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Date: Thu, 24 Aug 2017 14:02:32 +1200
From: Xin Long <lucien.xin@...il.com>
To: Stefano Brivio <sbrivio@...hat.com>
Cc: "David S . Miller" <davem@...emloft.net>,
network dev <netdev@...r.kernel.org>,
LKML <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>, stable@...r.kernel.org,
Vlad Yasevich <vyasevich@...il.com>,
Neil Horman <nhorman@...driver.com>, linux-sctp@...r.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH net] sctp: Avoid out-of-bounds reads from address storage
On Wed, Aug 23, 2017 at 11:27 PM, Stefano Brivio <sbrivio@...hat.com> wrote:
> inet_diag_msg_sctp{,l}addr_fill() and sctp_get_sctp_info() copy
> sizeof(sockaddr_storage) bytes to fill in sockaddr structs used
> to export diagnostic information to userspace.
>
> However, the memory allocated to store sockaddr information is
> smaller than that and depends on the address family, so we leak
> up to 100 uninitialized bytes to userspace. Just use the size of
> the source structs instead, in all the three cases this is what
> userspace expects. Zero out the remaining memory.
>
> Unused bytes (i.e. when IPv4 addresses are used) in source
> structs sctp_sockaddr_entry and sctp_transport are already
> cleared by sctp_add_bind_addr() and sctp_transport_new(),
> respectively.
>
> Noticed while testing KASAN-enabled kernel with 'ss':
>
> [ 2326.885243] BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in inet_sctp_diag_fill+0x42c/0x6c0 [sctp_diag] at addr ffff881be8779800
> [ 2326.896800] Read of size 128 by task ss/9527
> [ 2326.901564] CPU: 0 PID: 9527 Comm: ss Not tainted 4.11.0-22.el7a.x86_64 #1
> [ 2326.909236] Hardware name: Dell Inc. PowerEdge R730/072T6D, BIOS 2.4.3 01/17/2017
> [ 2326.917585] Call Trace:
> [ 2326.920312] dump_stack+0x63/0x8d
> [ 2326.924014] kasan_object_err+0x21/0x70
> [ 2326.928295] kasan_report+0x288/0x540
> [ 2326.932380] ? inet_sctp_diag_fill+0x42c/0x6c0 [sctp_diag]
> [ 2326.938500] ? skb_put+0x8b/0xd0
> [ 2326.942098] ? memset+0x31/0x40
> [ 2326.945599] check_memory_region+0x13c/0x1a0
> [ 2326.950362] memcpy+0x23/0x50
> [ 2326.953669] inet_sctp_diag_fill+0x42c/0x6c0 [sctp_diag]
> [ 2326.959596] ? inet_diag_msg_sctpasoc_fill+0x460/0x460 [sctp_diag]
> [ 2326.966495] ? __lock_sock+0x102/0x150
> [ 2326.970671] ? sock_def_wakeup+0x60/0x60
> [ 2326.975048] ? remove_wait_queue+0xc0/0xc0
> [ 2326.979619] sctp_diag_dump+0x44a/0x760 [sctp_diag]
> [ 2326.985063] ? sctp_ep_dump+0x280/0x280 [sctp_diag]
> [ 2326.990504] ? memset+0x31/0x40
> [ 2326.994007] ? mutex_lock+0x12/0x40
> [ 2326.997900] __inet_diag_dump+0x57/0xb0 [inet_diag]
> [ 2327.003340] ? __sys_sendmsg+0x150/0x150
> [ 2327.007715] inet_diag_dump+0x4d/0x80 [inet_diag]
> [ 2327.012979] netlink_dump+0x1e6/0x490
> [ 2327.017064] __netlink_dump_start+0x28e/0x2c0
> [ 2327.021924] inet_diag_handler_cmd+0x189/0x1a0 [inet_diag]
> [ 2327.028045] ? inet_diag_rcv_msg_compat+0x1b0/0x1b0 [inet_diag]
> [ 2327.034651] ? inet_diag_dump_compat+0x190/0x190 [inet_diag]
> [ 2327.040965] ? __netlink_lookup+0x1b9/0x260
> [ 2327.045631] sock_diag_rcv_msg+0x18b/0x1e0
