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Message-ID: <20171014145911.nfjrfvlwf5wmkbkh@pd.tnic>
Date: Sat, 14 Oct 2017 16:59:11 +0200
From: Borislav Petkov <bp@...en8.de>
To: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@....com>
Cc: x86@...nel.org, kvm@...r.kernel.org, linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org,
Thomas Gleixner <tglx@...utronix.de>,
Ingo Molnar <mingo@...hat.com>,
"H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@...or.com>,
Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@...hat.com>,
Radim Krčmář <rkrcmar@...hat.com>,
Joerg Roedel <joro@...tes.org>, Borislav Petkov <bp@...e.de>,
Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@....com>
Subject: Re: [Part2 PATCH v5 20/31] KVM: SVM: Add support for
KVM_SEV_LAUNCH_UPDATE_DATA command
On Wed, Oct 04, 2017 at 08:14:01AM -0500, Brijesh Singh wrote:
> The command is used for encrypting the guest memory region using the VM
> encryption key (VEK) created during KVM_SEV_LAUNCH_START.
>
> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@...utronix.de>
> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@...hat.com>
> Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@...or.com>
> Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@...hat.com>
> Cc: "Radim Krčmář" <rkrcmar@...hat.com>
> Cc: Joerg Roedel <joro@...tes.org>
> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@...e.de>
> Cc: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@....com>
> Cc: x86@...nel.org
> Cc: kvm@...r.kernel.org
> Cc: linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org
> Signed-off-by: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@....com>
> ---
> arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h | 1 +
> arch/x86/kvm/svm.c | 193 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-
> 2 files changed, 192 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
Just cleanups:
---
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h
index 0d4e33eec78c..2bbfcd4ab6bc 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h
@@ -752,7 +752,7 @@ struct kvm_sev_info {
unsigned int asid; /* ASID used for this guest */
unsigned int handle; /* SEV firmware handle */
int fd; /* SEV device fd */
- unsigned long locked; /* Number of pages locked */
+ unsigned long pages_locked; /* Number of pages locked */
};
struct kvm_arch {
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/svm.c b/arch/x86/kvm/svm.c
index 41eeeb30b56d..989bc8a9936f 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/svm.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/svm.c
@@ -1590,24 +1590,24 @@ static struct page **sev_pin_memory(struct kvm *kvm, unsigned long uaddr,
int write)
{
struct kvm_sev_info *sev = &kvm->arch.sev_info;
- unsigned long npages, pinned, size;
+ unsigned long npages, npinned, size;
unsigned long locked, lock_limit;
struct page **pages;
int first, last;
- /* calculate number of pages */
+ /* Calculate number of pages. */
first = (uaddr & PAGE_MASK) >> PAGE_SHIFT;
last = ((uaddr + ulen - 1) & PAGE_MASK) >> PAGE_SHIFT;
npages = (last - first + 1);
- locked = sev->locked + npages;
+ locked = sev->pages_locked + npages;
lock_limit = rlimit(RLIMIT_MEMLOCK) >> PAGE_SHIFT;
if (locked > lock_limit && !capable(CAP_IPC_LOCK)) {
- pr_err("locked(%lu) > lock_limit(%lu)\n", locked, lock_limit);
+ pr_err("SEV: %lu locked pages exceed the lock limit of %lu.\n", locked, lock_limit);
return NULL;
}
- /* Avoid using vmalloc for smaller buffer */
+ /* Avoid using vmalloc for smaller buffers. */
size = npages * sizeof(struct page *);
if (size > PAGE_SIZE)
pages = vmalloc(size);
@@ -1617,20 +1617,21 @@ static struct page **sev_pin_memory(struct kvm *kvm, unsigned long uaddr,
if (!pages)
return NULL;
- /* pin the user virtual address */
- pinned = get_user_pages_fast(uaddr, npages, write ? FOLL_WRITE : 0, pages);
- if (pinned != npages) {
- pr_err("failed to lock %lu pages\n", npages);
+ /* Pin the user virtual address. */
+ npinned = get_user_pages_fast(uaddr, npages, write ? FOLL_WRITE : 0, pages);
+ if (npinned != npages) {
+ pr_err("SEV: Failure locking %lu pages.\n", npages);
goto err;
}
*n = npages;
- sev->locked = locked;
+ sev->pages_locked = locked;
return pages;
+
err:
- if (pinned > 0)
- release_pages(pages, pinned, 0);
+ if (npinned > 0)
+ release_pages(pages, npinned, 0);
kvfree(pages);
return NULL;
@@ -1643,7 +1644,7 @@ static void sev_unpin_memory(struct kvm *kvm, struct page **pages,
release_pages(pages, npages, 0);
kvfree(pages);
- sev->locked -= npages;
+ sev->pages_locked -= npages;
}
static void sev_clflush_pages(struct page *pages[], unsigned long npages)
@@ -5909,8 +5910,7 @@ static int sev_launch_update_data(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_sev_cmd *argp)
if (!sev_guest(kvm))
return -ENOTTY;
- if (copy_from_user(¶ms, (void __user *)(uintptr_t)argp->data,
- sizeof(struct kvm_sev_launch_update_data)))
+ if (copy_from_user(¶ms, (void __user *)(uintptr_t)argp->data, sizeof(params)))
return -EFAULT;
data = kzalloc(sizeof(*data), GFP_KERNEL);
@@ -5921,7 +5921,7 @@ static int sev_launch_update_data(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_sev_cmd *argp)
size = params.len;
vaddr_end = vaddr + size;
- /* lock the user memory */
+ /* Lock the user memory. */
inpages = sev_pin_memory(kvm, vaddr, size, &npages, 1);
if (!inpages) {
ret = -ENOMEM;
@@ -5931,9 +5931,8 @@ static int sev_launch_update_data(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_sev_cmd *argp)
/*
* The LAUNCH_UPDATE command will perform in-place encryption of the
* memory content (i.e it will write the same memory region with C=1).
- * Its possible that our cache may contain the data with C=0. Lets
- * invalidate it so that we can get the recent contents after LAUNCH_UPDATE
- * command completes.
+ * It's possible that the cache may contain the data with C=0, i.e.,
+ * unencrypted so invalidate it first.
*/
sev_clflush_pages(inpages, npages);
@@ -5941,12 +5940,12 @@ static int sev_launch_update_data(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_sev_cmd *argp)
int offset, len;
/*
- * since user buffer may not be page aligned, calculate the
- * offset within the page.
+ * If the user buffer is not page-aligned, calculate the offset
+ * within the page.
*/
offset = vaddr & (PAGE_SIZE - 1);
- /* calculate the number of pages that can be encrypted in one go */
+ /* Calculate the number of pages that can be encrypted in one go. */
pages = get_num_contig_pages(i, inpages, npages);
len = min_t(size_t, ((pages * PAGE_SIZE) - offset), size);
--
Regards/Gruss,
Boris.
Good mailing practices for 400: avoid top-posting and trim the reply.
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