[<prev] [next>] [<thread-prev] [thread-next>] [day] [month] [year] [list]
Message-ID: <CAGXu5jJEiaOyaOTqa--5HzX225VhAisa4Axj-i-N_AJRFU-j3A@mail.gmail.com>
Date: Thu, 17 Aug 2017 16:01:49 -0700
From: Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>
To: Sergey Senozhatsky <sergey.senozhatsky.work@...il.com>
Cc: LKML <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>,
Nick Kralevich <nnk@...gle.com>,
Sebastian Schmidt <yath@...h.de>,
Tony Luck <tony.luck@...el.com>,
Anton Vorontsov <anton@...msg.org>,
Colin Cross <ccross@...roid.com>,
Petr Mladek <pmladek@...e.com>,
Sergey Senozhatsky <sergey.senozhatsky@...il.com>,
Steven Rostedt <rostedt@...dmis.org>,
Patrick Tjin <pattjin@...gle.com>,
Mark Salyzyn <salyzyn@...gle.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH 2/2] Revert "pstore: Honor dmesg_restrict sysctl on dmesg dumps"
On Wed, Aug 16, 2017 at 6:29 PM, Sergey Senozhatsky
<sergey.senozhatsky.work@...il.com> wrote:
> can we accidentally "leak" kernel pointers or some other critical
> info? kptr_restrict requires CAP_SYSLOG and pstore read used to
> require CAP_SYSLOG, but it seems that now we can bypass it by
> letting "entirely unprivileged groups" to read pstore. is there
> something to be concerned about (or at least mention it in the
> commit messages)?
I can expand the commit message a bit more, sure. There may be
sensitive things in pstorefs, and it's up to a system builder to
decide how they want to deal with that risk. Most users of pstore
don't mount with update_ms=N so pstorefs contains (mostly) old
addresses. Without this change, though, a builder can't give
permissions to an unprivileged crash dump process without also giving
it CAP_SYSLOG which has much MORE privilege that it would need
(reading and wiping _current_ dmesg, for example).
-Kees
--
Kees Cook
Pixel Security
Powered by blists - more mailing lists