> [ 2327.050199] netlink_rcv_skb+0x14b/0x180
> [ 2327.054574] ? sock_diag_bind+0x60/0x60
> [ 2327.058850] sock_diag_rcv+0x28/0x40
> [ 2327.062837] netlink_unicast+0x2e7/0x3b0
> [ 2327.067212] ? netlink_attachskb+0x330/0x330
> [ 2327.071975] ? kasan_check_write+0x14/0x20
> [ 2327.076544] netlink_sendmsg+0x5be/0x730
> [ 2327.080918] ? netlink_unicast+0x3b0/0x3b0
> [ 2327.085486] ? kasan_check_write+0x14/0x20
> [ 2327.090057] ? selinux_socket_sendmsg+0x24/0x30
> [ 2327.095109] ? netlink_unicast+0x3b0/0x3b0
> [ 2327.099678] sock_sendmsg+0x74/0x80
> [ 2327.103567] ___sys_sendmsg+0x520/0x530
> [ 2327.107844] ? __get_locked_pte+0x178/0x200
> [ 2327.112510] ? copy_msghdr_from_user+0x270/0x270
> [ 2327.117660] ? vm_insert_page+0x360/0x360
> [ 2327.122133] ? vm_insert_pfn_prot+0xb4/0x150
> [ 2327.126895] ? vm_insert_pfn+0x32/0x40
> [ 2327.131077] ? vvar_fault+0x71/0xd0
> [ 2327.134968] ? special_mapping_fault+0x69/0x110
> [ 2327.140022] ? __do_fault+0x42/0x120
> [ 2327.144008] ? __handle_mm_fault+0x1062/0x17a0
> [ 2327.148965] ? __fget_light+0xa7/0xc0
> [ 2327.153049] __sys_sendmsg+0xcb/0x150
> [ 2327.157133] ? __sys_sendmsg+0xcb/0x150
> [ 2327.161409] ? SyS_shutdown+0x140/0x140
> [ 2327.165688] ? exit_to_usermode_loop+0xd0/0xd0
> [ 2327.170646] ? __do_page_fault+0x55d/0x620
> [ 2327.175216] ? __sys_sendmsg+0x150/0x150
> [ 2327.179591] SyS_sendmsg+0x12/0x20
> [ 2327.183384] do_syscall_64+0xe3/0x230
> [ 2327.187471] entry_SYSCALL64_slow_path+0x25/0x25
> [ 2327.192622] RIP: 0033:0x7f41d18fa3b0
> [ 2327.196608] RSP: 002b:00007ffc3b731218 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 000000000000002e
> [ 2327.205055] RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00007ffc3b731380 RCX: 00007f41d18fa3b0
> [ 2327.213017] RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 00007ffc3b731340 RDI: 0000000000000003
> [ 2327.220978] RBP: 0000000000000002 R08: 0000000000000004 R09: 0000000000000040
> [ 2327.228939] R10: 00007ffc3b730f30 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000000000000003
> [ 2327.236901] R13: 00007ffc3b731340 R14: 00007ffc3b7313d0 R15: 0000000000000084
> [ 2327.244865] Object at ffff881be87797e0, in cache kmalloc-64 size: 64
> [ 2327.251953] Allocated:
> [ 2327.254581] PID = 9484
> [ 2327.257215] save_stack_trace+0x1b/0x20
> [ 2327.261485] save_stack+0x46/0xd0
> [ 2327.265179] kasan_kmalloc+0xad/0xe0
> [ 2327.269165] kmem_cache_alloc_trace+0xe6/0x1d0
> [ 2327.274138] sctp_add_bind_addr+0x58/0x180 [sctp]
> [ 2327.279400] sctp_do_bind+0x208/0x310 [sctp]
> [ 2327.284176] sctp_bind+0x61/0xa0 [sctp]
> [ 2327.288455] inet_bind+0x5f/0x3a0
> [ 2327.292151] SYSC_bind+0x1a4/0x1e0
> [ 2327.295944] SyS_bind+0xe/0x10
> [ 2327.299349] do_syscall_64+0xe3/0x230
> [ 2327.303433] return_from_SYSCALL_64+0x0/0x6a
> [ 2327.308194] Freed:
> [ 2327.310434] PID = 4131
> [ 2327.313065] save_stack_trace+0x1b/0x20
> [ 2327.317344] save_stack+0x46/0xd0
> [ 2327.321040] kasan_slab_free+0x73/0xc0
> [ 2327.325220] kfree+0x96/0x1a0
> [ 2327.328530] dynamic_kobj_release+0x15/0x40
> [ 2327.333195] kobject_release+0x99/0x1e0
> [ 2327.337472] kobject_put+0x38/0x70
