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Date: Sat, 09 Sep 2017 22:47:40 +0100
From: Ben Hutchings <ben@...adent.org.uk>
To: linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org, stable@...r.kernel.org
CC: akpm@...ux-foundation.org,
"Steffen Klassert" <steffen.klassert@...unet.com>,
"Vladis Dronov" <vdronov@...hat.com>,
"bo Zhang" <zhangbo5891001@...il.com>
Subject: [PATCH 3.2 099/106] xfrm: policy: check policy direction value
3.2.93-rc1 review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Vladis Dronov <vdronov@...hat.com>
commit 7bab09631c2a303f87a7eb7e3d69e888673b9b7e upstream.
The 'dir' parameter in xfrm_migrate() is a user-controlled byte which is used
as an array index. This can lead to an out-of-bound access, kernel lockup and
DoS. Add a check for the 'dir' value.
This fixes CVE-2017-11600.
References: https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1474928
Fixes: 80c9abaabf42 ("[XFRM]: Extension for dynamic update of endpoint address(es)")
Reported-by: "bo Zhang" <zhangbo5891001@...il.com>
Signed-off-by: Vladis Dronov <vdronov@...hat.com>
Signed-off-by: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@...unet.com>
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@...adent.org.uk>
---
net/xfrm/xfrm_policy.c | 6 ++++++
1 file changed, 6 insertions(+)
--- a/net/xfrm/xfrm_policy.c
+++ b/net/xfrm/xfrm_policy.c
@@ -2897,9 +2897,15 @@ int xfrm_migrate(const struct xfrm_selec
struct xfrm_state *x_new[XFRM_MAX_DEPTH];
struct xfrm_migrate *mp;
+ /* Stage 0 - sanity checks */
if ((err = xfrm_migrate_check(m, num_migrate)) < 0)
goto out;
+ if (dir >= XFRM_POLICY_MAX) {
+ err = -EINVAL;
+ goto out;
+ }
+
/* Stage 1 - find policy */
if ((pol = xfrm_migrate_policy_find(sel, dir, type)) == NULL) {
err = -ENOENT;
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