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Message-ID: <20170912140249.f26w5xedbrqu52i4@pd.tnic>
Date: Tue, 12 Sep 2017 16:02:50 +0200
From: Borislav Petkov <bp@...e.de>
To: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@....com>
Cc: linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org, x86@...nel.org, kvm@...r.kernel.org,
Thomas Gleixner <tglx@...utronix.de>,
Joerg Roedel <joro@...tes.org>,
"Michael S . Tsirkin" <mst@...hat.com>,
Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@...hat.com>,
\"Radim Krčmář\" <rkrcmar@...hat.com>,
Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@....com>,
Herbert Xu <herbert@...dor.apana.org.au>,
"David S . Miller" <davem@...emloft.net>,
Gary Hook <gary.hook@....com>, linux-crypto@...r.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [RFC Part2 PATCH v3 03/26] crypto: ccp: Add Secure Encrypted
Virtualization (SEV) device support
Just a cursory review: more indepth after the redesign.
On Mon, Jul 24, 2017 at 03:02:40PM -0500, Brijesh Singh wrote:
> AMDs new Secure Encrypted Virtualization (SEV) feature allows the memory
> contents of a virtual machine to be transparently encrypted with a key
> unique to the guest VM. The programming and management of the encryption
> keys are handled by the AMD Secure Processor (AMD-SP), which exposes the
> commands for these tasks. The complete spec for various commands are
s/ for various commands are/is/
> available at:
> http://support.amd.com/TechDocs/55766_SEV-KM%20API_Specification.pdf
>
> This patch extends AMD-SP driver to provide:
Never say "This patch" in a commit message of a patch. It is
tautologically useless.
> - a in-kernel APIs to communicate with SEV device. The APIs can be used
s/a/an/ with a SEV ...
> by the hypervisor to create encryption context for the SEV guests.
>
> - a userspace IOCTL to manage the platform certificates etc
>
> Cc: Herbert Xu <herbert@...dor.apana.org.au>
> Cc: David S. Miller <davem@...emloft.net>
> Cc: Gary Hook <gary.hook@....com>
> Cc: linux-crypto@...r.kernel.org
> Signed-off-by: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@....com>
> ---
> drivers/crypto/ccp/Kconfig | 10 +
> drivers/crypto/ccp/Makefile | 1 +
> drivers/crypto/ccp/psp-dev.c | 4 +
> drivers/crypto/ccp/psp-dev.h | 27 ++
> drivers/crypto/ccp/sev-dev.c | 416 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++
> drivers/crypto/ccp/sev-dev.h | 67 +++++
> drivers/crypto/ccp/sev-ops.c | 457 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
> drivers/crypto/ccp/sp-pci.c | 2 +-
> include/linux/psp-sev.h | 683 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
> include/uapi/linux/psp-sev.h | 110 +++++++
> 10 files changed, 1776 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
> create mode 100644 drivers/crypto/ccp/sev-dev.c
> create mode 100644 drivers/crypto/ccp/sev-dev.h
> create mode 100644 drivers/crypto/ccp/sev-ops.c
> create mode 100644 include/linux/psp-sev.h
> create mode 100644 include/uapi/linux/psp-sev.h
>
> diff --git a/drivers/crypto/ccp/Kconfig b/drivers/crypto/ccp/Kconfig
> index 41c0ff5..ae0ff1c 100644
> --- a/drivers/crypto/ccp/Kconfig
> +++ b/drivers/crypto/ccp/Kconfig
> @@ -40,3 +40,13 @@ config CRYPTO_DEV_SP_PSP
> Provide the support for AMD Platform Security Processor (PSP) device
> which can be used for communicating with Secure Encryption Virtualization
> (SEV) firmware.
