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Message-ID: <CAGXu5jJSp+8_AgGiG8f8ZaJvCzyk-jTumTAxcVc9yRm_z0OWCw@mail.gmail.com>
Date: Thu, 7 Sep 2017 12:08:14 -0700
From: Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>
To: Tycho Andersen <tycho@...ker.com>
Cc: LKML <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>, Linux-MM <linux-mm@...ck.org>,
"kernel-hardening@...ts.openwall.com"
<kernel-hardening@...ts.openwall.com>,
Marco Benatto <marco.antonio.780@...il.com>,
Juerg Haefliger <juerg.haefliger@...onical.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v6 11/11] lkdtm: Add test for XPFO
On Thu, Sep 7, 2017 at 10:36 AM, Tycho Andersen <tycho@...ker.com> wrote:
> From: Juerg Haefliger <juerg.haefliger@...onical.com>
>
> This test simply reads from userspace memory via the kernel's linear
> map.
>
> v6: * drop an #ifdef, just let the test fail if XPFO is not supported
> * add XPFO_SMP test to try and test the case when one CPU does an xpfo
> unmap of an address, that it can't be used accidentally by other
> CPUs.
This is very close! Thanks for the updates. :) Notes below...
>
> Signed-off-by: Juerg Haefliger <juerg.haefliger@...onical.com>
> Signed-off-by: Tycho Andersen <tycho@...ker.com>
> Tested-by: Marco Benatto <marco.antonio.780@...il.com>
> ---
> drivers/misc/Makefile | 1 +
> drivers/misc/lkdtm.h | 5 ++
> drivers/misc/lkdtm_core.c | 3 +
> drivers/misc/lkdtm_xpfo.c | 194 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
> 4 files changed, 203 insertions(+)
>
> diff --git a/drivers/misc/Makefile b/drivers/misc/Makefile
> index b0b766416306..8447b42a447d 100644
> --- a/drivers/misc/Makefile
> +++ b/drivers/misc/Makefile
> @@ -62,6 +62,7 @@ lkdtm-$(CONFIG_LKDTM) += lkdtm_heap.o
> lkdtm-$(CONFIG_LKDTM) += lkdtm_perms.o
> lkdtm-$(CONFIG_LKDTM) += lkdtm_rodata_objcopy.o
> lkdtm-$(CONFIG_LKDTM) += lkdtm_usercopy.o
> +lkdtm-$(CONFIG_LKDTM) += lkdtm_xpfo.o
>
> KCOV_INSTRUMENT_lkdtm_rodata.o := n
>
> diff --git a/drivers/misc/lkdtm.h b/drivers/misc/lkdtm.h
> index 3b4976396ec4..34a6ee37f216 100644
> --- a/drivers/misc/lkdtm.h
> +++ b/drivers/misc/lkdtm.h
> @@ -64,4 +64,9 @@ void lkdtm_USERCOPY_STACK_FRAME_FROM(void);
> void lkdtm_USERCOPY_STACK_BEYOND(void);
> void lkdtm_USERCOPY_KERNEL(void);
>
> +/* lkdtm_xpfo.c */
> +void lkdtm_XPFO_READ_USER(void);
> +void lkdtm_XPFO_READ_USER_HUGE(void);
> +void lkdtm_XPFO_SMP(void);
> +
> #endif
> diff --git a/drivers/misc/lkdtm_core.c b/drivers/misc/lkdtm_core.c
> index 42d2b8e31e6b..9544e329de4b 100644
> --- a/drivers/misc/lkdtm_core.c
> +++ b/drivers/misc/lkdtm_core.c
> @@ -235,6 +235,9 @@ struct crashtype crashtypes[] = {
> CRASHTYPE(USERCOPY_STACK_FRAME_FROM),
> CRASHTYPE(USERCOPY_STACK_BEYOND),
> CRASHTYPE(USERCOPY_KERNEL),
> + CRASHTYPE(XPFO_READ_USER),
> + CRASHTYPE(XPFO_READ_USER_HUGE),
> + CRASHTYPE(XPFO_SMP),
> };
>
>
> diff --git a/drivers/misc/lkdtm_xpfo.c b/drivers/misc/lkdtm_xpfo.c
> new file mode 100644
> index 000000000000..d903063bdd0b
> --- /dev/null
> +++ b/drivers/misc/lkdtm_xpfo.c
> @@ -0,0 +1,194 @@
> +/*
> + * This is for all the tests related to XPFO (eXclusive Page Frame Ownership).
