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Message-ID: <cc04e6c2-9a8e-c372-903e-df88060ff629@canonical.com>
Date: Fri, 4 Aug 2017 17:57:11 -0500
From: Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@...onical.com>
To: Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@...capital.net>,
Will Drewry <wad@...omium.org>,
Paul Moore <paul@...l-moore.com>,
Eric Paris <eparis@...hat.com>,
John Crispin <john@...ozen.org>, linux-audit@...hat.com,
LKML <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>,
Linux API <linux-api@...r.kernel.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v5 5/6] seccomp: Action to log before allowing
On 08/03/2017 11:56 AM, Kees Cook wrote:
> On Fri, Jul 28, 2017 at 1:55 PM, Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@...onical.com> wrote:
>> Add a new action, SECCOMP_RET_LOG, that logs a syscall before allowing
>> the syscall. At the implementation level, this action is identical to
>> the existing SECCOMP_RET_ALLOW action. However, it can be very useful when
>> initially developing a seccomp filter for an application. The developer
>> can set the default action to be SECCOMP_RET_LOG, maybe mark any
>> obviously needed syscalls with SECCOMP_RET_ALLOW, and then put the
>> application through its paces. A list of syscalls that triggered the
>> default action (SECCOMP_RET_LOG) can be easily gleaned from the logs and
>> that list can be used to build the syscall whitelist. Finally, the
>> developer can change the default action to the desired value.
>>
>> This provides a more friendly experience than seeing the application get
>> killed, then updating the filter and rebuilding the app, seeing the
>> application get killed due to a different syscall, then updating the
>> filter and rebuilding the app, etc.
>>
>> The functionality is similar to what's supported by the various LSMs.
>> SELinux has permissive mode, AppArmor has complain mode, SMACK has
>> bring-up mode, etc.
>>
>> SECCOMP_RET_LOG is given a lower value than SECCOMP_RET_ALLOW as allow
>> while logging is slightly more restrictive than quietly allowing.
>>
>> Unfortunately, the tests added for SECCOMP_RET_LOG are not capable of
>> inspecting the audit log to verify that the syscall was logged.
>>
>> Signed-off-by: Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@...onical.com>
>> ---
>>
>> * Change since v4:
>> - folded the previously separate selftest patch into this patch
>> - add TODO to verify that RET_LOG generates log messages in selftests
>> - adjust for new reStructuredText format
>>
>> Documentation/userspace-api/seccomp_filter.rst | 6 ++
>> include/uapi/linux/seccomp.h | 1 +
>> kernel/seccomp.c | 17 ++++-
>> tools/testing/selftests/seccomp/seccomp_bpf.c | 97 +++++++++++++++++++++++++-
>> 4 files changed, 118 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
>>
>> diff --git a/Documentation/userspace-api/seccomp_filter.rst b/Documentation/userspace-api/seccomp_filter.rst
>> index 2d1d8ab..2ece856 100644
>> --- a/Documentation/userspace-api/seccomp_filter.rst
>> +++ b/Documentation/userspace-api/seccomp_filter.rst
>> @@ -141,6 +141,12 @@ In precedence order, they are:
>> allow use of ptrace, even of other sandboxed processes, without
>> extreme care; ptracers can use this mechanism to escape.)
>>
>> +``SECCOMP_RET_LOG``:
>> + Results in the system call being executed after it is logged. This
>> + should be used by application developers to learn which syscalls their
>> + application needs without having to iterate through multiple test and
>> + development cycles to build the list.
>
> Perhaps this should note that it'll only be logged if the admin has
> left the default sysctl value alone.
>
Good idea. I'll add something about that.
Tyler
>> +
>> ``SECCOMP_RET_ALLOW``:
>> Results in the system call being executed.