> +
> +config CRYPTO_DEV_PSP_SEV
> + bool "Secure Encrypted Virtualization (SEV) interface"
> + default y
> + depends on CRYPTO_DEV_CCP_DD
> + depends on CRYPTO_DEV_SP_PSP
> + help
> + Provide the kernel and userspace (/dev/sev) interface to communicate with
> + Secure Encrypted Virtualization (SEV) firmware running inside AMD Platform
> + Security Processor (PSP)
> diff --git a/drivers/crypto/ccp/Makefile b/drivers/crypto/ccp/Makefile
> index 8aae4ff..94ca748 100644
> --- a/drivers/crypto/ccp/Makefile
> +++ b/drivers/crypto/ccp/Makefile
> @@ -8,6 +8,7 @@ ccp-$(CONFIG_CRYPTO_DEV_SP_CCP) += ccp-dev.o \
> ccp-debugfs.o
> ccp-$(CONFIG_PCI) += sp-pci.o
> ccp-$(CONFIG_CRYPTO_DEV_SP_PSP) += psp-dev.o
> +ccp-$(CONFIG_CRYPTO_DEV_PSP_SEV) += sev-dev.o sev-ops.o
>
> obj-$(CONFIG_CRYPTO_DEV_CCP_CRYPTO) += ccp-crypto.o
> ccp-crypto-objs := ccp-crypto-main.o \
> diff --git a/drivers/crypto/ccp/psp-dev.c b/drivers/crypto/ccp/psp-dev.c
> index bb0ea9a..0c9d25c 100644
> --- a/drivers/crypto/ccp/psp-dev.c
> +++ b/drivers/crypto/ccp/psp-dev.c
> @@ -97,6 +97,7 @@ irqreturn_t psp_irq_handler(int irq, void *data)
> static int psp_init(struct psp_device *psp)
> {
> psp_add_device(psp);
> + sev_dev_init(psp);
>
> return 0;
> }
> @@ -166,17 +167,20 @@ void psp_dev_destroy(struct sp_device *sp)
> struct psp_device *psp = sp->psp_data;
>
> sp_free_psp_irq(sp, psp);
> + sev_dev_destroy(psp);
>
> psp_del_device(psp);
> }
>
> int psp_dev_resume(struct sp_device *sp)
> {
> + sev_dev_resume(sp->psp_data);
> return 0;
> }
>
> int psp_dev_suspend(struct sp_device *sp, pm_message_t state)
> {
> + sev_dev_suspend(sp->psp_data, state);
> return 0;
> }
>
> diff --git a/drivers/crypto/ccp/psp-dev.h b/drivers/crypto/ccp/psp-dev.h
> index 6e167b8..9334d87 100644
> --- a/drivers/crypto/ccp/psp-dev.h
> +++ b/drivers/crypto/ccp/psp-dev.h
> @@ -78,5 +78,32 @@ int psp_free_tee_irq(struct psp_device *psp, void *data);
> struct psp_device *psp_get_master_device(void);
>
> extern const struct psp_vdata psp_entry;
> +#ifdef CONFIG_CRYPTO_DEV_PSP_SEV
> +
> +int sev_dev_init(struct psp_device *psp);
> +void sev_dev_destroy(struct psp_device *psp);
> +int sev_dev_resume(struct psp_device *psp);
> +int sev_dev_suspend(struct psp_device *psp, pm_message_t state);
> +
> +#else /* !CONFIG_CRYPTO_DEV_PSP_SEV */
> +
> +static inline int sev_dev_init(struct psp_device *psp)
> +{
> + return -ENODEV;
> +}
> +
> +static inline void sev_dev_destroy(struct psp_device *psp) { }
> +
> +static inline int sev_dev_resume(struct psp_device *psp)
> +{
> + return -ENODEV;
> +}
> +
> +static inline int sev_dev_suspend(struct psp_device *psp, pm_message_t state)
> +{
> + return -ENODEV;
> +}
> +
> +#endif /* CONFIG_CRYPTO_DEV_PSP_SEV */
>
> #endif /* __PSP_DEV_H */
> diff --git a/drivers/crypto/ccp/sev-dev.c b/drivers/crypto/ccp/sev-dev.c
> new file mode 100644
> index 0000000..a2b41dd
> --- /dev/null
> +++ b/drivers/crypto/ccp/sev-dev.c
> @@ -0,0 +1,416 @@
> +/*
> + * AMD Secure Encrypted Virtualization (SEV) interface
> + *
> + * Copyright (C) 2016-2017 Advanced Micro Devices, Inc.
> + *
> + * Author: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@....com>
> + *
> + * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
> + * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License version 2 as
> + * published by the Free Software Foundation.
> + */
> +
> +#include <linux/module.h>
> +#include <linux/kernel.h>
> +#include <linux/kthread.h>
> +#include <linux/sched.h>
> +#include <linux/interrupt.h>
> +#include <linux/spinlock.h>
> +#include <linux/spinlock_types.h>
> +#include <linux/types.h>
> +#include <linux/mutex.h>
> +#include <linux/delay.h>
> +#include <linux/wait.h>
> +#include <linux/jiffies.h>
> +
> +#include "psp-dev.h"
> +#include "sev-dev.h"
> +
> +extern const struct file_operations sev_fops;
> +
> +static LIST_HEAD(sev_devs);
> +static DEFINE_SPINLOCK(sev_devs_lock);
> +static atomic_t sev_id;
> +
> +static unsigned int sev_poll;
> +module_param(sev_poll, uint, 0444);
> +MODULE_PARM_DESC(sev_poll, "Poll for sev command completion - any non-zero value");
> +
> +DEFINE_MUTEX(sev_cmd_mutex);
Please audit all those drivers after you redesign them and check for
variables and functions which are not static but used in a single
compilation unit. Like this one, for example.