> + */
> +
> +#include "lkdtm.h"
> +
> +#include <linux/cpumask.h>
> +#include <linux/mman.h>
> +#include <linux/uaccess.h>
> +#include <linux/xpfo.h>
> +#include <linux/kthread.h>
> +
> +#include <linux/delay.h>
> +#include <linux/sched/task.h>
> +
> +#define XPFO_DATA 0xdeadbeef
> +
> +static unsigned long do_map(unsigned long flags)
> +{
> + unsigned long user_addr, user_data = XPFO_DATA;
> +
> + user_addr = vm_mmap(NULL, 0, PAGE_SIZE,
> + PROT_READ | PROT_WRITE | PROT_EXEC,
> + flags, 0);
> + if (user_addr >= TASK_SIZE) {
> + pr_warn("Failed to allocate user memory\n");
> + return 0;
> + }
> +
> + if (copy_to_user((void __user *)user_addr, &user_data,
> + sizeof(user_data))) {
> + pr_warn("copy_to_user failed\n");
> + goto free_user;
> + }
> +
> + return user_addr;
> +
> +free_user:
> + vm_munmap(user_addr, PAGE_SIZE);
> + return 0;
> +}
> +
> +static unsigned long *user_to_kernel(unsigned long user_addr)
> +{
> + phys_addr_t phys_addr;
> + void *virt_addr;
> +
> + phys_addr = user_virt_to_phys(user_addr);
> + if (!phys_addr) {
> + pr_warn("Failed to get physical address of user memory\n");
> + return NULL;
> + }
> +
> + virt_addr = phys_to_virt(phys_addr);
> + if (phys_addr != virt_to_phys(virt_addr)) {
> + pr_warn("Physical address of user memory seems incorrect\n");
> + return NULL;
> + }
> +
> + return virt_addr;
> +}
> +
> +static void read_map(unsigned long *virt_addr)
> +{
> + pr_info("Attempting bad read from kernel address %p\n", virt_addr);
> + if (*(unsigned long *)virt_addr == XPFO_DATA)
> + pr_err("FAIL: Bad read succeeded?!\n");
> + else
> + pr_err("FAIL: Bad read didn't fail but data is incorrect?!\n");
> +}
> +
> +static void read_user_with_flags(unsigned long flags)
> +{
> + unsigned long user_addr, *kernel;
> +
> + user_addr = do_map(flags);
> + if (!user_addr) {
> + pr_err("FAIL: map failed\n");
> + return;
> + }
> +
> + kernel = user_to_kernel(user_addr);
> + if (!kernel) {
> + pr_err("FAIL: user to kernel conversion failed\n");
> + goto free_user;
> + }
> +
> + read_map(kernel);
> +
> +free_user:
> + vm_munmap(user_addr, PAGE_SIZE);
> +}
> +
> +/* Read from userspace via the kernel's linear map. */
> +void lkdtm_XPFO_READ_USER(void)
> +{
> + read_user_with_flags(MAP_PRIVATE | MAP_ANONYMOUS);
> +}
> +
> +void lkdtm_XPFO_READ_USER_HUGE(void)
> +{
> + read_user_with_flags(MAP_PRIVATE | MAP_ANONYMOUS | MAP_HUGETLB);
> +}
> +
> +struct smp_arg {
> + unsigned long *virt_addr;
> + unsigned int cpu;
> +};
> +
> +static int smp_reader(void *parg)
> +{
> + struct smp_arg *arg = parg;
> + unsigned long *virt_addr;
> +
> + if (arg->cpu != smp_processor_id()) {
> + pr_err("FAIL: scheduled on wrong CPU?\n");
> + return 0;
> + }
> +
> + virt_addr = smp_cond_load_acquire(&arg->virt_addr, VAL != NULL);
> + read_map(virt_addr);
> +
> + return 0;
> +}
> +
> +#ifdef CONFIG_X86
> +#define XPFO_SMP_KILLED SIGKILL
> +#elif CONFIG_ARM64
> +#define XPFO_SMP_KILLED SIGSEGV
> +#else
> +#error unsupported arch
> +#endif
This will fail the build for other architectures, so I would just do
this as an single if/else:
#ifdef CONFIG_ARM64
# define XPFO_SMP_KILLED SIGSEGV
#else
# define XPFO_SMP_KILLED SIGKILL
#endif
> +
> +/* The idea here is to read from the kernel's map on a different thread than
Comment style nit: leading /*\n please...
> + * did the mapping (and thus the TLB flushing), to make sure that the page
> + * faults on other cores too.
> + */
> +void lkdtm_XPFO_SMP(void)
> +{
> + unsigned long user_addr, *virt_addr;
> + struct task_struct *thread;
> + int ret;
> + struct smp_arg arg;
> +
> + if (num_online_cpus() < 2) {
> + pr_err("not enough to do a multi cpu test\n");
> + return;
> + }
> +
> + arg.virt_addr = NULL;
> + arg.cpu = (smp_processor_id() + 1) % num_online_cpus();
> + thread = kthread_create(smp_reader, &arg, "lkdtm_xpfo_test");
> + if (IS_ERR(thread)) {
> + pr_err("couldn't create kthread? %ld\n", PTR_ERR(thread));
> + return;
> + }
> +
> + kthread_bind(thread, arg.cpu);
> + get_task_struct(thread);
> + wake_up_process(thread);
> +
> + user_addr = do_map(MAP_PRIVATE | MAP_ANONYMOUS);
> + if (!user_addr)
> + goto kill_thread;
> +
> + virt_addr = user_to_kernel(user_addr);
> + if (!virt_addr) {
> + /*
> + * let's store something that will fail, so we can unblock the
> + * thread
> + */
> + smp_store_release(&arg.virt_addr, &arg);
> + goto free_user;
> + }
> +
> + smp_store_release(&arg.virt_addr, virt_addr);
> +
> + /* there must be a better way to do this. */
> + while (1) {
> + if (thread->exit_state)
> + break;
> + msleep_interruptible(100);
> + }
I don't like infinite loops. How about giving this a 1 second max runtime?
> +
> +free_user:
> + if (user_addr)
> + vm_munmap(user_addr, PAGE_SIZE);
> +
> +kill_thread:
> + ret = kthread_stop(thread);
> + if (ret != XPFO_SMP_KILLED)
> + pr_err("FAIL: thread wasn't killed: %d\n", ret);
> + put_task_struct(thread);
> +}
> --
> 2.11.0
>
Otherwise it looks great, thanks!
-Kees
--
Kees Cook
Pixel Security
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