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Message-Id: <20171018005331.2688-18-bauerman@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Date: Tue, 17 Oct 2017 22:53:30 -0200
From: Thiago Jung Bauermann <bauerman@...ux.vnet.ibm.com>
To: linux-integrity@...r.kernel.org
Cc: linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org, keyrings@...r.kernel.org,
linux-crypto@...r.kernel.org, linuxppc-dev@...ts.ozlabs.org,
linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org,
Mimi Zohar <zohar@...ux.vnet.ibm.com>,
Dmitry Kasatkin <dmitry.kasatkin@...il.com>,
James Morris <james.l.morris@...cle.com>,
"Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@...lyn.com>,
David Howells <dhowells@...hat.com>,
David Woodhouse <dwmw2@...radead.org>,
Jessica Yu <jeyu@...hat.com>,
Rusty Russell <rusty@...tcorp.com.au>,
Herbert Xu <herbert@...dor.apana.org.au>,
"David S. Miller" <davem@...emloft.net>,
"AKASHI, Takahiro" <takahiro.akashi@...aro.org>,
Thiago Jung Bauermann <bauerman@...ux.vnet.ibm.com>
Subject: [PATCH v5 17/18] ima: Implement support for module-style appended signatures
This patch actually implements the appraise_type=modsig option, allowing
IMA to read and verify modsig signatures
Signed-off-by: Thiago Jung Bauermann <bauerman@...ux.vnet.ibm.com>
---
security/integrity/ima/ima.h | 17 +++--
security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c | 119 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--
security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c | 7 +-
3 files changed, 128 insertions(+), 15 deletions(-)
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima.h b/security/integrity/ima/ima.h
index eb58af06566f..b082138461b3 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima.h
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima.h
@@ -157,7 +157,8 @@ void ima_init_template_list(void);
static inline bool is_ima_sig(const struct evm_ima_xattr_data *xattr_value)
{
- return xattr_value && xattr_value->type == EVM_IMA_XATTR_DIGSIG;
+ return xattr_value && (xattr_value->type == EVM_IMA_XATTR_DIGSIG ||
+ xattr_value->type == IMA_MODSIG);
}
/*
@@ -243,9 +244,10 @@ int ima_policy_show(struct seq_file *m, void *v);
#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_APPRAISE
int ima_appraise_measurement(enum ima_hooks func,
struct integrity_iint_cache *iint,
- struct file *file, const unsigned char *filename,
- struct evm_ima_xattr_data *xattr_value,
- int xattr_len, int opened);
+ struct file *file, const void *buf, loff_t size,
+ const unsigned char *filename,
+ struct evm_ima_xattr_data **xattr_value,
+ int *xattr_len, int opened);
int ima_must_appraise(struct inode *inode, int mask, enum ima_hooks func);
void ima_update_xattr(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint, struct file *file);
enum integrity_status ima_get_cache_status(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint,
@@ -270,10 +272,11 @@ void ima_free_xattr_data(struct evm_ima_xattr_data *hdr);
#else
static inline int ima_appraise_measurement(enum ima_hooks func,
struct integrity_iint_cache *iint,
- struct file *file,
+ struct file *file, const void *buf,
+ loff_t size,
const unsigned char *filename,
- struct evm_ima_xattr_data *xattr_value,
- int xattr_len, int opened)
+ struct evm_ima_xattr_data **xattr_value,
+ int *xattr_len, int opened)
{
return INTEGRITY_UNKNOWN;
}
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c
index 58e147049e98..108690741c1a 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c
@@ -190,6 +190,45 @@ int ima_read_xattr(struct dentry *dentry,
return ret;
}
+static int appraise_modsig(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint,
+ struct evm_ima_xattr_data *xattr_value,
+ int xattr_len)
+{
+ enum hash_algo algo;
+ const void *digest;
+ void *buf;
+ int rc, len;
+ u8 dig_len;
+
+ rc = ima_modsig_verify(INTEGRITY_KEYRING_IMA, xattr_value);
+ if (rc)
+ return rc;
+
+ /*
+ * The signature is good. Now let's put the sig hash
+ * into the iint cache so that it gets stored in the
+ * measurement list.