<... skipping over the rest, will look at it in the next version ...>
...
> +static int sev_cmd_buffer_len(int cmd)
> +{
> + int size;
> +
> + switch (cmd) {
> + case SEV_CMD_INIT:
> + size = sizeof(struct sev_data_init);
> + break;
You could make that more tabular like this:
case SEV_CMD_INIT: return sizeof(struct sev_data_init);
case SEV_CMD_PLATFORM_STATUS: return sizeof(struct sev_data_status);
case SEV_CMD_PEK_CSR: return sizeof(struct sev_data_pek_csr);
...
which should make it more readable.
But looking at this more, this is a static mapping between the commands
and the corresponding struct sizes and you use it in
print_hex_dump_debug("(in): ", DUMP_PREFIX_OFFSET, 16, 2, data,
sev_cmd_buffer_len(cmd), false);
But then, I don't see what that brings you because you're not dumping
the actual @data length but the *expected* data length based on the
command type.
And *that* you can look up in the manual and do not need it in code,
enlarging the driver unnecessarily.
...
> +int sev_platform_init(struct sev_data_init *data, int *error)
> +{
> + return sev_issue_cmd(SEV_CMD_INIT, data, error);
> +}
> +EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(sev_platform_init);
> +
> +int sev_platform_shutdown(int *error)
> +{
> + return sev_issue_cmd(SEV_CMD_SHUTDOWN, 0, error);
> +}
> +EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(sev_platform_shutdown);
All those could be static inlines in a header instead of separate
symbols.
> +int sev_issue_cmd(int cmd, void *data, int *psp_ret)
> +{
> + struct sev_device *sev = get_sev_master_device();
> + unsigned int phys_lsb, phys_msb;
> + unsigned int reg, ret;
> +
> + if (!sev)
> + return -ENODEV;
> +
> + if (psp_ret)
> + *psp_ret = 0;
> +
> + /* Set the physical address for the PSP */
> + phys_lsb = data ? lower_32_bits(__psp_pa(data)) : 0;
> + phys_msb = data ? upper_32_bits(__psp_pa(data)) : 0;
> +
> + dev_dbg(sev->dev, "sev command id %#x buffer 0x%08x%08x\n",
> + cmd, phys_msb, phys_lsb);
> + print_hex_dump_debug("(in): ", DUMP_PREFIX_OFFSET, 16, 2, data,
> + sev_cmd_buffer_len(cmd), false);
> +
> + /* Only one command at a time... */
> + mutex_lock(&sev_cmd_mutex);
> +
> + iowrite32(phys_lsb, sev->io_regs + PSP_CMDBUFF_ADDR_LO);
> + iowrite32(phys_msb, sev->io_regs + PSP_CMDBUFF_ADDR_HI);
> + wmb();
WARNING: memory barrier without comment
#503: FILE: drivers/crypto/ccp/sev-dev.c:339:
+ wmb();
Again:
Please integrate scripts/checkpatch.pl into your patch creation
workflow. Some of the warnings/errors *actually* make sense.
> diff --git a/drivers/crypto/ccp/sev-dev.h b/drivers/crypto/ccp/sev-dev.h
> new file mode 100644
> index 0000000..0a8ce08
> --- /dev/null
> +++ b/drivers/crypto/ccp/sev-dev.h
> @@ -0,0 +1,67 @@
> +/*
> + * AMD Secure Encrypted Virtualization (SEV) interface
> + *
> + * Copyright (C) 2016-2017 Advanced Micro Devices, Inc.
> + *
> + * Author: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@....com>
> + *
> + * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
> + * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License version 2 as
> + * published by the Free Software Foundation.
