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Message-ID: <CA+55aFwMgUJSMQ96XdKnTbn8UsxzHTb8tZQdH40nxDeF7fWObw@mail.gmail.com>
Date: Fri, 8 Sep 2017 10:25:53 -0700
From: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@...ux-foundation.org>
To: Christoph Hellwig <hch@...radead.org>
Cc: James Morris <jmorris@...ei.org>,
Linux Kernel Mailing List <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>,
LSM List <linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org>,
Mimi Zohar <zohar@...ux.vnet.ibm.com>
Subject: Re: [GIT PULL] Security subsystem updates for 4.14
On Fri, Sep 8, 2017 at 12:09 AM, Christoph Hellwig <hch@...radead.org> wrote:
>
> But yes, for the init-time integrity_read_file this is incorrect.
> It never tripped up, and I explicitly added the lockdep annotations
> so that anything would show up, and it's been half a year since
> I sent that first RFC patch..
I don't think anybody actually tests linux-next kernels in any big
way, and the automated tests that do get run probably don't run with
any integrity checking enabled.
Which is why I actually look at the code when merging unexpected stuff.
This is also why I tend to prefer getting multiple branches for
independent things.
Now the whole security pull will be ignored because of this thing. I
refuse to pull garbage where I notice major fundamental problems in
code that has obviously never ever been tested.
Side note: one of the reasons why I _looked_ at this code was because
the exclusive lock requirement was entirely unexplained in the first
place.
Linus
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