>>
>> diff --git a/include/uapi/linux/seccomp.h b/include/uapi/linux/seccomp.h
>> index 19a611d..f944332 100644
>> --- a/include/uapi/linux/seccomp.h
>> +++ b/include/uapi/linux/seccomp.h
>> @@ -31,6 +31,7 @@
>> #define SECCOMP_RET_TRAP 0x00030000U /* disallow and force a SIGSYS */
>> #define SECCOMP_RET_ERRNO 0x00050000U /* returns an errno */
>> #define SECCOMP_RET_TRACE 0x7ff00000U /* pass to a tracer or disallow */
>> +#define SECCOMP_RET_LOG 0x7ffc0000U /* allow after logging */
>> #define SECCOMP_RET_ALLOW 0x7fff0000U /* allow */
>>
>> /* Masks for the return value sections. */
>> diff --git a/kernel/seccomp.c b/kernel/seccomp.c
>> index 03ad3ba..c12d3dd 100644
>> --- a/kernel/seccomp.c
>> +++ b/kernel/seccomp.c
>> @@ -533,10 +533,12 @@ static void seccomp_send_sigsys(int syscall, int reason)
>> #define SECCOMP_LOG_TRAP (1 << 2)
>> #define SECCOMP_LOG_ERRNO (1 << 3)
>> #define SECCOMP_LOG_TRACE (1 << 4)
>> -#define SECCOMP_LOG_ALLOW (1 << 5)
>> +#define SECCOMP_LOG_LOG (1 << 5)
>> +#define SECCOMP_LOG_ALLOW (1 << 6)
>>
>> static u32 seccomp_actions_logged = SECCOMP_LOG_KILL | SECCOMP_LOG_TRAP |
>> - SECCOMP_LOG_ERRNO | SECCOMP_LOG_TRACE;
>> + SECCOMP_LOG_ERRNO | SECCOMP_LOG_TRACE |
>> + SECCOMP_LOG_LOG;
>>
>> static inline void seccomp_log(unsigned long syscall, long signr, u32 action,
>> bool requested)
>> @@ -554,6 +556,9 @@ static inline void seccomp_log(unsigned long syscall, long signr, u32 action,
>> case SECCOMP_RET_TRACE:
>> log = seccomp_actions_logged & SECCOMP_LOG_TRACE;
>> break;
>> + case SECCOMP_RET_LOG:
>> + log = seccomp_actions_logged & SECCOMP_LOG_LOG;
>> + break;
>> case SECCOMP_RET_ALLOW:
>> log = false;
>> break;
>> @@ -701,6 +706,10 @@ static int __seccomp_filter(int this_syscall, const struct seccomp_data *sd,
>>
>> return 0;
>>
>> + case SECCOMP_RET_LOG:
>> + seccomp_log(this_syscall, 0, action, true);
>> + return 0;
>> +
>> case SECCOMP_RET_ALLOW:
>> return 0;
>>
>> @@ -870,6 +879,7 @@ static long seccomp_get_action_avail(const char __user *uaction)
>> case SECCOMP_RET_TRAP:
>> case SECCOMP_RET_ERRNO:
>> case SECCOMP_RET_TRACE:
>> + case SECCOMP_RET_LOG:
>> case SECCOMP_RET_ALLOW:
>> break;
>> default:
>> @@ -1020,12 +1030,14 @@ long seccomp_get_filter(struct task_struct *task, unsigned long filter_off,
>> #define SECCOMP_RET_TRAP_NAME "trap"
>> #define SECCOMP_RET_ERRNO_NAME "errno"
>> #define SECCOMP_RET_TRACE_NAME "trace"
>> +#define SECCOMP_RET_LOG_NAME "log"
>> #define SECCOMP_RET_ALLOW_NAME "allow"
>>
>> static const char seccomp_actions_avail[] = SECCOMP_RET_KILL_NAME " "
>> SECCOMP_RET_TRAP_NAME " "
>> SECCOMP_RET_ERRNO_NAME " "
>> SECCOMP_RET_TRACE_NAME " "
>> + SECCOMP_RET_LOG_NAME " "
>> SECCOMP_RET_ALLOW_NAME;
>>
>> #define SECCOMP_ACTIONS_AVAIL_LEN strlen(seccomp_actions_avail)
>> @@ -1040,6 +1052,7 @@ static const struct seccomp_log_name seccomp_log_names[] = {