> + */
> +
> +#ifndef __SEV_DEV_H__
> +#define __SEV_DEV_H__
> +
> +#include <linux/device.h>
> +#include <linux/spinlock.h>
> +#include <linux/mutex.h>
> +#include <linux/list.h>
> +#include <linux/wait.h>
> +#include <linux/interrupt.h>
> +#include <linux/irqreturn.h>
> +#include <linux/miscdevice.h>
> +
> +#include <linux/psp-sev.h>
> +
> +#define PSP_C2PMSG(_num) ((_num) << 2)
> +#define PSP_CMDRESP PSP_C2PMSG(32)
> +#define PSP_CMDBUFF_ADDR_LO PSP_C2PMSG(56)
> +#define PSP_CMDBUFF_ADDR_HI PSP_C2PMSG(57)
> +#define PSP_FEATURE_REG PSP_C2PMSG(63)
> +
> +#define PSP_P2CMSG(_num) (_num << 2)
> +#define PSP_CMD_COMPLETE_REG 1
> +#define PSP_CMD_COMPLETE PSP_P2CMSG(PSP_CMD_COMPLETE_REG)
> +
> +#define MAX_PSP_NAME_LEN 16
> +#define SEV_DEFAULT_TIMEOUT 5
> +
> +struct sev_device {
> + struct list_head entry;
> +
> + struct dentry *debugfs;
> + struct miscdevice misc;
> +
> + unsigned int id;
> + char name[MAX_PSP_NAME_LEN];
> +
> + struct device *dev;
> + struct sp_device *sp;
> + struct psp_device *psp;
> +
> + void __iomem *io_regs;
> +
> + unsigned int int_rcvd;
> + wait_queue_head_t int_queue;
> +};
> +
> +void sev_add_device(struct sev_device *sev);
> +void sev_del_device(struct sev_device *sev);
> +
> +int sev_ops_init(struct sev_device *sev);
> +void sev_ops_destroy(struct sev_device *sev);
> +
> +int sev_issue_cmd(int cmd, void *data, int *error);
> +
> +#endif /* __SEV_DEV_H */
> diff --git a/drivers/crypto/ccp/sev-ops.c b/drivers/crypto/ccp/sev-ops.c
> new file mode 100644
> index 0000000..a13d857
> --- /dev/null
> +++ b/drivers/crypto/ccp/sev-ops.c
> @@ -0,0 +1,457 @@
> +/*
> + * AMD Secure Encrypted Virtualization (SEV) command interface
> + *
> + * Copyright (C) 2016-2017 Advanced Micro Devices, Inc.
> + *
> + * Author: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@....com>
> + *
> + * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
> + * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License version 2 as
> + * published by the Free Software Foundation.
> + */
> +
> +#include <linux/module.h>
> +#include <linux/kernel.h>
> +#include <linux/kthread.h>
> +#include <linux/sched.h>
> +#include <linux/interrupt.h>
> +#include <linux/spinlock.h>
> +#include <linux/spinlock_types.h>
> +#include <linux/types.h>
> +#include <linux/mutex.h>
> +#include <linux/uaccess.h>
> +
> +#include <uapi/linux/psp-sev.h>
> +
> +#include "psp-dev.h"
> +#include "sev-dev.h"
> +
> +static bool sev_initialized;
Variables like this one are a good example that the design is not
optimal. sev-ops should all be in psp-dev and then you don't need all those
registrations and ops passing around and so on... But you get the idea...
> +static int sev_platform_get_state(int *state, int *error)
> +{
> + int ret;
> + struct sev_data_status *data;
> +
> + data = kzalloc(sizeof(*data), GFP_KERNEL);
> + if (!data)
> + return -ENOMEM;
> +
> + ret = sev_platform_status(data, error);
> + *state = data->state;
> +
> + kfree(data);
> + return ret;
> +}
> +
> +static int __sev_platform_init(int *error)
> +{
> + int ret;
> + struct sev_data_init *data;
> +
> + data = kzalloc(sizeof(*data), GFP_KERNEL);
> + if (!data)
> + return -ENOMEM;
> +
> + ret = sev_platform_init(data, error);
It is usually the other way around: the function without the "__" calls
the "__" variant.
> +
> + kfree(data);
> + return ret;
> +}
> +
> +static int sev_ioctl_factory_reset(struct sev_issue_cmd *argp)
> +{
> + return sev_issue_cmd(SEV_CMD_FACTORY_RESET, 0, &argp->error);
> +}
static inline in a header.
> +
> +static int sev_ioctl_platform_status(struct sev_issue_cmd *argp)
> +{
> + int ret;
> + struct sev_data_status *data;
> +
> + data = kzalloc(sizeof(*data), GFP_KERNEL);
> + if (!data)
> + return -ENOMEM;
> +
> + ret = sev_platform_status(data, &argp->error);
> +
> + if (copy_to_user((void *)argp->data, data, sizeof(*data)))
> + ret = -EFAULT;
> +
> + kfree(data);
> + return ret;
> +}
> +
> +static int sev_ioctl_pek_csr(struct sev_issue_cmd *argp)
> +{
> + int do_shutdown = 0;
> + int ret, state, error;
> + void *csr_addr = NULL;
> + struct sev_data_pek_csr *data;
> + struct sev_user_data_pek_csr input;
> +
> + if (copy_from_user(&input, (void *)argp->data,
> + sizeof(struct sev_user_data_pek_csr)))
> + return -EFAULT;
> +
> + data = kzalloc(sizeof(*data), GFP_KERNEL);
> + if (!data)
> + return -ENOMEM;
> +
> + /*
> + * PEK_CSR command can be issued when firmware is in INIT or WORKING
> + * state. If firmware is in UNINIT state then we transition into INIT
> + * state and issue the command.
