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Message-ID: <1507052834.19102.53.camel@bitron.ch>
Date: Tue, 03 Oct 2017 19:47:14 +0200
From: Jürg Billeter <j@...ron.ch>
To: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@...ssion.com>
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@...ux-foundation.org>,
Oleg Nesterov <oleg@...hat.com>,
Linus Torvalds <torvalds@...ux-foundation.org>,
Michael Kerrisk <mtk.manpages@...il.com>,
Filipe Brandenburger <filbranden@...gle.com>,
David Wilcox <davidvsthegiant@...il.com>, hansecke@...il.com,
linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [RESEND PATCH] prctl: add PR_[GS]ET_PDEATHSIG_PROC
On Tue, 2017-10-03 at 12:40 -0500, Eric W. Biederman wrote:
> Jürg Billeter <j@...ron.ch> writes:
> > What's actually the reason that CLONE_NEWPID requires CAP_SYS_ADMIN?
> > Does CLONE_NEWPID pose any risks that don't exist for
> > CLONE_NEWUSER|CLONE_NEWPID? Assuming we can't simply drop the
> > CAP_SYS_ADMIN requirement, do you see a better solution for this use
> > case?
>
> CLONE_NEWPID without a permission check would allow runing a setuid root
> application in a pid namespace. Off the top of my head I can't think of
> a really good exploit. But when you mess up pid files, and hide
> information from a privileged application I can completely imagine
> forcing that application to misbehave in ways the attacker can control.
> Leading to bad things.
Could we allow unprivileged CLONE_NEWPID if the no_new_privs bit is
set?
Jürg
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