linux-kernel - [ANNOUNCE] Git v2.14.1, v2.13.5, and others

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Message-ID: <xmqqh8xf482j.fsf@gitster.mtv.corp.google.com>
Date:   Thu, 10 Aug 2017 11:00:04 -0700
From:   Junio C Hamano <gitster@...ox.com>
To:     git@...r.kernel.org
Cc:     Linux Kernel <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>
Subject: [ANNOUNCE] Git v2.14.1, v2.13.5, and others

The latest maintenance release Git v2.14.1 is now available at the
usual places, together with releases for older maintenance track for
the same issue: v2.7.6, v2.8.6, v2.9.5, v2.10.4, v2.11.3, v2.12.4,
and v2.13.5.

These contain a security fix for CVE-2017-1000117, and are released
in coordination with Subversion and Mercurial that share a similar
issue.  CVE-2017-9800 and CVE-2017-1000116 are assigned to these
systems, respectively, for issues similar to it that are now
addressed in their part of this coordinated release.

The tarballs are found at:

    https://www.kernel.org/pub/software/scm/git/

The following public repositories all have a copy of these tags:

  url = https://kernel.googlesource.com/pub/scm/git/git
  url = git://repo.or.cz/alt-git.git
  url = https://github.com/gitster/git

A malicious third-party can give a crafted "ssh://..." URL to an
unsuspecting victim, and an attempt to visit the URL can result in
any program that exists on the victim's machine being executed.
Such a URL could be placed in the .gitmodules file of a malicious
project, and an unsuspecting victim could be tricked into running
"git clone --recurse-submodules" to trigger the vulnerability.

Credits to find and fix the issue go to Brian Neel at GitLab, Joern
Schneeweisz of Recurity Labs and Jeff King at GitHub.

 * A "ssh://..." URL can result in a "ssh" command line with a
   hostname that begins with a dash "-", which would cause the "ssh"
   command to instead (mis)treat it as an option.  This is now
   prevented by forbidding such a hostname (which should not impact
   any real-world usage).

 * Similarly, when GIT_PROXY_COMMAND is configured, the command is
   run with host and port that are parsed out from "ssh://..." URL;
   a poorly written GIT_PROXY_COMMAND could be tricked into treating
   a string that begins with a dash "-" as an option.  This is now
   prevented by forbidding such a hostname and port number (again,
   which should not impact any real-world usage).

 * In the same spirit, a repository name that begins with a dash "-"
   is also forbidden now.