> + */
> + ret = sev_platform_get_state(&state, &argp->error);
> + if (ret)
> + return ret;
> +
> + if (state == SEV_STATE_UNINIT) {
> + /* transition the plaform into INIT state */
> + ret = __sev_platform_init(&argp->error);
> + if (ret)
> + return ret;
> + do_shutdown = 1;
> + }
> +
> + if (input.address) {
> + csr_addr = kmalloc(input.length, GFP_KERNEL);
> + if (!csr_addr) {
> + ret = -ENOMEM;
> + goto e_free;
> + }
> + data->address = __psp_pa(csr_addr);
> + data->length = input.length;
> + }
> +
> + ret = sev_issue_cmd(SEV_CMD_PEK_CSR, data, &argp->error);
> +
> + if (csr_addr) {
> + if (copy_to_user((void *)input.address, csr_addr,
> + input.length)) {
> + ret = -EFAULT;
> + goto e_free;
> + }
> + }
> +
> + input.length = data->length;
> + if (copy_to_user((void *)argp->data, &input,
> + sizeof(struct sev_user_data_pek_csr)))
> + ret = -EFAULT;
> +e_free:
> + if (do_shutdown)
> + sev_platform_shutdown(&error);
Who's looking at that error?
No one, AFAICT. It is a stack variable which gets destroyed after this
function returns. The other call sites look the same. Please fix.
> + kfree(csr_addr);
> + kfree(data);
> + return ret;
> +}
> +
> +static int sev_ioctl_pdh_gen(struct sev_issue_cmd *argp)
> +{
> + int ret, state, error, do_shutdown = 0;
> +
> + /*
> + * PDH_GEN command can be issued when platform is in INIT or WORKING
> + * state. If we are in UNINIT state then transition into INIT.
> + */
> + ret = sev_platform_get_state(&state, &argp->error);
> + if (ret)
> + return ret;
> +
> + if (state == SEV_STATE_UNINIT) {
> + /* transition the plaform into INIT state */
> + ret = __sev_platform_init(&argp->error);
> + if (ret)
> + return ret;
> + do_shutdown = 1;
> + }
> +
> + ret = sev_issue_cmd(SEV_CMD_PDH_GEN, 0, &argp->error);
> + if (do_shutdown)
> + sev_platform_shutdown(&error);
> + return ret;
> +}
> +
> +static int sev_ioctl_pek_gen(struct sev_issue_cmd *argp)
> +{
> + int do_shutdown = 0;
> + int error, ret, state;
> +
> + /*
> + * PEK_GEN command can be issued only when firmware is in INIT state.
> + * If firmware is in UNINIT state then we transition into INIT state
> + * and issue the command and then shutdown.
> + */
> + ret = sev_platform_get_state(&state, &argp->error);
> + if (ret)
> + return ret;
> +
> + if (state == SEV_STATE_UNINIT) {
> + /* transition the plaform into INIT state */
> + ret = __sev_platform_init(&argp->error);
> + if (ret)
> + return ret;
> +
> + do_shutdown = 1;
> + }
> +
> + ret = sev_issue_cmd(SEV_CMD_PEK_GEN, 0, &argp->error);
> +
> + if (do_shutdown)
> + sev_platform_shutdown(&error);
> + return ret;
> +}
> +
> +static int sev_ioctl_pek_cert_import(struct sev_issue_cmd *argp)
> +{
> + int ret, state, error, do_shutdown = 0;
> + struct sev_data_pek_cert_import *data;
> + struct sev_user_data_pek_cert_import input;
> + void *pek_cert = NULL, *oca_cert = NULL;
> +
> + if (copy_from_user(&input, (void *)argp->data, sizeof(*data)))
> + return -EFAULT;
> +
> + if (!input.pek_cert_address || !input.pek_cert_length ||
> + !input.oca_cert_address || !input.oca_cert_length)
> + return -EINVAL;
Here and everywhere else: please audit all those copy_from_user() calls
for user-controlled fields and the such and conservatively sanity-check
them. ou don't want to have security bugs in this driver!
You need to massage all those user values into sanity.
> + ret = sev_platform_get_state(&state, &argp->error);
> + if (ret)
> + return ret;
> +
> + /*
> + * CERT_IMPORT command can be issued only when platform is in INIT
> + * state. If we are in UNINIT state then transition into INIT state
> + * and issue the command.