> [ 2327.341266] free_notes_attrs+0x66/0x80
> [ 2327.345545] mod_sysfs_teardown+0x1a5/0x270
> [ 2327.350211] free_module+0x20/0x2a0
> [ 2327.354099] SyS_delete_module+0x2cb/0x2f0
> [ 2327.358667] do_syscall_64+0xe3/0x230
> [ 2327.362750] return_from_SYSCALL_64+0x0/0x6a
> [ 2327.367510] Memory state around the buggy address:
> [ 2327.372855] ffff881be8779700: fc fc fc fc 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 fc fc fc fc
> [ 2327.380914] ffff881be8779780: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fc fc fc fc 00 00 00 00
> [ 2327.388972] >ffff881be8779800: 00 00 00 00 fc fc fc fc fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb
> [ 2327.397031] ^
> [ 2327.401792] ffff881be8779880: fc fc fc fc fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fc fc fc fc
> [ 2327.409850] ffff881be8779900: 00 00 00 00 00 04 fc fc fc fc fc fc 00 00 00 00
> [ 2327.417907] ==================================================================
>
> This fixes CVE-2017-7558.
>
> References: https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1480266
> Fixes: 8f840e47f190 ("sctp: add the sctp_diag.c file")
> Cc: <stable@...r.kernel.org> # 4.7+
> Cc: Xin Long <lucien.xin@...il.com>
> Cc: Vlad Yasevich <vyasevich@...il.com>
> Cc: Neil Horman <nhorman@...driver.com>
> Signed-off-by: Stefano Brivio <sbrivio@...hat.com>
Reviewed-by: Xin Long <lucien.xin@...il.com>
> ---
> net/sctp/sctp_diag.c | 7 +++++--
> net/sctp/socket.c | 3 +--
> 2 files changed, 6 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
>
> diff --git a/net/sctp/sctp_diag.c b/net/sctp/sctp_diag.c
> index 9a647214a91e..e99518e79b52 100644
> --- a/net/sctp/sctp_diag.c
> +++ b/net/sctp/sctp_diag.c
> @@ -70,7 +70,8 @@ static int inet_diag_msg_sctpladdrs_fill(struct sk_buff *skb,
>
> info = nla_data(attr);
> list_for_each_entry_rcu(laddr, address_list, list) {
> - memcpy(info, &laddr->a, addrlen);
> + memcpy(info, &laddr->a, sizeof(laddr->a));
> + memset(info + sizeof(laddr->a), 0, addrlen - sizeof(laddr->a));
> info += addrlen;
> }
>
> @@ -93,7 +94,9 @@ static int inet_diag_msg_sctpaddrs_fill(struct sk_buff *skb,
> info = nla_data(attr);
> list_for_each_entry(from, &asoc->peer.transport_addr_list,
> transports) {
> - memcpy(info, &from->ipaddr, addrlen);
> + memcpy(info, &from->ipaddr, sizeof(from->ipaddr));
> + memset(info + sizeof(from->ipaddr), 0,
> + addrlen - sizeof(from->ipaddr));
> info += addrlen;
> }
>
> diff --git a/net/sctp/socket.c b/net/sctp/socket.c
> index 1db478e34520..8d760863bc41 100644
> --- a/net/sctp/socket.c
> +++ b/net/sctp/socket.c
> @@ -4538,8 +4538,7 @@ int sctp_get_sctp_info(struct sock *sk, struct sctp_association *asoc,
> info->sctpi_ictrlchunks = asoc->stats.ictrlchunks;
>
> prim = asoc->peer.primary_path;
> - memcpy(&info->sctpi_p_address, &prim->ipaddr,
> - sizeof(struct sockaddr_storage));
> + memcpy(&info->sctpi_p_address, &prim->ipaddr, sizeof(prim->ipaddr));
> info->sctpi_p_state = prim->state;
> info->sctpi_p_cwnd = prim->cwnd;
> info->sctpi_p_srtt = prim->srtt;
> --
> 2.9.4
>
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