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Message-Id: <1505465028-15256-1-git-send-email-s.mesoraca16@gmail.com>
Date: Fri, 15 Sep 2017 10:43:48 +0200
From: Salvatore Mesoraca <s.mesoraca16@...il.com>
To: Kernel Hardening <kernel-hardening@...ts.openwall.com>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>,
Solar Designer <solar@...nwall.com>,
Alexander Viro <viro@...iv.linux.org.uk>,
"Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@...ssion.com>,
linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org, linux-fsdevel@...r.kernel.org,
Salvatore Mesoraca <s.mesoraca16@...il.com>
Subject: [RFC] Restrict writes into untrusted FIFOs and regular files
Disallows writing into FIFOs or regular files not owned by the user
in world writable sticky directories, unless the owner is the same as
that of the directory or the file is opened without the O_CREAT flag.
The purpose is to make data spoofing attacks harder.
This protection can be turned on and off separately for FIFOs and regular
files via sysctl, just like the symlinks/hardlinks protection.
This patch is based on Openwall's "HARDEN_FIFO" feature by Solar
Designer <solar at openwall.com>.
Suggested-by: Solar Designer <solar@...nwall.com>
Suggested-by: Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>
Signed-off-by: Salvatore Mesoraca <s.mesoraca16@...il.com>
---
Documentation/sysctl/fs.txt | 34 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
fs/namei.c | 23 +++++++++++++++++++++++
include/linux/fs.h | 2 ++
kernel/sysctl.c | 18 ++++++++++++++++++
4 files changed, 77 insertions(+)
diff --git a/Documentation/sysctl/fs.txt b/Documentation/sysctl/fs.txt
index 35e17f7..18e16b7 100644
--- a/Documentation/sysctl/fs.txt
+++ b/Documentation/sysctl/fs.txt
@@ -36,6 +36,8 @@ Currently, these files are in /proc/sys/fs:
- pipe-user-pages-soft
- protected_hardlinks
- protected_symlinks
+- protected_fifos
+- protected_regular_files
- suid_dumpable
- super-max
- super-nr
@@ -222,6 +224,38 @@ This protection is based on the restrictions in Openwall and grsecurity.
==============================================================
+protected_fifos:
+
+The intent of this protection is to avoid unintentional writes to
+an attacker-controlled FIFO, where program expected to create a regular
+file.
+
+When set to "0", FIFOs writing is unrestricted.
+
+When set to "1" don't allow O_CREAT open on FIFOs that we don't own
+in world writable sticky directories, unless they are owned by the
+owner of the directory.
+
+This protection is based on the restrictions in Openwall.
+
+==============================================================
+
+protected_regular_files:
+
+This protection is similar to protected_fifos, but it
+avoids writes to an attacker-controlled regular file, where program
+expected to create one.
+
+When set to "0", regular files writing is unrestricted.
+
+When set to "1" don't allow O_CREAT open on regular files that we
+don't own in world writable sticky directories, unless they are
+owned by the owner of the directory.
+
+This protection is based on the restrictions in Openwall.
+
+==============================================================
+
suid_dumpable:
This value can be used to query and set the core dump mode for setuid
diff --git a/fs/namei.c b/fs/namei.c
index c75ea03..5459dbc 100644
--- a/fs/namei.c
+++ b/fs/namei.c
@@ -3225,6 +3225,9 @@ static int lookup_open(struct nameidata *nd, struct path *path,
return error;
}
+int sysctl_protected_fifos __read_mostly;
+int sysctl_protected_regular_files __read_mostly;
+
/*
* Handle the last step of open()
*/
@@ -3354,6 +3357,26 @@ static int do_last(struct nameidata *nd,
seq = 0; /* out of RCU mode, so the value doesn't matter */
inode = d_backing_inode(path.dentry);
+ /*
+ * When this protection is turned on via sysctl:
+ * don't allow "O_CREAT" open on FIFOs or regular files that we
+ * don't own in world writable sticky directories, unless they
+ * are owned by the owner of the directory.
+ */
+ if (((sysctl_protected_fifos && S_ISFIFO(inode->i_mode)) ||
+ (sysctl_protected_regular_files && S_ISREG(inode->i_mode))) &&
+ (dir->d_inode->i_mode & (S_ISVTX|S_IWOTH) == (S_ISVTX|S_IWOTH)) &&
+ !uid_eq(inode->i_uid, dir->d_inode->i_uid) &&
+ !uid_eq(current_fsuid(), inode->i_uid)) {
+ pr_notice_ratelimited("denied writing in file of %d.%d in a sticky directory by UID %d, EUID %d, process %s:%d.",
+ from_kuid(&init_user_ns, inode->i_uid),
+ from_kgid(&init_user_ns, inode->i_gid),
+ from_kuid(&init_user_ns, current_uid()),
+ from_kuid(&init_user_ns, current_euid()),
+ current->comm, current->pid);
+ path_to_nameidata(&path, nd);
+ return -EACCES;
+ }
finish_lookup:
error = step_into(nd, &path, 0, inode, seq);
if (unlikely(error))
diff --git a/include/linux/fs.h b/include/linux/fs.h
index 339e737..591ae87 100644
--- a/include/linux/fs.h
+++ b/include/linux/fs.h
@@ -71,6 +71,8 @@
extern int leases_enable, lease_break_time;
extern int sysctl_protected_symlinks;
extern int sysctl_protected_hardlinks;
+extern int sysctl_protected_fifos;
+extern int sysctl_protected_regular_files;
typedef __kernel_rwf_t rwf_t;
diff --git a/kernel/sysctl.c b/kernel/sysctl.c
index 6648fbb..b18d500 100644
--- a/kernel/sysctl.c
+++ b/kernel/sysctl.c
@@ -1807,6 +1807,24 @@ static int sysrq_sysctl_handler(struct ctl_table *table, int write,
.extra2 = &one,
},
{
+ .procname = "protected_fifos",
+ .data = &sysctl_protected_fifos,
+ .maxlen = sizeof(int),
+ .mode = 0600,
+ .proc_handler = proc_dointvec_minmax,
+ .extra1 = &zero,
+ .extra2 = &one,
+ },
+ {
+ .procname = "protected_regular_files",
+ .data = &sysctl_protected_regular_files,
+ .maxlen = sizeof(int),
+ .mode = 0600,
+ .proc_handler = proc_dointvec_minmax,
+ .extra1 = &zero,
+ .extra2 = &one,
+ },
+ {
.procname = "suid_dumpable",
.data = &suid_dumpable,
.maxlen = sizeof(int),
--
1.9.1
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