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Message-ID: <20171013151832.3ab0891d@alans-desktop>
Date: Fri, 13 Oct 2017 15:18:32 +0100
From: Alan Cox <gnomes@...rguk.ukuu.org.uk>
To: <Mario.Limonciello@...l.com>
Cc: <dvhart@...radead.org>, <andy.shevchenko@...il.com>,
<linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>,
<platform-driver-x86@...r.kernel.org>, <luto@...nel.org>,
<quasisec@...gle.com>, <pali.rohar@...il.com>, <rjw@...ysocki.net>,
<mjg59@...gle.com>, <hch@....de>, <greg@...ah.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v7 10/15] platform/x86: dell-smbios: add filtering
capability for requests
> Within Linux the security model is that items accessible through this interface
> are only accessible by root.
"root" has not been a security concept in the Linux kernel since about
2.0. If you are relying on file permissions then at best you are using
CAP_SYS_DAC which is too weak for this.
If you are allowing near unchecked communication with a third party
entity that the user doesn't trust too much you should be requiring
CAP_SYS_RAWIO.
In fact it's a fair argument hat if you require CAP_SYS_RAWIO and have a
module option you have to set to allow it that with the module loaded
with say
insmod dell_smbios factory=1
does even blacklisted stuff then you are ok, because a process with
CAP_SYS_RAWIO has enough power to totally own the machine anyway
including taking over and doing the WMI call itself by hand in user space
or loading its own module.
Alan
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