lists.openwall.net   lists  /  announce  owl-users  owl-dev  john-users  john-dev  passwdqc-users  yescrypt  popa3d-users  /  oss-security  kernel-hardening  musl  sabotage  tlsify  passwords  /  crypt-dev  xvendor  /  Bugtraq  Full-Disclosure  linux-kernel  linux-netdev  linux-ext4  linux-hardening  linux-cve-announce  PHC 
Open Source and information security mailing list archives
 
Hash Suite: Windows password security audit tool. GUI, reports in PDF.
[<prev] [next>] [<thread-prev] [thread-next>] [day] [month] [year] [list]
Message-Id: <1503956111-36652-26-git-send-email-keescook@chromium.org>
Date:   Mon, 28 Aug 2017 14:35:06 -0700
From:   Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>
To:     linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org
Cc:     Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>,
        David Windsor <dave@...lcore.net>,
        Ingo Molnar <mingo@...nel.org>,
        Andrew Morton <akpm@...ux-foundation.org>,
        Thomas Gleixner <tglx@...utronix.de>,
        Andy Lutomirski <luto@...nel.org>, linux-mm@...ck.org,
        kernel-hardening@...ts.openwall.com
Subject: [PATCH v2 25/30] fork: Define usercopy region in thread_stack slab caches

From: David Windsor <dave@...lcore.net>

In support of usercopy hardening, this patch defines a region in the
thread_stack slab caches in which userspace copy operations are allowed.
Since the entire thread_stack needs to be available to userspace, the
entire slab contents are whitelisted. Note that the slab-based thread
stack is only present on systems with THREAD_SIZE < PAGE_SIZE and
!CONFIG_VMAP_STACK.

cache object allocation:
    kernel/fork.c:
        alloc_thread_stack_node(...):
            return kmem_cache_alloc_node(thread_stack_cache, ...)

        dup_task_struct(...):
            ...
            stack = alloc_thread_stack_node(...)
            ...
            tsk->stack = stack;

        copy_process(...):
            ...
            dup_task_struct(...)

        _do_fork(...):
            ...
            copy_process(...)

This region is known as the slab cache's usercopy region. Slab caches
can now check that each copy operation involving cache-managed memory
falls entirely within the slab's usercopy region.

This patch is modified from Brad Spengler/PaX Team's PAX_USERCOPY
whitelisting code in the last public patch of grsecurity/PaX based on my
understanding of the code. Changes or omissions from the original code are
mine and don't reflect the original grsecurity/PaX code.

Signed-off-by: David Windsor <dave@...lcore.net>
[kees: adjust commit log, split patch, provide usage trace]
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@...nel.org>
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@...ux-foundation.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@...utronix.de>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@...nel.org>
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>
---
 kernel/fork.c | 5 +++--
 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

diff --git a/kernel/fork.c b/kernel/fork.c
index d8ebf755a47b..0f33fb1aabbf 100644
--- a/kernel/fork.c
+++ b/kernel/fork.c
@@ -276,8 +276,9 @@ static void free_thread_stack(struct task_struct *tsk)
 
 void thread_stack_cache_init(void)
 {
-	thread_stack_cache = kmem_cache_create("thread_stack", THREAD_SIZE,
-					      THREAD_SIZE, 0, NULL);
+	thread_stack_cache = kmem_cache_create_usercopy("thread_stack",
+					THREAD_SIZE, THREAD_SIZE, 0, 0,
+					THREAD_SIZE, NULL);
 	BUG_ON(thread_stack_cache == NULL);
 }
 # endif
-- 
2.7.4

Powered by blists - more mailing lists

Powered by Openwall GNU/*/Linux Powered by OpenVZ