linux-kernel - Re: [PATCH v2 14/20] mm: Provide speculative fault infrastructure

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Message-Id: <db7e5c3e-0bb6-a1f3-a025-379071c30183@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Date:   Wed, 30 Aug 2017 11:53:41 +0200
From:   Laurent Dufour <ldufour@...ux.vnet.ibm.com>
To:     Anshuman Khandual <khandual@...ux.vnet.ibm.com>,
        Peter Zijlstra <peterz@...radead.org>
Cc:     "Kirill A. Shutemov" <kirill@...temov.name>,
        paulmck@...ux.vnet.ibm.com, akpm@...ux-foundation.org,
        ak@...ux.intel.com, mhocko@...nel.org, dave@...olabs.net,
        jack@...e.cz, Matthew Wilcox <willy@...radead.org>,
        benh@...nel.crashing.org, mpe@...erman.id.au, paulus@...ba.org,
        Thomas Gleixner <tglx@...utronix.de>,
        Ingo Molnar <mingo@...hat.com>, hpa@...or.com,
        Will Deacon <will.deacon@....com>,
        linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org, linux-mm@...ck.org,
        haren@...ux.vnet.ibm.com, npiggin@...il.com, bsingharora@...il.com,
        Tim Chen <tim.c.chen@...ux.intel.com>,
        linuxppc-dev@...ts.ozlabs.org, x86@...nel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH v2 14/20] mm: Provide speculative fault infrastructure

On 30/08/2017 07:03, Anshuman Khandual wrote:
> On 08/29/2017 07:15 PM, Peter Zijlstra wrote:
>> On Tue, Aug 29, 2017 at 03:18:25PM +0200, Laurent Dufour wrote:
>>> On 29/08/2017 14:04, Peter Zijlstra wrote:
>>>> On Tue, Aug 29, 2017 at 09:59:30AM +0200, Laurent Dufour wrote:
>>>>> On 27/08/2017 02:18, Kirill A. Shutemov wrote:
>>>>>>> +
>>>>>>> +	if (unlikely(!vma->anon_vma))
>>>>>>> +		goto unlock;
>>>>>>
>>>>>> It deserves a comment.
>>>>>
>>>>> You're right I'll add it in the next version.
>>>>> For the record, the root cause is that __anon_vma_prepare() requires the
>>>>> mmap_sem to be held because vm_next and vm_prev must be safe.
>>>>
>>>> But should that test not be:
>>>>
>>>> 	if (unlikely(vma_is_anonymous(vma) && !vma->anon_vma))
>>>> 		goto unlock;
>>>>
>>>> Because !anon vmas will never have ->anon_vma set and you don't want to
>>>> exclude those.
>>>
>>> Yes in the case we later allow non anonymous vmas to be handled.
>>> Currently only anonymous vmas are supported so the check is good enough,
>>> isn't it ?
>>
>> That wasn't at all clear from reading the code. This makes it clear
>> ->anon_vma is only ever looked at for anonymous.
>>
>> And like Kirill says, we _really_ should start allowing some (if not
>> all) vm_ops. Large file based mappings aren't particularly rare.
>>
>> I'm not sure we want to introduce a white-list or just bite the bullet
>> and audit all ->fault() implementations. But either works and isn't
>> terribly difficult, auditing all is more work though.
> 
> filemap_fault() is used as vma-vm_ops->fault() for most of the file
> systems. Changing it can enable speculative fault support for all of
> them. It will still exclude other driver based vma-vm_ops->fault()
> implementation. AFAICS, __lock_page_or_retry() function can drop
> mm->mmap_sem if the page could not be locked right away. As suggested
> by Peterz, making it understand FAULT_FLAG_SPECULATIVE should be good
> enough. The patch is lightly tested for file mappings on top of this
> series.

Hi Anshuman,

This sounds pretty good, except for  the FAULT_FLAG_RETRY_NOWAIT's case I
mentioned in another mail.

The next step would be to find a way to discriminate between the vm_fault()
functions. Any idea ?

Thanks,
Laurent.

> 
> diff --git a/mm/filemap.c b/mm/filemap.c
> index a497024..08f3042 100644
> --- a/mm/filemap.c
> +++ b/mm/filemap.c
> @@ -1181,6 +1181,18 @@ int __lock_page_killable(struct page *__page)
>  int __lock_page_or_retry(struct page *page, struct mm_struct *mm,
>                          unsigned int flags)
>  {
> +       if (flags & FAULT_FLAG_SPECULATIVE) {
> +               if (flags & FAULT_FLAG_KILLABLE) {
> +                       int ret;
> +
> +                       ret = __lock_page_killable(page);
> +                       if (ret)
> +                               return 0;
> +               } else
> +                       __lock_page(page);
> +               return 1;
> +       }
> +
>         if (flags & FAULT_FLAG_ALLOW_RETRY) {
>                 /*
>                  * CAUTION! In this case, mmap_sem is not released
> diff --git a/mm/memory.c b/mm/memory.c
> index 549d235..02347f3 100644
> --- a/mm/memory.c
> +++ b/mm/memory.c
> @@ -3836,8 +3836,6 @@ static int handle_pte_fault(struct vm_fault *vmf)
>         if (!vmf->pte) {
>                 if (vma_is_anonymous(vmf->vma))
>                         return do_anonymous_page(vmf);
> -               else if (vmf->flags & FAULT_FLAG_SPECULATIVE)
> -                       return VM_FAULT_RETRY;
>                 else
>                         return do_fault(vmf);
>         }
> @@ -4012,17 +4010,7 @@ int handle_speculative_fault(struct mm_struct *mm, unsigned long address,
>                 goto unlock;
>         }
> 
> -       /*
> -        * Can't call vm_ops service has we don't know what they would do
> -        * with the VMA.
> -        * This include huge page from hugetlbfs.
> -        */
> -       if (vma->vm_ops) {
> -               trace_spf_vma_notsup(_RET_IP_, vma, address);
> -               goto unlock;
> -       }
> -
> -       if (unlikely(!vma->anon_vma)) {
> +       if (unlikely(vma_is_anonymous(vma) && !vma->anon_vma)) {
>                 trace_spf_vma_notsup(_RET_IP_, vma, address);
>                 goto unlock;
>         }
>