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Date:   Tue, 10 Oct 2017 10:05:17 -0400
From:   Waiman Long <longman@...hat.com>
To:     Stephen Smalley <sds@...ho.nsa.gov>,
        Antonio Murdaca <runcom@...hat.com>
Cc:     Tejun Heo <tj@...nel.org>, selinux@...ho.nsa.gov,
        lkml <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>,
        Paul Moore <paul@...l-moore.com>,
        Miroslav Grepl <mgrepl@...hat.com>
Subject: Re: About commit 901ef845fa2469c ("selinux: allow per-file labeling
 for cgroupfs")

On 10/10/2017 10:06 AM, Stephen Smalley wrote:
> On Fri, 2017-10-06 at 13:53 -0400, Waiman Long wrote:
>> Antonio,
>>
>> I have a question about your 4.14 upstream commit 901ef845fa2469c
>> ("selinux: allow per-file labeling for cgroupfs"). With that, I am no
>> longer able to mount the cgroup2 filesystem with a 4.14 kernel. The
>> problem is that your commit sets the SE_SBGENFS flag, which causes
>> selinux to lookup the genfs database for a filesystem type match.
>> However, the filesystem type "cgroup2" isn't in the genfs database in
>> my
>> RHEL7 based test system. The "cgroup" filesystem type is in the genfs
>> database,
>> so I have no problem with v1 cgroup mount.
>>
>> Do you know where the genfs database is defined? I need some way to
>> add cgroup2
>> as a valid genfs fstype, or I have to manually back out the commit in
>> order to
>> do my cgroup2 testing.
> It is part of the policy; you could add it via a policy module ala:
> $ cat cgroup2.cil
> (genfscon cgroup2 / (system_u object_r cgroup_t ((s0) (s0))))
>
> $ sudo semodule -i cgroup2.cil

Thanks for the workaround. I will try that next time.

> That said, the fact that you can't even mount it without that is
> arguably a bug/regression.  I guess this is due to the ENOENT from
> security_genfs_sid being propagated all the way up instead of just
> leaving it unlabeled and permitting the mount to proceed.

Yes, the mount command got the ENOENT error and it printed out some
confusing message.

Cheers,
Longman

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