>> { SECCOMP_LOG_TRAP, SECCOMP_RET_TRAP_NAME },
>> { SECCOMP_LOG_ERRNO, SECCOMP_RET_ERRNO_NAME },
>> { SECCOMP_LOG_TRACE, SECCOMP_RET_TRACE_NAME },
>> + { SECCOMP_LOG_LOG, SECCOMP_RET_LOG_NAME },
>> { SECCOMP_LOG_ALLOW, SECCOMP_RET_ALLOW_NAME },
>> { }
>> };
>> diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/seccomp/seccomp_bpf.c b/tools/testing/selftests/seccomp/seccomp_bpf.c
>> index 8f0872b..040e875 100644
>> --- a/tools/testing/selftests/seccomp/seccomp_bpf.c
>> +++ b/tools/testing/selftests/seccomp/seccomp_bpf.c
>> @@ -87,6 +87,10 @@ struct seccomp_data {
>> };
>> #endif
>>
>> +#ifndef SECCOMP_RET_LOG
>> +#define SECCOMP_RET_LOG 0x7ffc0000U /* allow after logging */
>> +#endif
>> +
>> #if __BYTE_ORDER == __LITTLE_ENDIAN
>> #define syscall_arg(_n) (offsetof(struct seccomp_data, args[_n]))
>> #elif __BYTE_ORDER == __BIG_ENDIAN
>> @@ -342,6 +346,28 @@ TEST(empty_prog)
>> EXPECT_EQ(EINVAL, errno);
>> }
>>
>> +TEST(log_all)
>> +{
>> + struct sock_filter filter[] = {
>> + BPF_STMT(BPF_RET|BPF_K, SECCOMP_RET_LOG),
>> + };
>> + struct sock_fprog prog = {
>> + .len = (unsigned short)ARRAY_SIZE(filter),
>> + .filter = filter,
>> + };
>> + long ret;
>> + pid_t parent = getppid();
>> +
>> + ret = prctl(PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS, 1, 0, 0, 0);
>> + ASSERT_EQ(0, ret);
>> +
>> + ret = prctl(PR_SET_SECCOMP, SECCOMP_MODE_FILTER, &prog);
>> + ASSERT_EQ(0, ret);
>> +
>> + /* getppid() should succeed and be logged (no check for logging) */
>> + EXPECT_EQ(parent, syscall(__NR_getppid));
>> +}
>> +
>> TEST_SIGNAL(unknown_ret_is_kill_inside, SIGSYS)
>> {
>> struct sock_filter filter[] = {
>> @@ -735,6 +761,7 @@ TEST_F(TRAP, handler)
>>
>> FIXTURE_DATA(precedence) {
>> struct sock_fprog allow;
>> + struct sock_fprog log;
>> struct sock_fprog trace;
>> struct sock_fprog error;
>> struct sock_fprog trap;
>> @@ -746,6 +773,13 @@ FIXTURE_SETUP(precedence)
>> struct sock_filter allow_insns[] = {
>> BPF_STMT(BPF_RET|BPF_K, SECCOMP_RET_ALLOW),
>> };
>> + struct sock_filter log_insns[] = {
>> + BPF_STMT(BPF_LD|BPF_W|BPF_ABS,
>> + offsetof(struct seccomp_data, nr)),
>> + BPF_JUMP(BPF_JMP|BPF_JEQ|BPF_K, __NR_getpid, 1, 0),
>> + BPF_STMT(BPF_RET|BPF_K, SECCOMP_RET_ALLOW),
>> + BPF_STMT(BPF_RET|BPF_K, SECCOMP_RET_LOG),
>> + };
>> struct sock_filter trace_insns[] = {
>> BPF_STMT(BPF_LD|BPF_W|BPF_ABS,
>> offsetof(struct seccomp_data, nr)),
>> @@ -782,6 +816,7 @@ FIXTURE_SETUP(precedence)
>> memcpy(self->_x.filter, &_x##_insns, sizeof(_x##_insns)); \
>> self->_x.len = (unsigned short)ARRAY_SIZE(_x##_insns)
>> FILTER_ALLOC(allow);
>> + FILTER_ALLOC(log);
>> FILTER_ALLOC(trace);
>> FILTER_ALLOC(error);
>> FILTER_ALLOC(trap);
>> @@ -792,6 +827,7 @@ FIXTURE_TEARDOWN(precedence)
>> {
>> #define FILTER_FREE(_x) if (self->_x.filter) free(self->_x.filter)
>> FILTER_FREE(allow);
>> + FILTER_FREE(log);
>> FILTER_FREE(trace);
