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Date:   Sun, 17 Sep 2017 08:37:55 -0700
From:   Christoph Hellwig <hch@...radead.org>
To:     Linus Torvalds <torvalds@...ux-foundation.org>
Cc:     Christoph Hellwig <hch@...radead.org>,
        Mimi Zohar <zohar@...ux.vnet.ibm.com>,
        LSM List <linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org>,
        Christoph Hellwig <hch@....de>,
        linux-ima-devel@...ts.sourceforge.net,
        James Morris <jmorris@...ei.org>,
        Linux Kernel Mailing List <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>,
        Matthew Garrett <mjg59@...f.ucam.org>,
        Jan Kara <jack@...e.com>, Theodore Ts'o <tytso@....edu>,
        Andreas Dilger <adilger.kernel@...ger.ca>,
        Jaegeuk Kim <jaegeuk@...nel.org>, Chao Yu <yuchao0@...wei.com>,
        Steven Whitehouse <swhiteho@...hat.com>,
        Bob Peterson <rpeterso@...hat.com>,
        David Woodhouse <dwmw2@...radead.org>,
        Dave Kleikamp <shaggy@...nel.org>,
        Ryusuke Konishi <konishi.ryusuke@....ntt.co.jp>,
        Mark Fasheh <mfasheh@...sity.com>,
        Joel Becker <jlbec@...lplan.org>,
        Richard Weinberger <richard@....at>,
        "Darrick J. Wong" <darrick.wong@...cle.com>,
        Hugh Dickins <hughd@...gle.com>, Chris Mason <clm@...com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH 3/3] ima: use fs method to read integrity data (updated
 patch description)

On Sun, Sep 17, 2017 at 08:28:40AM -0700, Linus Torvalds wrote:
> The issue is that somebody else can come in - using direct IO - at the
> same time as the first person is collecting measurements, and thus
> race with the collector.
>
> So now the measurements are not trustworthy any more.

Yes.  And it's always been that way with IMA.

> .. and *my* point is that it's the wrong lock for actually checking
> integrity (it doesn't actually guarantee exclusion, even though in
> practice it's almost always the case), and so we're adding a nasty
> callback that in 99% of all cases is the same as the normal read, and
> we *could* have just added it with a RWF flag instead.
> 
> Is there some reason why integrity has to use that particular lock
> that is so inconvenient for the filesystems it wants to check?

I'll have to defer that to Mimi - I just jumped into this whole mess
to help fixing the deadlocks we saw on XFS and NFS.

Unfortunately the whole security code is a giant mess that doesn't
document assumptions, threat models or gets any sort of verification
of those through automated testing.

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