Date:   Tue, 19 Sep 2017 22:35:46 -0400
From:   Meng Xu <mengxu.gatech@...il.com>
To:     Jerry.Hoemann@....com, Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@...el.com>
Cc:     Meng Xu <meng.xu@...ech.edu>,
        "linux-nvdimm@...ts.01.org" <linux-nvdimm@...ts.01.org>,
        "linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org" <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>,
        sanidhya@...ech.edu, Taesoo Kim <taesoo@...ech.edu>
Subject: Re: [PATCH] nvdimm: fix potential double-fetch bug

Hi Jerry and Dan,

Sorry for the late reply. I looked at this issue again and found 
that simple patches like memcmp(buf, in_env, in_len) && 
memcmp(buf + in_len, out_env, out_len) will only work
in the case of (cmd == ND_CMD_CALL) and does not apply
to other cmd. 

In fact, I fail to find a patch that is small enough (i.e., within
20 lines of modifications) to fix this problem. This is largely
because there are too many factors that can affect the in_size
and out_size (i.e., the if-else branches in nd_cmd_in_size() 
and nd_cmd_out_size()). 

One option maybe is to split the loops for processing input
and output envelopes early, like this:

if (nvdimm && cmd == ND_CMD_SET_CONFIG_DATA) {
	/* process an input envelope */
	for (i = 0; i < desc->in_num; i++) {}
	……
	/* process an output envelope */
	for (i = 0; i < desc->out_num; i++) {}
} else if (nvdimm && cmd == ND_CMD_VENDOR {
	/* process an input envelope */
	for (i = 0; i < desc->in_num; i++) {}
	……
	/* process an output envelope */
	for (i = 0; i < desc->out_num; i++) {}
} else if (cmd == ND_CMD_CALL) {
	/* process an input envelope */
	for (i = 0; i < desc->in_num; i++) {}
	……
	/* process an output envelope */
	for (i = 0; i < desc->out_num; i++) {}
}

But I guess this will require some major refactoring of the
code, which I am not sure is a good idea or is in my capability.
Please let me know your thoughts on this matter. Thanks.

