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Message-ID: <1507694810.3552.45.camel@perches.com>
Date: Tue, 10 Oct 2017 21:06:50 -0700
From: Joe Perches <joe@...ches.com>
To: "Tobin C. Harding" <me@...in.cc>,
kernel-hardening@...ts.openwall.com, kvm@...r.kernel.org,
linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@...ux-foundation.org>,
Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>,
Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@...hat.com>,
Tycho Andersen <tycho@...ker.com>,
"Roberts, William C" <william.c.roberts@...el.com>,
Tejun Heo <tj@...nel.org>,
Jordan Glover <Golden_Miller83@...tonmail.ch>,
Greg KH <gregkh@...uxfoundation.org>,
Petr Mladek <pmladek@...e.com>,
Ian Campbell <ijc@...lion.org.uk>,
Sergey Senozhatsky <sergey.senozhatsky@...il.com>,
Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@....com>,
Will Deacon <will.deacon@....com>,
Steven Rostedt <rostedt@...dmis.org>,
Chris Fries <cfries@...gle.com>,
Dave Weinstein <olorin@...gle.com>,
Daniel Micay <danielmicay@...il.com>,
Djalal Harouni <tixxdz@...il.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH] printk: hash addresses printed with %p
On Wed, 2017-10-11 at 14:48 +1100, Tobin C. Harding wrote:
> Currently there are many places in the kernel where addresses are being
> printed using an unadorned %p. Kernel pointers should be printed using
> %pK allowing some control via the kptr_restrict sysctl. Exposing addresses
> gives attackers sensitive information about the kernel layout in memory.
[]
> diff --git a/lib/vsprintf.c b/lib/vsprintf.c
[]
> @@ -1591,6 +1591,35 @@ char *device_node_string(char *buf, char *end, struct device_node *dn,
> return widen_string(buf, buf - buf_start, end, spec);
> }
>
> +static long get_random_odd_long(void)
> +{
> + long val = 0;
> +
> + while((val & 1) == 0) {
> + val = get_random_long();
> + }
> +
> + return val;
> +}
Perhaps
static long get_random_odd_long(void)
{
return get_random_long() | 1L;
}
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