> + */
> + if (state == SEV_STATE_UNINIT) {
> + /* transition platform init INIT state */
> + ret = __sev_platform_init(&argp->error);
> + if (ret)
> + return ret;
> + do_shutdown = 1;
> + }
> +
> + data = kzalloc(sizeof(*data), GFP_KERNEL);
> + if (!data) {
> + ret = -ENOMEM;
> + goto e_free;
> + }
> +
> + pek_cert = kmalloc(input.pek_cert_length, GFP_KERNEL);
> + if (!pek_cert) {
> + ret = -ENOMEM;
> + goto e_free;
> + }
> +
> + /* copy PEK certificate from userspace */
> + if (copy_from_user(pek_cert, (void *)input.pek_cert_address,
> + input.pek_cert_length)) {
> + ret = -EFAULT;
> + goto e_free;
> + }
> +
> + data->pek_cert_address = __psp_pa(pek_cert);
> + data->pek_cert_length = input.pek_cert_length;
> +
> + oca_cert = kmalloc(input.oca_cert_length, GFP_KERNEL);
There's your first overrun: that oca_cert_length you copy from userspace
and check only if it is 0 but it can be huuge.
> + if (!oca_cert) {
> + ret = -ENOMEM;
> + goto e_free;
> + }
> +
> + /* copy OCA certificate from userspace */
> + if (copy_from_user(oca_cert, (void *)input.oca_cert_address,
... and here's the user-controlled address where you copy the exploit
code from. You need to revisit all those copy_from_user() calls and be
absolutely defensive here.
> + input.oca_cert_length)) {
> + ret = -EFAULT;
> + goto e_free;
> + }
> +
> + data->oca_cert_address = __psp_pa(oca_cert);
> + data->oca_cert_length = input.oca_cert_length;
> +
> + ret = sev_issue_cmd(SEV_CMD_PEK_CERT_IMPORT, data, &argp->error);
> +e_free:
> + if (do_shutdown)
> + sev_platform_shutdown(&error);
> + kfree(oca_cert);
> + kfree(pek_cert);
> + kfree(data);
> + return ret;
> +}
> +
> +static int sev_ioctl_pdh_cert_export(struct sev_issue_cmd *argp)
> +{
> + int ret, state, error, need_shutdown = 0;
> + struct sev_data_pdh_cert_export *data;
> + struct sev_user_data_pdh_cert_export input;
> + void *pdh_cert = NULL, *cert_chain = NULL;
> +
> + if (copy_from_user(&input, (void *)argp->data, sizeof(*data)))
> + return -EFAULT;
> +
> + /*
> + * CERT_EXPORT command can be issued in INIT or WORKING state.
> + * If we are in UNINIT state then transition into INIT state and
> + * shutdown before exiting. But if platform is in WORKING state
> + * then EXPORT the certificate but do not shutdown the platform.
> + */
> + ret = sev_platform_get_state(&state, &argp->error);
> + if (ret)
> + return ret;
> +
> + if (state == SEV_STATE_UNINIT) {
> + ret = __sev_platform_init(&argp->error);
> + if (ret)
> + return ret;
> + need_shutdown = 1;
> + }
> +
> + data = kzalloc(sizeof(*data), GFP_KERNEL);
> + if (!data) {
> + ret = -ENOMEM;
> + goto e_free;
> + }
> +
> + if (input.pdh_cert_address) {
Oh wow, so that address is absolutely unchecked.
> + pdh_cert = kmalloc(input.pdh_cert_length, GFP_KERNEL);
> + if (!pdh_cert) {
> + ret = -ENOMEM;
> + goto e_free;
> + }
> +
> + data->pdh_cert_address = __psp_pa(pdh_cert);
> + data->pdh_cert_length = input.pdh_cert_length;
> + }
> +
> + if (input.cert_chain_address) {
Ditto.
And so on and so on...