Best Regards,
Meng

> On Sep 12, 2017, at 6:49 PM, Meng Xu <mengxu.gatech@...il.com> wrote:
> 
> Hi Jerry,
> 
> Thank you for the question. Yes, these double copies
> do seem to present an issue.
> 
> __nd_ioctl() and acpi_nfit_ctl() both use the same way
> to derive `out_size`, but based on different data fetches.
> 
> A simple patch would be
> memcmp(buf, in_env, in_len)
> memcmp(buf + in_len, out_env, out_len)
> 
> I am not sure I captured all the subtle issues with such a
> patch so please allow me some time to create and test it.
> 
> Best regards,
> Meng
> 
> On 09/12/2017 06:03 PM, Jerry Hoemann wrote:
>> On Thu, Aug 31, 2017 at 03:42:52PM -0700, Dan Williams wrote:
>>> [ adding Jerry ]
>>> 
>>> On Wed, Aug 23, 2017 at 2:07 PM, Meng Xu <meng.xu@...ech.edu> wrote:
>>>> From: Meng Xu <mengxu.gatech@...il.com>
>>>> 
>>>> While examining the kernel source code, I found a dangerous operation that
>>>> could turn into a double-fetch situation (a race condition bug) where
>>>> the same userspace memory region are fetched twice into kernel with sanity
>>>> checks after the first fetch while missing checks after the second fetch.
>>>> 
>>>> In the case of _IOC_NR(ioctl_cmd) == ND_CMD_CALL:
>>>> 
>>>> 1. The first fetch happens in line 935 copy_from_user(&pkg, p, sizeof(pkg)
>>>> 
>>>> 2. subsequently `pkg.nd_reserved2` is asserted to be all zeroes
>>>> (line 984 to 986).
>>>> 
>>>> 3. The second fetch happens in line 1022 copy_from_user(buf, p, buf_len)
>>>> 
>>>> 4. Given that `p` can be fully controlled in userspace, an attacker can
>>>> race condition to override the header part of `p`, say,
>>>> `((struct nd_cmd_pkg *)p)->nd_reserved2` to arbitrary value
>>>> (say nine 0xFFFFFFFF for `nd_reserved2`) after the first fetch but before the
>>>> second fetch. The changed value will be copied to `buf`.
>>>> 
>>>> 5. There is no checks on the second fetches until the use of it in
>>>> line 1034: nd_cmd_clear_to_send(nvdimm_bus, nvdimm, cmd, buf) and
>>>> line 1038: nd_desc->ndctl(nd_desc, nvdimm, cmd, buf, buf_len, &cmd_rc)
>>>> which means that the assumed relation, `p->nd_reserved2` are all zeroes might
>>>> not hold after the second fetch. And once the control goes to these functions
>>>> we lose the context to assert the assumed relation.
>>>> 
>>>> 6. Based on my manual analysis, `p->nd_reserved2` is not used in function
>>>> `nd_cmd_clear_to_send` and potential implementations of `nd_desc->ndctl`
>>>> so there is no working exploit against it right now. However, this could
>>>> easily turns to an exploitable one if careless developers start to use
>>>> `p->nd_reserved2` later and assume that they are all zeroes.
>>>> 
>>>> Proposed patch:
>>>> 
>>>> The patch explicitly overrides `buf->nd_reserved2` after the second fetch with
>>>> the value `pkg.nd_reserved2` from the first fetch. In this way, it is assured
>>>> that the relation, `buf->nd_reserved2` are all zeroes, holds after the second
>>>> fetch.
>>>> 
>>>> Signed-off-by: Meng Xu <mengxu.gatech@...il.com>
>>>> ---
>>>>  drivers/nvdimm/bus.c | 6 ++++++
>>>>  1 file changed, 6 insertions(+)
>>>> 
>>>> 
>>>> 
>>>> diff --git a/drivers/nvdimm/bus.c b/drivers/nvdimm/bus.c
>>>> index 937fafa..20c4d0f 100644
>>>> --- a/drivers/nvdimm/bus.c
>>>> +++ b/drivers/nvdimm/bus.c
>>>> @@ -1024,6 +1024,12 @@ static int __nd_ioctl(struct nvdimm_bus *nvdimm_bus, struct nvdimm *nvdimm,
>>>>                 goto out;
>>>>         }
>>>> 
>>>> +       if (cmd == ND_CMD_CALL) {
>>>> +               struct nd_cmd_pkg *hdr = (struct nd_cmd_pkg *)buf;
>>>> +               memcpy(hdr->nd_reserved2, pkg.nd_reserved2,
>>>> +                               sizeof(pkg.nd_reserved2));
>>>> +       }
>>>> +
>>> I think we're ok because the end point like acpi_nfit_ctl() is
>>> responsible for re-validating the buffer. So what I would rather like
>>> to see is deleting this loop:
>>> 
>>>                 for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(pkg.nd_reserved2); i++)
>>>                         if (pkg.nd_reserved2[i])
>>>                                 return -EINVAL;
>>> 
>>> ...from __nd_ioctl() and move it into acpi_nfit_ctl() directly where it belongs.
>> Sorry for the delay, I've been away.
>> 
>> I'm okay with moving the test to the beginning of acpi_nfit_ctl.  If/When the reserved
>> fields are defined/used, we may need to tweak that.  But we can cross that
>> bridge when it comes.
>> 
>> However, I do have a question.
>> 
>> There are two for loops in __nd_ioctl that process desc->in_num and desc->out_num
>> respectively.  These loops also copy_from_user before
>> 
>>         buf = vmalloc(buf_len);
>>         if (!buf)
>>                 return -ENOMEM;
>> 
>>         if (copy_from_user(buf, p, buf_len)) {
>>                 rc = -EFAULT;
>>                 goto out;
>>         }
>> 
>> 
>> Do these double copy instances present any problems?
>> 
>> 
> 

Powered by blists - more mailing lists