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Message-ID: <20170920234052.euqzh6opnn27nxth@mwanda>
Date: Thu, 21 Sep 2017 02:40:52 +0300
From: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@...cle.com>
To: Colin King <colin.king@...onical.com>
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@...uxfoundation.org>,
Jiri Slaby <jslaby@...e.com>, Ingo Molnar <mingo@...nel.org>,
kernel-janitors@...r.kernel.org, linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH] tty: vt: keyboard: add range check to kbs->kb_func index
On Wed, Sep 20, 2017 at 10:38:28PM +0100, Colin King wrote:
> From: Colin Ian King <colin.king@...onical.com>
>
> A value outside the range 0..MAX_NR_FUNC-1 in kbs->kb_func will
> cause an array bounds overflow on func_table. Fix this by adding
> a range check.
>
> Detected by CoverityScan, CID#401961 ("Untrusted array index read")
>
> Fixes: 079c9534a96d ("vt:tackle kbd_table")
> Signed-off-by: Colin Ian King <colin.king@...onical.com>
> ---
> drivers/tty/vt/keyboard.c | 5 +++++
> 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+)
>
> diff --git a/drivers/tty/vt/keyboard.c b/drivers/tty/vt/keyboard.c
> index f4166263bb3a..1ecf545a96a8 100644
> --- a/drivers/tty/vt/keyboard.c
> +++ b/drivers/tty/vt/keyboard.c
> @@ -1982,6 +1982,11 @@ int vt_do_kdgkb_ioctl(int cmd, struct kbsentry __user *user_kdgkb, int perm)
> kbs->kb_string[sizeof(kbs->kb_string)-1] = '\0';
> i = kbs->kb_func;
>
> + if (i < 0 || i >= MAX_NR_FUNC) {
kbs->kb_func is an unsigned char and MAX_NR_FUNC is 256 so this check
will never be true.
regards,
dan carpenter
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