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Message-ID: <20170817130405.GE20203@x1>
Date: Thu, 17 Aug 2017 21:04:05 +0800
From: Baoquan He <bhe@...hat.com>
To: mingo@...nel.org
Cc: linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org, keescook@...omium.org,
tglx@...utronix.de, hpa@...or.com, izumi.taku@...fujitsu.com,
fanc.fnst@...fujitsu.com, thgarnie@...gle.com,
n-horiguchi@...jp.nec.com, ard.biesheuvel@...aro.org,
linux-efi@...r.kernel.org, x86@...nel.org, matt@...eblueprint.co.uk
Subject: Re: [PATCH v9 2/2] x86/boot/KASLR: Restrict kernel to be randomized
in mirror regions
On 08/14/17 at 10:54pm, Baoquan He wrote:
> Currently KASLR will parse all e820 entries of RAM type and add all
> candidate position into slots array. Then we will choose one slot
> randomly as the new position which kernel will be decompressed into
> and run at.
>
> On system with EFI enabled, e820 memory regions are coming from EFI
> memory regions by combining adjacent regions. While these EFI memory
> regions have more attributes to mark their different use. Mirror
> attribute is such kind. The physical memory region whose descriptors
> in EFI memory map has EFI_MEMORY_MORE_RELIABLE attribute (bit: 16) are
> mirrored. The address range mirroring feature of kernel arranges such
> mirror region into normal zone and other region into movable zone. And
> with mirroring feature enabled, the code and date of kernel can only be
> located in more reliable mirror region. However, the current KASLR code
> doesn't check EFI memory entries, and could choose new position in
> non-mirrored region. This will break the functionality of the address
> range mirroring feature.
Thanks a lot for helping improving the patch log, Ingo! Will pay more
attention to the description in words and paragraph partition of log.
>
> So if EFI is detected, iterate EFI memory map and pick the mirror region
> to process for adding candidate of randomization slot. If EFI is disabled
> or no mirror region found, still process e820 memory map.
>
> Signed-off-by: Baoquan He <bhe@...hat.com>
> ---
> arch/x86/boot/compressed/kaslr.c | 68 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--
> 1 file changed, 66 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
>
> diff --git a/arch/x86/boot/compressed/kaslr.c b/arch/x86/boot/compressed/kaslr.c
> index 99c7194f7ea6..7de23bb279ce 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/boot/compressed/kaslr.c
> +++ b/arch/x86/boot/compressed/kaslr.c
> @@ -37,7 +37,9 @@
> #include <linux/uts.h>
> #include <linux/utsname.h>
> #include <linux/ctype.h>
> +#include <linux/efi.h>
> #include <generated/utsrelease.h>
> +#include <asm/efi.h>
>
> /* Macros used by the included decompressor code below. */
> #define STATIC
> @@ -558,6 +560,65 @@ static void process_mem_region(struct mem_vector *entry,
> }
> }
>
> +#ifdef CONFIG_EFI
> +/*
> + * Returns true if mirror region found (and must have been processed
> + * for slots adding)
> + */
> +static bool
> +process_efi_entries(unsigned long minimum, unsigned long image_size)
> +{
> + struct efi_info *e = &boot_params->efi_info;
> + bool efi_mirror_found = false;
> + struct mem_vector region;
> + efi_memory_desc_t *md;
> + unsigned long pmap;
> + char *signature;
> + u32 nr_desc;
> + int i;
> +
> + signature = (char *)&e->efi_loader_signature;
> + if (strncmp(signature, EFI32_LOADER_SIGNATURE, 4) &&
> + strncmp(signature, EFI64_LOADER_SIGNATURE, 4))
> + return false;
> +
> +#ifdef CONFIG_X86_32
> + /* Can't handle data above 4GB at this time */
> + if (e->efi_memmap_hi) {
> + warn("EFI memmap is above 4GB, can't be handled now on x86_32. EFI should be disabled.\n");
> + return false;
> + }
> + pmap = e->efi_memmap;
> +#else
> + pmap = (e->efi_memmap | ((__u64)e->efi_memmap_hi << 32));
> +#endif
> +
> + nr_desc = e->efi_memmap_size / e->efi_memdesc_size;
> + for (i = 0; i < nr_desc; i++) {
> + md = efi_early_memdesc_ptr(pmap, e->efi_memdesc_size, i);
> + if (md->attribute & EFI_MEMORY_MORE_RELIABLE) {
> + region.start = md->phys_addr;
> + region.size = md->num_pages << EFI_PAGE_SHIFT;
> + process_mem_region(®ion, minimum, image_size);
> + efi_mirror_found = true;
> +
> + if (slot_area_index == MAX_SLOT_AREA) {
> + debug_putstr("Aborted EFI scan (slot_areas full)!\n");
> + break;
> + }
> + }
> + }
> +
> + return efi_mirror_found;
> +}
> +#else
> +static inline bool
> +process_efi_entries(unsigned long minimum, unsigned long image_size)
> +{
> + return false;
> +}
> +#endif
> +
> static void process_e820_entries(unsigned long minimum,
> unsigned long image_size)
> {
> @@ -586,13 +647,16 @@ static unsigned long find_random_phys_addr(unsigned long minimum,
> {
> /* Check if we had too many memmaps. */
> if (memmap_too_large) {
> - debug_putstr("Aborted e820 scan (more than 4 memmap= args)!\n");
> + debug_putstr("Aborted memory entries scan (more than 4 memmap= args)!\n");
> return 0;
> }
>
> /* Make sure minimum is aligned. */
> minimum = ALIGN(minimum, CONFIG_PHYSICAL_ALIGN);
>
> + if (process_efi_entries(minimum, image_size))
> + return slots_fetch_random();
> +
> process_e820_entries(minimum, image_size);
> return slots_fetch_random();
> }
> @@ -652,7 +716,7 @@ void choose_random_location(unsigned long input,
> */
> min_addr = min(*output, 512UL << 20);
>
> - /* Walk e820 and find a random address. */
> + /* Walk available memory entries to find a random address. */
> random_addr = find_random_phys_addr(min_addr, output_size);
> if (!random_addr) {
> warn("Physical KASLR disabled: no suitable memory region!");
> --
> 2.5.5
>
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