> + cert_chain = kmalloc(input.cert_chain_length, GFP_KERNEL);
> + if (!cert_chain) {
> + ret = -ENOMEM;
> + goto e_free;
> + }
> +
> + data->cert_chain_address = __psp_pa(cert_chain);
> + data->cert_chain_length = input.cert_chain_length;
> + }
> +
> + ret = sev_issue_cmd(SEV_CMD_PDH_CERT_EXPORT, data, &argp->error);
> +
> + input.cert_chain_length = data->cert_chain_length;
> + input.pdh_cert_length = data->pdh_cert_length;
> +
> + /* copy PDH certificate to userspace */
> + if (pdh_cert) {
> + if (copy_to_user((void *)input.pdh_cert_address,
> + pdh_cert, input.pdh_cert_length)) {
> + ret = -EFAULT;
> + goto e_free;
> + }
> + }
> +
> + /* copy certificate chain to userspace */
> + if (cert_chain) {
> + if (copy_to_user((void *)input.cert_chain_address,
> + cert_chain, input.cert_chain_length)) {
> + ret = -EFAULT;
> + goto e_free;
> + }
> + }
> +
> + /* copy certificate length to userspace */
> + if (copy_to_user((void *)argp->data, &input,
> + sizeof(struct sev_user_data_pdh_cert_export)))
> + ret = -EFAULT;
> +
> +e_free:
> + if (need_shutdown)
> + sev_platform_shutdown(&error);
> +
> + kfree(cert_chain);
> + kfree(pdh_cert);
> + kfree(data);
> + return ret;
> +}
> +
> +static long sev_ioctl(struct file *file, unsigned int ioctl, unsigned long arg)
> +{
> + int ret = -EFAULT;
> + void __user *argp = (void __user *)arg;
> + struct sev_issue_cmd input;
> +
> + if (ioctl != SEV_ISSUE_CMD)
> + return -EINVAL;
> +
> + if (copy_from_user(&input, argp, sizeof(struct sev_issue_cmd)))
> + return -EFAULT;
> +
> + if (input.cmd > SEV_CMD_MAX)
> + return -EINVAL;
> +
> + switch (input.cmd) {
> +
> + case SEV_USER_CMD_FACTORY_RESET: {
> + ret = sev_ioctl_factory_reset(&input);
> + break;
> + }
> + case SEV_USER_CMD_PLATFORM_STATUS: {
> + ret = sev_ioctl_platform_status(&input);
> + break;
> + }
> + case SEV_USER_CMD_PEK_GEN: {
> + ret = sev_ioctl_pek_gen(&input);
> + break;
> + }
> + case SEV_USER_CMD_PDH_GEN: {
> + ret = sev_ioctl_pdh_gen(&input);
> + break;
> + }
> + case SEV_USER_CMD_PEK_CSR: {
> + ret = sev_ioctl_pek_csr(&input);
> + break;
> + }
> + case SEV_USER_CMD_PEK_CERT_IMPORT: {
> + ret = sev_ioctl_pek_cert_import(&input);
> + break;
> + }
> + case SEV_USER_CMD_PDH_CERT_EXPORT: {
> + ret = sev_ioctl_pdh_cert_export(&input);
> + break;
> + }
> + default:
> + ret = -EINVAL;
> + break;
> + }
> +
> + if (copy_to_user(argp, &input, sizeof(struct sev_issue_cmd)))
> + ret = -EFAULT;
> +
> + return ret;
> +}
> +
> +const struct file_operations sev_fops = {
> + .owner = THIS_MODULE,
> + .unlocked_ioctl = sev_ioctl,
> +};
> +
> +int sev_ops_init(struct sev_device *sev)
> +{
> + struct miscdevice *misc = &sev->misc;
> +
> + /* if sev device is already registered then do nothing */
> + if (sev_initialized)
> + return 0;
> +
> + misc->minor = MISC_DYNAMIC_MINOR;
> + misc->name = sev->name;
> + misc->fops = &sev_fops;
> + sev_initialized = true;
> +
> + return misc_register(misc);
> +}
> +
> +void sev_ops_destroy(struct sev_device *sev)
> +{
> + misc_deregister(&sev->misc);
> +}
> diff --git a/drivers/crypto/ccp/sp-pci.c b/drivers/crypto/ccp/sp-pci.c
> index e58b3ad..20a0f35 100644
> --- a/drivers/crypto/ccp/sp-pci.c
> +++ b/drivers/crypto/ccp/sp-pci.c
> @@ -280,7 +280,7 @@ static const struct sp_dev_vdata dev_vdata[] = {
> #ifdef CONFIG_CRYPTO_DEV_SP_CCP
> .ccp_vdata = &ccpv5a,
> #endif
> -#ifdef CONFIG_CRYPTO_DEV_PSP
> +#ifdef CONFIG_CRYPTO_DEV_SP_PSP
> .psp_vdata = &psp_entry
> #endif
> },
> diff --git a/include/linux/psp-sev.h b/include/linux/psp-sev.h
> new file mode 100644
> index 0000000..1736880
> --- /dev/null
> +++ b/include/linux/psp-sev.h
> @@ -0,0 +1,683 @@
> +/*
> + * AMD Secure Encrypted Virtualization (SEV) driver interface
> + *
> + * Copyright (C) 2016-2017 Advanced Micro Devices, Inc.
> + *
> + * Author: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@....com>
> + *
> + * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
> + * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License version 2 as
> + * published by the Free Software Foundation.
<--- you probably should have a reference to the document containing all
those commands, i.e.,
http://support.amd.com/TechDocs/55766_SEV-KM%20API_Specification.pdf
Also, for your next submission, please split this huuge patch. Those
definitions can go separately, for example.