>> FILTER_FREE(error);
>> FILTER_FREE(trap);
>> @@ -809,6 +845,8 @@ TEST_F(precedence, allow_ok)
>>
>> ret = prctl(PR_SET_SECCOMP, SECCOMP_MODE_FILTER, &self->allow);
>> ASSERT_EQ(0, ret);
>> + ret = prctl(PR_SET_SECCOMP, SECCOMP_MODE_FILTER, &self->log);
>> + ASSERT_EQ(0, ret);
>> ret = prctl(PR_SET_SECCOMP, SECCOMP_MODE_FILTER, &self->trace);
>> ASSERT_EQ(0, ret);
>> ret = prctl(PR_SET_SECCOMP, SECCOMP_MODE_FILTER, &self->error);
>> @@ -833,6 +871,8 @@ TEST_F_SIGNAL(precedence, kill_is_highest, SIGSYS)
>>
>> ret = prctl(PR_SET_SECCOMP, SECCOMP_MODE_FILTER, &self->allow);
>> ASSERT_EQ(0, ret);
>> + ret = prctl(PR_SET_SECCOMP, SECCOMP_MODE_FILTER, &self->log);
>> + ASSERT_EQ(0, ret);
>> ret = prctl(PR_SET_SECCOMP, SECCOMP_MODE_FILTER, &self->trace);
>> ASSERT_EQ(0, ret);
>> ret = prctl(PR_SET_SECCOMP, SECCOMP_MODE_FILTER, &self->error);
>> @@ -864,6 +904,8 @@ TEST_F_SIGNAL(precedence, kill_is_highest_in_any_order, SIGSYS)
>> ASSERT_EQ(0, ret);
>> ret = prctl(PR_SET_SECCOMP, SECCOMP_MODE_FILTER, &self->error);
>> ASSERT_EQ(0, ret);
>> + ret = prctl(PR_SET_SECCOMP, SECCOMP_MODE_FILTER, &self->log);
>> + ASSERT_EQ(0, ret);
>> ret = prctl(PR_SET_SECCOMP, SECCOMP_MODE_FILTER, &self->trace);
>> ASSERT_EQ(0, ret);
>> ret = prctl(PR_SET_SECCOMP, SECCOMP_MODE_FILTER, &self->trap);
>> @@ -885,6 +927,8 @@ TEST_F_SIGNAL(precedence, trap_is_second, SIGSYS)
>>
>> ret = prctl(PR_SET_SECCOMP, SECCOMP_MODE_FILTER, &self->allow);
>> ASSERT_EQ(0, ret);
>> + ret = prctl(PR_SET_SECCOMP, SECCOMP_MODE_FILTER, &self->log);
>> + ASSERT_EQ(0, ret);
>> ret = prctl(PR_SET_SECCOMP, SECCOMP_MODE_FILTER, &self->trace);
>> ASSERT_EQ(0, ret);
>> ret = prctl(PR_SET_SECCOMP, SECCOMP_MODE_FILTER, &self->error);
>> @@ -910,6 +954,8 @@ TEST_F_SIGNAL(precedence, trap_is_second_in_any_order, SIGSYS)
>> ASSERT_EQ(0, ret);
>> ret = prctl(PR_SET_SECCOMP, SECCOMP_MODE_FILTER, &self->trap);
>> ASSERT_EQ(0, ret);
>> + ret = prctl(PR_SET_SECCOMP, SECCOMP_MODE_FILTER, &self->log);
>> + ASSERT_EQ(0, ret);
>> ret = prctl(PR_SET_SECCOMP, SECCOMP_MODE_FILTER, &self->trace);
>> ASSERT_EQ(0, ret);
>> ret = prctl(PR_SET_SECCOMP, SECCOMP_MODE_FILTER, &self->error);
>> @@ -931,6 +977,8 @@ TEST_F(precedence, errno_is_third)
>>
>> ret = prctl(PR_SET_SECCOMP, SECCOMP_MODE_FILTER, &self->allow);
>> ASSERT_EQ(0, ret);
>> + ret = prctl(PR_SET_SECCOMP, SECCOMP_MODE_FILTER, &self->log);
>> + ASSERT_EQ(0, ret);
>> ret = prctl(PR_SET_SECCOMP, SECCOMP_MODE_FILTER, &self->trace);
>> ASSERT_EQ(0, ret);
>> ret = prctl(PR_SET_SECCOMP, SECCOMP_MODE_FILTER, &self->error);
>> @@ -949,6 +997,8 @@ TEST_F(precedence, errno_is_third_in_any_order)
>> ret = prctl(PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS, 1, 0, 0, 0);
>> ASSERT_EQ(0, ret);
>>
>> + ret = prctl(PR_SET_SECCOMP, SECCOMP_MODE_FILTER, &self->log);
>> + ASSERT_EQ(0, ret);
>> ret = prctl(PR_SET_SECCOMP, SECCOMP_MODE_FILTER, &self->error);
