linux-kernel - [RFC 08/17] x86/asm/64: De-Xen-ify our NMI code

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Message-Id: <f0d45728756ebe8540edcc7b0da57bb77b3b719e.1504733277.git.luto@kernel.org>
Date:   Wed,  6 Sep 2017 14:36:53 -0700
From:   Andy Lutomirski <luto@...nel.org>
To:     x86@...nel.org
Cc:     linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org, Borislav Petkov <bp@...en8.de>,
        Brian Gerst <brgerst@...il.com>,
        Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@...rix.com>,
        Juergen Gross <jgross@...e.com>,
        Boris Ostrovsky <boris.ostrovsky@...cle.com>,
        Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>,
        Andy Lutomirski <luto@...nel.org>
Subject: [RFC 08/17] x86/asm/64: De-Xen-ify our NMI code

Xen PV is fundamentally incompatible with our fancy NMI code: it
doesn't use IST at all, and Xen entries clobber two stack slots
below the hardware frame.

Drop Xen PV support from our NMI code entirely.

XXX: Juergen: could you write and test the tiny patch needed to
make Xen PV have a xen_nmi entry that handles NMIs?  I don't know
how to test it.

Cc: Juergen Gross <jgross@...e.com>
Cc: Boris Ostrovsky <boris.ostrovsky@...cle.com>
Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@...nel.org>
---
 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S | 41 +++++++++++++++++------------------------
 1 file changed, 17 insertions(+), 24 deletions(-)

diff --git a/arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S b/arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S
index a9e318f7cc9b..c81e05fb999e 100644
--- a/arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S
+++ b/arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S
@@ -1171,21 +1171,12 @@ ENTRY(error_exit)
 	jmp	retint_user
 END(error_exit)
 
-/* Runs on exception stack */
+/*
+ * Runs on exception stack.  Xen PV does not go through this path at all,
+ * so we can use real assembly here.
+ */
 ENTRY(nmi)
 	/*
-	 * Fix up the exception frame if we're on Xen.
-	 * PARAVIRT_ADJUST_EXCEPTION_FRAME is guaranteed to push at most
-	 * one value to the stack on native, so it may clobber the rdx
-	 * scratch slot, but it won't clobber any of the important
-	 * slots past it.
-	 *
-	 * Xen is a different story, because the Xen frame itself overlaps
-	 * the "NMI executing" variable.
-	 */
-	PARAVIRT_ADJUST_EXCEPTION_FRAME
-
-	/*
 	 * We allow breakpoints in NMIs. If a breakpoint occurs, then
 	 * the iretq it performs will take us out of NMI context.
 	 * This means that we can have nested NMIs where the next
@@ -1240,7 +1231,7 @@ ENTRY(nmi)
 	 * stacks lest we corrupt the "NMI executing" variable.
 	 */
 
-	SWAPGS_UNSAFE_STACK
+	swapgs
 	cld
 	movq	%rsp, %rdx
 	movq	PER_CPU_VAR(cpu_current_top_of_stack), %rsp
@@ -1402,7 +1393,7 @@ nested_nmi_out:
 	popq	%rdx
 
 	/* We are returning to kernel mode, so this cannot result in a fault. */
-	INTERRUPT_RETURN
+	iretq
 
 first_nmi:
 	/* Restore rdx. */
@@ -1432,7 +1423,7 @@ first_nmi:
 	pushfq			/* RFLAGS */
 	pushq	$__KERNEL_CS	/* CS */
 	pushq	$1f		/* RIP */
-	INTERRUPT_RETURN	/* continues at repeat_nmi below */
+	iretq			/* continues at repeat_nmi below */
 1:
 #endif
 
@@ -1502,20 +1493,22 @@ nmi_restore:
 	/*
 	 * Clear "NMI executing".  Set DF first so that we can easily
 	 * distinguish the remaining code between here and IRET from
-	 * the SYSCALL entry and exit paths.  On a native kernel, we
-	 * could just inspect RIP, but, on paravirt kernels,
-	 * INTERRUPT_RETURN can translate into a jump into a
-	 * hypercall page.
+	 * the SYSCALL entry and exit paths.
+	 *
+	 * We arguably should just inspect RIP instead, but I (Andy) wrote
+	 * this code when I had the misapprehension that Xen PV supported
+	 * NMIs, and Xen PV would break that approach.
 	 */
 	std
 	movq	$0, 5*8(%rsp)		/* clear "NMI executing" */
 
 	/*
-	 * INTERRUPT_RETURN reads the "iret" frame and exits the NMI
-	 * stack in a single instruction.  We are returning to kernel
-	 * mode, so this cannot result in a fault.
+	 * iretq reads the "iret" frame and exits the NMI stack in a
+	 * single instruction.  We are returning to kernel mode, so this
+	 * cannot result in a fault.  Similarly, we don't need to worry
+	 * about espfix64 on the way back to kernel mode.
 	 */
-	INTERRUPT_RETURN
+	iretq
 END(nmi)
 
 ENTRY(ignore_sysret)
-- 
2.13.5