> + */
> +
> +#ifndef __PSP_SEV_H__
> +#define __PSP_SEV_H__
> +
> +#ifdef CONFIG_X86
> +#include <linux/mem_encrypt.h>
> +
> +#define __psp_pa(x) __sme_pa(x)
> +#else
> +#define __psp_pa(x) __pa(x)
> +#endif
> +
> +/**
> + * SEV platform state
> + */
> +enum sev_state {
> + SEV_STATE_UNINIT = 0x0,
> + SEV_STATE_INIT = 0x1,
> + SEV_STATE_WORKING = 0x2,
> +
> + SEV_STATE_MAX
> +};
> +
> +/**
> + * SEV platform and guest management commands
> + */
> +enum sev_cmd {
> + /* platform commands */
> + SEV_CMD_INIT = 0x001,
> + SEV_CMD_SHUTDOWN = 0x002,
> + SEV_CMD_FACTORY_RESET = 0x003,
> + SEV_CMD_PLATFORM_STATUS = 0x004,
> + SEV_CMD_PEK_GEN = 0x005,
> + SEV_CMD_PEK_CSR = 0x006,
> + SEV_CMD_PEK_CERT_IMPORT = 0x007,
> + SEV_CMD_PDH_CERT_EXPORT = 0x008,
> + SEV_CMD_PDH_GEN = 0x009,
> + SEV_CMD_DF_FLUSH = 0x00A,
> +
> + /* Guest commands */
> + SEV_CMD_DECOMMISSION = 0x020,
> + SEV_CMD_ACTIVATE = 0x021,
> + SEV_CMD_DEACTIVATE = 0x022,
> + SEV_CMD_GUEST_STATUS = 0x023,
> +
> + /* Guest launch commands */
> + SEV_CMD_LAUNCH_START = 0x030,
> + SEV_CMD_LAUNCH_UPDATE_DATA = 0x031,
> + SEV_CMD_LAUNCH_UPDATE_VMSA = 0x032,
> + SEV_CMD_LAUNCH_MEASURE = 0x033,
> + SEV_CMD_LAUNCH_UPDATE_SECRET = 0x034,
> + SEV_CMD_LAUNCH_FINISH = 0x035,
> +
> + /* Guest migration commands (outgoing) */
> + SEV_CMD_SEND_START = 0x040,
> + SEV_CMD_SEND_UPDATE_DATA = 0x041,
> + SEV_CMD_SEND_UPDATE_VMSA = 0x042,
> + SEV_CMD_SEND_FINISH = 0x043,
> +
> + /* Guest migration commands (incoming) */
> + SEV_CMD_RECEIVE_START = 0x050,
> + SEV_CMD_RECEIVE_UPDATE_DATA = 0x051,
> + SEV_CMD_RECEIVE_UPDATE_VMSA = 0x052,
> + SEV_CMD_RECEIVE_FINISH = 0x053,
> +
> + /* Guest debug commands */
> + SEV_CMD_DBG_DECRYPT = 0x060,
> + SEV_CMD_DBG_ENCRYPT = 0x061,
> +
> + SEV_CMD_MAX,
> +};
> +
> +/**
> + * status code returned by the commands
> + */
> +enum psp_ret_code {
> + SEV_RET_SUCCESS = 0,
> + SEV_RET_INVALID_PLATFORM_STATE,
> + SEV_RET_INVALID_GUEST_STATE,
> + SEV_RET_INAVLID_CONFIG,
> + SEV_RET_INVALID_LENGTH,
> + SEV_RET_ALREADY_OWNED,
> + SEV_RET_INVALID_CERTIFICATE,
> + SEV_RET_POLICY_FAILURE,
> + SEV_RET_INACTIVE,
> + SEV_RET_INVALID_ADDRESS,
> + SEV_RET_BAD_SIGNATURE,
> + SEV_RET_BAD_MEASUREMENT,
> + SEV_RET_ASID_OWNED,
> + SEV_RET_INVALID_ASID,
> + SEV_RET_WBINVD_REQUIRED,
> + SEV_RET_DFFLUSH_REQUIRED,
> + SEV_RET_INVALID_GUEST,
> + SEV_RET_INVALID_COMMAND,
> + SEV_RET_ACTIVE,
> + SEV_RET_HWSEV_RET_PLATFORM,
> + SEV_RET_HWSEV_RET_UNSAFE,
> + SEV_RET_UNSUPPORTED,
> + SEV_RET_MAX,
> +};
> +
> +/**
> + * struct sev_data_init - INIT command parameters
> + *
> + * @flags: processing flags
> + * @tmr_address: system physical address used for SEV-ES
> + * @tmr_length: length of tmr_address
> + */
> +struct sev_data_init {
> + __u32 flags; /* In */
> + __u32 reserved; /* In */
> + __u64 tmr_address; /* In */
> + __u32 tmr_length; /* In */
> +};
I guess all those structs should be __packed to avoid the compiler
adding padding.
--
Regards/Gruss,
Boris.
SUSE Linux GmbH, GF: Felix Imendörffer, Jane Smithard, Graham Norton, HRB 21284 (AG Nürnberg)
--
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