linux-kernel - Re: [lockdep] b09be676e0 BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at 000001f2

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Message-ID: <20171004224008.3gbwuzn3zfwpidh3@treble>
Date:   Wed, 4 Oct 2017 17:40:08 -0500
From:   Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@...hat.com>
To:     Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@...ove.SAKURA.ne.jp>
Cc:     fengguang.wu@...el.com, byungchul.park@....com, mingo@...nel.org,
        peterz@...radead.org, linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org, lkp@...org,
        torvalds@...ux-foundation.org, bp@...en8.de, x86@...nel.org,
        hpa@...or.com, tglx@...utronix.de
Subject: Re: [lockdep] b09be676e0 BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer
 dereference at 000001f2

On Wed, Oct 04, 2017 at 06:44:50AM +0900, Tetsuo Handa wrote:
> Josh Poimboeuf wrote:
> > On Tue, Oct 03, 2017 at 11:28:15AM -0500, Josh Poimboeuf wrote:
> > > There are two bugs:
> > > 
> > > 1) Somebody -- presumably lockdep -- is corrupting the stack.  Need the
> > >    lockdep people to look at that.
> > > 
> > > 2) The 32-bit FP unwinder isn't handling the corrupt stack very well,
> > >    It's blindly dereferencing untrusted data:
> > > 
> > > 	/* Is the next frame pointer an encoded pointer to pt_regs? */
> > > 	regs = decode_frame_pointer(next_bp);
> > > 	if (regs) {
> > > 		frame = (unsigned long *)regs;
> > > 		len = regs_size(regs);
> > > 		state->got_irq = true;
> > > 
> > >   On 32-bit, regs_size() dereferences the regs pointer before we know it
> > >   points to a valid stack.  I'll fix that, along with the other unwinder
> > >   improvements I discussed with Linus.
> > 
> > Tetsuo and/or Fengguang,
> > 
> > Would you mind testing with this patch?  It should at least prevent the
> > unwinder panic and should hopefully print a useful unwinder dump
> > instead.
> > 
> Here are two outputs.

Tetsuo, would you mind trying the following patch?


diff --git a/arch/x86/entry/entry_32.S b/arch/x86/entry/entry_32.S
index 8a13d468635a..50e0d2bc4528 100644
--- a/arch/x86/entry/entry_32.S
+++ b/arch/x86/entry/entry_32.S
@@ -176,7 +176,7 @@
 /*
  * This is a sneaky trick to help the unwinder find pt_regs on the stack.  The
  * frame pointer is replaced with an encoded pointer to pt_regs.  The encoding
- * is just setting the LSB, which makes it an invalid stack address and is also
+ * is just clearing the MSB, which makes it an invalid stack address and is also
  * a signal to the unwinder that it's a pt_regs pointer in disguise.
  *
  * NOTE: This macro must be used *after* SAVE_ALL because it corrupts the
@@ -185,7 +185,7 @@
 .macro ENCODE_FRAME_POINTER
 #ifdef CONFIG_FRAME_POINTER
 	mov %esp, %ebp
-	orl $0x1, %ebp
+	andl $0x7fffffff, %ebp
 #endif
 .endm
 
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/unwind_frame.c b/arch/x86/kernel/unwind_frame.c
index d145a0b1f529..acefab447f00 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/unwind_frame.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/unwind_frame.c
@@ -44,7 +44,8 @@ static void unwind_dump(struct unwind_state *state)
 			state->stack_info.type, state->stack_info.next_sp,
 			state->stack_mask, state->graph_idx);
 
-	for (sp = state->orig_sp; sp; sp = PTR_ALIGN(stack_info.next_sp, sizeof(long))) {
+	for (sp = PTR_ALIGN(state->orig_sp, sizeof(long)); sp;
+	     sp = PTR_ALIGN(stack_info.next_sp, sizeof(long))) {
 		if (get_stack_info(sp, state->task, &stack_info, &visit_mask))
 			break;
 
@@ -77,6 +78,12 @@ static size_t regs_size(struct pt_regs *regs)
 	return sizeof(*regs);
 }
 
+#ifdef CONFIG_X86_32
+#define KERNEL_REGS_SIZE (sizeof(struct pt_regs) - 2*sizeof(long))
+#else
+#define KERNEL_REGS_SIZE (sizeof(struct pt_regs))
+#endif
+
 static bool in_entry_code(unsigned long ip)
 {
 	char *addr = (char *)ip;
@@ -174,6 +181,7 @@ static bool is_last_task_frame(struct unwind_state *state)
  * This determines if the frame pointer actually contains an encoded pointer to
  * pt_regs on the stack.  See ENCODE_FRAME_POINTER.
  */
+#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
 static struct pt_regs *decode_frame_pointer(unsigned long *bp)
 {
 	unsigned long regs = (unsigned long)bp;
@@ -183,6 +191,17 @@ static struct pt_regs *decode_frame_pointer(unsigned long *bp)
 
 	return (struct pt_regs *)(regs & ~0x1);
 }
+#else
+static struct pt_regs *decode_frame_pointer(unsigned long *bp)
+{
+	unsigned long regs = (unsigned long)bp;
+
+	if (regs & 0x80000000)
+		return NULL;
+
+	return (struct pt_regs *)(regs | 0x80000000);
+}
+#endif
 
 static bool update_stack_state(struct unwind_state *state,
 			       unsigned long *next_bp)
@@ -202,7 +221,7 @@ static bool update_stack_state(struct unwind_state *state,
 	regs = decode_frame_pointer(next_bp);
 	if (regs) {
 		frame = (unsigned long *)regs;
-		len = regs_size(regs);
+		len = KERNEL_REGS_SIZE;
 		state->got_irq = true;
 	} else {
 		frame = next_bp;
@@ -226,6 +245,14 @@ static bool update_stack_state(struct unwind_state *state,
 	    frame < prev_frame_end)
 		return false;
 
+	/*
+	 * On 32-bit with user mode regs, make sure the last two regs are safe
+	 * to access:
+	 */
+	if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_X86_32) && regs && user_mode(regs) &&
+	    !on_stack(info, frame, len + 2*sizeof(long)))
+		return false;
+
 	/* Move state to the next frame: */
 	if (regs) {
 		state->regs = regs;