linux-kernel - Re: early x86 unseeded randomness

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Date:   Mon, 14 Aug 2017 20:00:48 +0200
From:   Borislav Petkov <bp@...en8.de>
To:     Linus Torvalds <torvalds@...ux-foundation.org>
Cc:     x86-ml <x86@...nel.org>, Theodore Ts'o <tytso@....edu>,
        "Jason A. Donenfeld" <Jason@...c4.com>,
        lkml <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>
Subject: Re: early x86 unseeded randomness

On Mon, Aug 14, 2017 at 10:47:47AM -0700, Linus Torvalds wrote:
> Plus on modern x86, you'll always get at least the hardware
> randomness, which is fundamentally much better anyway.

Right, my only intention was to get rid of those:

[    0.000000] random: get_random_bytes called from start_kernel+0x30/0x3d8 with crng_init=0

What do you propose? Keep 'em?

Or fix the above, snipped bit to conditionally do rdtsc() *once* or
get_random_bytes() depending on the crng state?

> So this patch is utter and absolute garbage, and should be shot in the
> head and buried very very deep.

/me takes out a 44 magnum...

> Please immediately delete it from the whole internet.

Haha, lemme call a guy.

-- 
Regards/Gruss,
    Boris.

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