>> ASSERT_EQ(0, ret);
>> ret = prctl(PR_SET_SECCOMP, SECCOMP_MODE_FILTER, &self->trace);
>> @@ -971,6 +1021,8 @@ TEST_F(precedence, trace_is_fourth)
>>
>> ret = prctl(PR_SET_SECCOMP, SECCOMP_MODE_FILTER, &self->allow);
>> ASSERT_EQ(0, ret);
>> + ret = prctl(PR_SET_SECCOMP, SECCOMP_MODE_FILTER, &self->log);
>> + ASSERT_EQ(0, ret);
>> ret = prctl(PR_SET_SECCOMP, SECCOMP_MODE_FILTER, &self->trace);
>> ASSERT_EQ(0, ret);
>> /* Should work just fine. */
>> @@ -992,12 +1044,54 @@ TEST_F(precedence, trace_is_fourth_in_any_order)
>> ASSERT_EQ(0, ret);
>> ret = prctl(PR_SET_SECCOMP, SECCOMP_MODE_FILTER, &self->allow);
>> ASSERT_EQ(0, ret);
>> + ret = prctl(PR_SET_SECCOMP, SECCOMP_MODE_FILTER, &self->log);
>> + ASSERT_EQ(0, ret);
>> /* Should work just fine. */
>> EXPECT_EQ(parent, syscall(__NR_getppid));
>> /* No ptracer */
>> EXPECT_EQ(-1, syscall(__NR_getpid));
>> }
>>
>> +TEST_F(precedence, log_is_fifth)
>> +{
>> + pid_t mypid, parent;
>> + long ret;
>> +
>> + mypid = getpid();
>> + parent = getppid();
>> + ret = prctl(PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS, 1, 0, 0, 0);
>> + ASSERT_EQ(0, ret);
>> +
>> + ret = prctl(PR_SET_SECCOMP, SECCOMP_MODE_FILTER, &self->allow);
>> + ASSERT_EQ(0, ret);
>> + ret = prctl(PR_SET_SECCOMP, SECCOMP_MODE_FILTER, &self->log);
>> + ASSERT_EQ(0, ret);
>> + /* Should work just fine. */
>> + EXPECT_EQ(parent, syscall(__NR_getppid));
>> + /* Should also work just fine */
>> + EXPECT_EQ(mypid, syscall(__NR_getpid));
>> +}
>> +
>> +TEST_F(precedence, log_is_fifth_in_any_order)
>> +{
>> + pid_t mypid, parent;
>> + long ret;
>> +
>> + mypid = getpid();
>> + parent = getppid();
>> + ret = prctl(PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS, 1, 0, 0, 0);
>> + ASSERT_EQ(0, ret);
>> +
>> + ret = prctl(PR_SET_SECCOMP, SECCOMP_MODE_FILTER, &self->log);
>> + ASSERT_EQ(0, ret);
>> + ret = prctl(PR_SET_SECCOMP, SECCOMP_MODE_FILTER, &self->allow);
>> + ASSERT_EQ(0, ret);
>> + /* Should work just fine. */
>> + EXPECT_EQ(parent, syscall(__NR_getppid));
>> + /* Should also work just fine */
>> + EXPECT_EQ(mypid, syscall(__NR_getpid));
>> +}
>> +
>> #ifndef PTRACE_O_TRACESECCOMP
>> #define PTRACE_O_TRACESECCOMP 0x00000080
>> #endif
>> @@ -2494,7 +2588,7 @@ TEST(get_action_avail)
>> {
>> __u32 actions[] = { SECCOMP_RET_KILL, SECCOMP_RET_TRAP,
>> SECCOMP_RET_ERRNO, SECCOMP_RET_TRACE,
>> - SECCOMP_RET_ALLOW };
>> + SECCOMP_RET_LOG, SECCOMP_RET_ALLOW };
>> __u32 unknown_action = 0x10000000U;
>> int i;
>> long ret;
>> @@ -2531,6 +2625,7 @@ TEST(get_action_avail)
>> * - 64-bit arg prodding
>> * - arch value testing (x86 modes especially)
>> * - verify that FILTER_FLAG_LOG filters generate log messages
>> + * - verify that RET_LOG generates log messages
>> * - ...
>> */
>>
>> --
>> 2.7.4
>>
>
> Test updates look great, thanks!
>
> -Kees
>
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