[<prev] [next>] [<thread-prev] [thread-next>] [day] [month] [year] [list]
Message-Id: <1502426037-3777-3-git-send-email-tyhicks@canonical.com>
Date: Fri, 11 Aug 2017 04:33:53 +0000
From: Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@...onical.com>
To: Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@...capital.net>,
Will Drewry <wad@...omium.org>,
Paul Moore <paul@...l-moore.com>,
Eric Paris <eparis@...hat.com>,
John Crispin <john@...ozen.org>,
Tycho Andersen <tycho@...ker.com>, linux-audit@...hat.com,
linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org, linux-api@...r.kernel.org
Subject: [PATCH v6 2/6] seccomp: Operation for checking if an action is available
Userspace code that needs to check if the kernel supports a given action
may not be able to use the /proc/sys/kernel/seccomp/actions_avail
sysctl. The process may be running in a sandbox and, therefore,
sufficient filesystem access may not be available. This patch adds an
operation to the seccomp(2) syscall that allows userspace code to ask
the kernel if a given action is available.
If the action is supported by the kernel, 0 is returned. If the action
is not supported by the kernel, -1 is returned with errno set to
-EOPNOTSUPP. If this check is attempted on a kernel that doesn't support
this new operation, -1 is returned with errno set to -EINVAL meaning
that userspace code will have the ability to differentiate between the
two error cases.
Signed-off-by: Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@...onical.com>
Suggested-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@...capital.net>
---
include/uapi/linux/seccomp.h | 5 ++--
kernel/seccomp.c | 26 +++++++++++++++++++
tools/testing/selftests/seccomp/seccomp_bpf.c | 36 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++
3 files changed, 65 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
diff --git a/include/uapi/linux/seccomp.h b/include/uapi/linux/seccomp.h
index 4b75d8c..95d20d2 100644
--- a/include/uapi/linux/seccomp.h
+++ b/include/uapi/linux/seccomp.h
@@ -11,8 +11,9 @@
#define SECCOMP_MODE_FILTER 2 /* uses user-supplied filter. */
/* Valid operations for seccomp syscall. */
-#define SECCOMP_SET_MODE_STRICT 0
-#define SECCOMP_SET_MODE_FILTER 1
+#define SECCOMP_SET_MODE_STRICT 0
+#define SECCOMP_SET_MODE_FILTER 1
+#define SECCOMP_GET_ACTION_AVAIL 2
/* Valid flags for SECCOMP_SET_MODE_FILTER */
#define SECCOMP_FILTER_FLAG_TSYNC 1
diff --git a/kernel/seccomp.c b/kernel/seccomp.c
index ee77eb3..1e57eff 100644
--- a/kernel/seccomp.c
+++ b/kernel/seccomp.c
@@ -854,6 +854,27 @@ static inline long seccomp_set_mode_filter(unsigned int flags,
}
#endif
+static long seccomp_get_action_avail(const char __user *uaction)
+{
+ u32 action;
+
+ if (copy_from_user(&action, uaction, sizeof(action)))
+ return -EFAULT;
+
+ switch (action) {
+ case SECCOMP_RET_KILL:
+ case SECCOMP_RET_TRAP:
+ case SECCOMP_RET_ERRNO:
+ case SECCOMP_RET_TRACE:
+ case SECCOMP_RET_ALLOW:
+ break;
+ default:
+ return -EOPNOTSUPP;
+ }
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
/* Common entry point for both prctl and syscall. */
static long do_seccomp(unsigned int op, unsigned int flags,
const char __user *uargs)
@@ -865,6 +886,11 @@ static long do_seccomp(unsigned int op, unsigned int flags,
return seccomp_set_mode_strict();
case SECCOMP_SET_MODE_FILTER:
return seccomp_set_mode_filter(flags, uargs);
+ case SECCOMP_GET_ACTION_AVAIL:
+ if (flags != 0)
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ return seccomp_get_action_avail(uargs);
default:
return -EINVAL;
}
diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/seccomp/seccomp_bpf.c b/tools/testing/selftests/seccomp/seccomp_bpf.c
index 92f2779..d3a78ec 100644
--- a/tools/testing/selftests/seccomp/seccomp_bpf.c
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/seccomp/seccomp_bpf.c
@@ -116,6 +116,10 @@ struct seccomp_data {
#define SECCOMP_SET_MODE_FILTER 1
#endif
+#ifndef SECCOMP_GET_ACTION_AVAIL
+#define SECCOMP_GET_ACTION_AVAIL 2
+#endif
+
#ifndef SECCOMP_FILTER_FLAG_TSYNC
#define SECCOMP_FILTER_FLAG_TSYNC 1
#endif
@@ -2552,6 +2556,38 @@ TEST(syscall_restart)
_metadata->passed = 0;
}
+TEST(get_action_avail)
+{
+ __u32 actions[] = { SECCOMP_RET_KILL, SECCOMP_RET_TRAP,
+ SECCOMP_RET_ERRNO, SECCOMP_RET_TRACE,
+ SECCOMP_RET_ALLOW };
+ __u32 unknown_action = 0x10000000U;
+ int i;
+ long ret;
+
+ ret = seccomp(SECCOMP_GET_ACTION_AVAIL, 0, &actions[0]);
+ ASSERT_NE(ENOSYS, errno) {
+ TH_LOG("Kernel does not support seccomp syscall!");
+ }
+ ASSERT_NE(EINVAL, errno) {
+ TH_LOG("Kernel does not support SECCOMP_GET_ACTION_AVAIL operation!");
+ }
+ EXPECT_EQ(ret, 0);
+
+ for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(actions); i++) {
+ ret = seccomp(SECCOMP_GET_ACTION_AVAIL, 0, &actions[i]);
+ EXPECT_EQ(ret, 0) {
+ TH_LOG("Expected action (0x%X) not available!",
+ actions[i]);
+ }
+ }
+
+ /* Check that an unknown action is handled properly (EOPNOTSUPP) */
+ ret = seccomp(SECCOMP_GET_ACTION_AVAIL, 0, &unknown_action);
+ EXPECT_EQ(ret, -1);
+ EXPECT_EQ(errno, EOPNOTSUPP);
+}
+
/*
* TODO:
* - add microbenchmarks
--
2.7.4
Powered by blists - more mailing lists