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Message-ID: <e11a174b-078e-bf00-6a4a-e3c8c5de4c64@amd.com>
Date: Fri, 29 Sep 2017 10:54:39 -0500
From: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@....com>
To: Borislav Petkov <bp@...e.de>
Cc: brijesh.singh@....com, kvm@...r.kernel.org,
linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org, x86@...nel.org,
Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@....com>,
Thomas Gleixner <tglx@...utronix.de>,
Ingo Molnar <mingo@...hat.com>,
"H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@...or.com>, Andy Lutomirski <luto@...nel.org>
Subject: Re: [Part1 PATCH v5 02/17] x86/mm: Add Secure Encrypted
Virtualization (SEV) support
On 09/29/2017 09:41 AM, Borislav Petkov wrote:
> On Fri, Sep 29, 2017 at 07:28:47AM -0500, Brijesh Singh wrote:
>> if we are adding a chicken bits then I think we should do it for both
>> "smeonly" and "sevonly". We can boot host OS with SME disabled and SEV
>> enabled, and still be able to create the SEV guest from the hypervisor.
>
> Sure, but is that a real use case? I mean, who would want to run
> encrypted guests on an unencrypted hypervisor?
>
In production, you do not want to run encrypted guest on an unencrypted
hypervisor -- I was thinking about the debug environment. We can start
with mem_encrypt=sme and if we see the need for 'sev' arg then we can
extend it later.
I am working on the patch and will send for the review. thanks
-Brijesh
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