[<prev] [next>] [<thread-prev] [thread-next>] [day] [month] [year] [list]
Message-ID: <c3ecdc80-15f8-344f-214e-97fa43f3e650@suse.de>
Date: Wed, 16 Aug 2017 14:43:29 +1000
From: Aleksa Sarai <asarai@...e.de>
To: "Michael Kerrisk (man-pages)" <mtk.manpages@...il.com>
Cc: linux-man@...r.kernel.org, linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org,
Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@...uxfoundation.org>,
Christian Brauner <christian.brauner@...ntu.com>,
Valentin Rothberg <vrothberg@...e.com>,
Jiri Slaby <jslaby@...e.com>,
containers@...ts.linux-foundation.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH] ioctl_tty.2: add TIOCGPTPEER documentation
> I've applied this patch, and then tweaked the wording a little. Could
> you please check the following text:
>
> TIOCGPTPEER int flags
> (since Linux 4.13) Given a file descriptor in fd that
> refers to a pseudoterminal master, open (with the given
> open(2)-style flags) and return a new file descriptor that
> refers to the peer pseudoterminal slave device. This oper‐
> ation can be performed regardless of whether the pathname
> of the slave device is accessible through the calling
> process's mount namespaces.
>
> Security-conscious programs interacting with namespaces may
> wish to use this operation rather than open(2) with the
> pathname returned by ptsname(3), and similar library func‐
> tions that have insecure APIs.
Yup, that sounds good.
> I also have a question on the last sentence: what are the "similar library
> functions that have insecure APIs"? It's not clear to me what you are
> referring to here.
There are a few posix_-style functions provided by glibc that are just
wrappers around the open+ptsname combo that I mention earlier in the
sentence (and thus are vulnerable to the same issue). But if you feel
it's confusing you can feel free to drop it.
Thanks.
--
Aleksa Sarai
Software Engineer (Containers)
SUSE Linux GmbH
https://www.cyphar.com/
Powered by blists - more mailing lists