linux-kernel - Re: [PATCH] selinux: Fix bool initialization/comparison

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Date:   Tue, 10 Oct 2017 16:19:46 -0700
From:   Casey Schaufler <casey@...aufler-ca.com>
To:     Thomas Meyer <thomas@...3r.de>, paul@...l-moore.com,
        sds@...ho.nsa.gov, eparis@...isplace.org,
        james.l.morris@...cle.com, serge@...lyn.com, selinux@...ho.nsa.gov,
        linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org, linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH] selinux: Fix bool initialization/comparison

On 10/7/2017 7:02 AM, Thomas Meyer wrote:
> Bool initializations should use true and false. Bool tests don't need
> comparisons.
>
> Signed-off-by: Thomas Meyer <thomas@...3r.de>
> ---
>
> diff -u -p a/security/selinux/ss/mls.c b/security/selinux/ss/mls.c
> --- a/security/selinux/ss/mls.c
> +++ b/security/selinux/ss/mls.c
> @@ -550,7 +550,7 @@ int mls_compute_sid(struct context *scon
>  
>  		/* Fallthrough */
>  	case AVTAB_CHANGE:
> -		if ((tclass == policydb.process_class) || (sock == true))
> +		if ((tclass == policydb.process_class) || (sock))

How about

	+	if ((tclass == policydb.process_class) || sock)

>  			/* Use the process MLS attributes. */
>  			return mls_context_cpy(newcontext, scontext);
>  		else
> diff -u -p a/security/selinux/ss/services.c b/security/selinux/ss/services.c
> --- a/security/selinux/ss/services.c
> +++ b/security/selinux/ss/services.c
> @@ -1656,7 +1656,7 @@ static int security_compute_sid(u32 ssid
>  	} else if (cladatum && cladatum->default_role == DEFAULT_TARGET) {
>  		newcontext.role = tcontext->role;
>  	} else {
> -		if ((tclass == policydb.process_class) || (sock == true))
> +		if ((tclass == policydb.process_class) || (sock))

Excessive ()

>  			newcontext.role = scontext->role;
>  		else
>  			newcontext.role = OBJECT_R_VAL;
> @@ -1668,7 +1668,7 @@ static int security_compute_sid(u32 ssid
>  	} else if (cladatum && cladatum->default_type == DEFAULT_TARGET) {
>  		newcontext.type = tcontext->type;
>  	} else {
> -		if ((tclass == policydb.process_class) || (sock == true)) {
> +		if ((tclass == policydb.process_class) || (sock)) {

Excessive ()

>  			/* Use the type of process. */
>  			newcontext.type = scontext->type;
>  		} else {
>