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Date: Tue, 8 Aug 2017 09:52:11 -0700
From: Matthew Wilcox <willy@...radead.org>
To: Rik van Riel <riel@...hat.com>
Cc: Mike Kravetz <mike.kravetz@...cle.com>,
Florian Weimer <fweimer@...hat.com>,
linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org, linux-mm@...ck.org,
colm@...costs.net, akpm@...ux-foundation.org,
keescook@...omium.org, luto@...capital.net, wad@...omium.org,
mingo@...nel.org, kirill@...temov.name, dave.hansen@...el.com
Subject: Re: [PATCH v2 0/2] mm,fork,security: introduce MADV_WIPEONFORK
On Tue, Aug 08, 2017 at 11:46:08AM -0400, Rik van Riel wrote:
> On Tue, 2017-08-08 at 08:19 -0700, Mike Kravetz wrote:
> > If the use case is fairly specific, then perhaps it makes sense to
> > make MADV_WIPEONFORK not applicable (EINVAL) for mappings where the
> > result is 'questionable'.
>
> That would be a question for Florian and Colm.
>
> If they are OK with MADV_WIPEONFORK only working on
> anonymous VMAs (no file mapping), that certainly could
> be implemented.
>
> On the other hand, I am not sure that introducing cases
> where MADV_WIPEONFORK does not implement wipe-on-fork
> semantics would reduce user confusion...
It'll simply do exactly what it does today, so it won't introduce any
new fallback code.
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