 * Appended signatures aren't protected by EVM but we still call
> >> +	 * evm_verifyxattr to check other security xattrs, if they exist.
> >> +	 */
> >> +	if (appraising_modsig) {
> >> +		xattr_value_evm = NULL;
> >> +		xattr_len_evm = 0;
> >> +	} else {
> >> +		xattr_value_evm = xattr_value;
> >> +		xattr_len_evm = xattr_len;
> >> +	}
> >> +
> >> +	status = evm_verifyxattr(dentry, XATTR_NAME_IMA, xattr_value_evm,
> >> +				 xattr_len_evm, iint);
> >> +	if (appraising_modsig && status == INTEGRITY_FAIL) {
> >> +		cause = "invalid-HMAC";
> >> +		goto out;
> >
> > "modsig" is special, because having any security xattrs is not
> > required. This test doesn't prevent status from being set to
> > "missing-HMAC". This test is redundant with the original tests below.
> 
> Indeed, that is wrong. I'm still a bit fuzzy about how EVM works and how
> it interacts with IMA. The only way I can think of singling out modsig
> without reintroduced the complex expression you didn't like in v2 is as
> below. What do you think?

The original code, without any extra tests, should be fine.

> 
> @@ -229,8 +241,25 @@ int ima_appraise_measurement(enum ima_hooks func,
>  		goto out;
>  	}
> 
> -	status = evm_verifyxattr(dentry, XATTR_NAME_IMA, xattr_value, rc, iint);
> -	if ((status != INTEGRITY_PASS) && (status != INTEGRITY_UNKNOWN)) {
> +	/*
> +	 * Appended signatures aren't protected by EVM but we still call
> +	 * evm_verifyxattr to check other security xattrs, if they exist.
> +	 */
> +	if (appraising_modsig) {
> +		xattr_value_evm = NULL;
> +		xattr_len_evm = 0;
> +	} else {
> +		xattr_value_evm = xattr_value;
> +		xattr_len_evm = xattr_len;
> +	}
> +
> +	status = evm_verifyxattr(dentry, XATTR_NAME_IMA, xattr_value_evm,
> +				 xattr_len_evm, iint);
> +	if (appraising_modsig && (status == INTEGRITY_NOLABEL
> +				  || status == INTEGRITY_NOXATTRS))
> +		/* It's ok if there's no xattr in the case of modsig. */
> +		;
> +	else if (status != INTEGRITY_PASS && status != INTEGRITY_UNKNOWN) {
>  		if ((status == INTEGRITY_NOLABEL)
>  		    || (status == INTEGRITY_NOXATTRS))
>  			cause = "missing-HMAC";
> 
> >> +	} else if (status != INTEGRITY_PASS && status != INTEGRITY_UNKNOWN) {
> >>  		if ((status == INTEGRITY_NOLABEL)
> >>  		    || (status == INTEGRITY_NOXATTRS))
> >>  			cause = "missing-HMAC";
> >> @@ -281,6 +319,43 @@ int ima_appraise_measurement(enum ima_hooks func,
> >>  			status = INTEGRITY_PASS;
> >>  		}
> >
> > Calling evm_verifyxattr() with the IMA xattr value prevents EVM from
> > having to re-read the IMA xattr, but isn't necessary.On modsig
> > signature verification failure, calling evm_verifyxattr() a second
> > time isn't necessary.
> 
> So even for the IMA xattr sig case, the evm_verifyxattr call in
> ima_appraise_measurement is an optimization and can be skipped?

Right, it is just an optimization.  The evm xattr needs to be verified
just once.

> >> +	case IMA_MODSIG:
> >> +		/*
> >> +		 * To avoid being tricked into recursion, we don't allow a
> >> +		 * modsig stored in the xattr.
> >> +		 */
> >> +		if (!appraising_modsig) {
> >> +			status = INTEGRITY_UNKNOWN;
> >> +			cause = "unknown-ima-data";
> >> +
> >> +			break;
> >> +		}
> >> +
> >> +		rc = ima_modsig_verify(INTEGRITY_KEYRING_IMA, xattr_value);
> >> +		if (!rc) {
> >> +			iint->flags |= IMA_DIGSIG;
> >> +			status = 
> >> +
> >> +			kfree(*xattr_value_);
> >> +			*xattr_value_ = xattr_value;
> >> +			*xattr_len_ = xattr_len;
> >> +
> >> +			break;
> >> +		}
> >
> > When including the appended signature in the measurement list, the
> > corresponding file hash needs to be included in the measurement list,
> > which might be different than the previously calculated file hash
> > based on the hash algorithm as defined in the IMA xattr.
> >
> > Including the file hash and signature in the measurement list allows
> I> the attestation server, with just a public key, to verify the file
> > signature against the file hash. No need for a white list.
> >
> > ima_modsig_verify() must calculate the file hash in order to verify
> > the file signature. This file hash value somehow needs to be returned
> > in order for it to be included in the measurement list.
> 
> In that case, patch 6/7 "ima: Store measurement after appraisal" isn't
> enough and we have to go back to v2's change in ima_main.c which ties
> together the collect and appraise steps in process_measurement (In that
> version I called the function measure_and_appraise but it should be
> called collect_and_appraise instead). That is because if the modsig
> verification fails, the hash needs to be recalculated for the xattr
> signature verification.

> Either that, or I add another call to ima_collect_measurement inside
> ima_appraise_measurement if the modsig verification fails. Which do you
> prefer?

The file hash (without the appended signature) is already being
calculated by verify_pkcs7_message_sig().  There's no reason to
calculate it twice.

If the appended signature verification succeeds, that means the file
hash stored in the appended signature was valid.  Somehow we need
access to sig->digest, sig->digest_size and sig->hash_algo, which was
compared against the calculated hash.  Refer to
public_key_verify_signature().

Mimi

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