+ */
+
+ rc = ima_get_modsig_hash(xattr_value, &algo, &digest, &dig_len);
+ if (rc)
+ return rc;
+
+ len = sizeof(iint->ima_hash) + dig_len;
+ buf = krealloc(iint->ima_hash, len, GFP_NOFS);
+ if (!buf)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+
+ iint->ima_hash = buf;
+ iint->flags |= IMA_DIGSIG;
+ iint->ima_hash->algo = algo;
+ iint->ima_hash->length = dig_len;
+
+ memcpy(iint->ima_hash->digest, digest, dig_len);
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
/*
* ima_appraise_measurement - appraise file measurement
*
@@ -200,18 +239,28 @@ int ima_read_xattr(struct dentry *dentry,
*/
int ima_appraise_measurement(enum ima_hooks func,
struct integrity_iint_cache *iint,
- struct file *file, const unsigned char *filename,
- struct evm_ima_xattr_data *xattr_value,
- int xattr_len, int opened)
+ struct file *file, const void *buf, loff_t size,
+ const unsigned char *filename,
+ struct evm_ima_xattr_data **xattr_value_,
+ int *xattr_len_, int opened)
{
static const char op[] = "appraise_data";
const char *cause = "unknown";
struct dentry *dentry = file_dentry(file);
struct inode *inode = d_backing_inode(dentry);
enum integrity_status status = INTEGRITY_UNKNOWN;
- int rc = xattr_len, hash_start = 0;
+ struct evm_ima_xattr_data *xattr_value = *xattr_value_;
+ int xattr_len = *xattr_len_, rc = xattr_len, hash_start = 0;
+ bool appraising_modsig = false;
+
+ if (iint->flags & IMA_MODSIG_ALLOWED &&
+ !ima_read_modsig(func, buf, size, &xattr_value, &xattr_len)) {
+ appraising_modsig = true;
+ rc = xattr_len;
+ }
- if (!(inode->i_opflags & IOP_XATTR))
+ /* If not appraising a modsig, we need an xattr. */
+ if (!appraising_modsig && !(inode->i_opflags & IOP_XATTR))
return INTEGRITY_UNKNOWN;
if (rc <= 0) {
@@ -235,6 +284,9 @@ int ima_appraise_measurement(enum ima_hooks func,
case INTEGRITY_UNKNOWN:
break;
case INTEGRITY_NOXATTRS: /* No EVM protected xattrs. */
+ /* It's fine not to have xattrs when using a modsig. */
+ if (appraising_modsig)
+ break;
case INTEGRITY_NOLABEL: /* No security.evm xattr. */
cause = "missing-HMAC";
goto out;
@@ -242,6 +294,8 @@ int ima_appraise_measurement(enum ima_hooks func,
cause = "invalid-HMAC";
goto out;
}
+
+ retry:
switch (xattr_value->type) {
case IMA_XATTR_DIGEST_NG:
/* first byte contains algorithm id */
@@ -285,6 +339,61 @@ int ima_appraise_measurement(enum ima_hooks func,
status = INTEGRITY_PASS;
}
break;
+ case IMA_MODSIG:
+ /*
+ * To avoid being tricked into an infinite loop, we don't allow
+ * a modsig stored in the xattr.
+ */
+ if (!appraising_modsig) {
+ status = INTEGRITY_UNKNOWN;
+ cause = "unknown-ima-data";
+ break;
+ }
+
+ rc = appraise_modsig(iint, xattr_value, xattr_len);
+ if (!rc) {
+ kfree(*xattr_value_);
+ *xattr_value_ = xattr_value;
+ *xattr_len_ = xattr_len;
+
+ status = INTEGRITY_PASS;
+ break;
+ }
+
+ ima_free_xattr_data(xattr_value);
+
+ /*
+ * The appended signature failed verification. If there's a
+ * signature in the extended attribute, let's fall back to it.
+ */
+ if (inode->i_opflags & IOP_XATTR && *xattr_len_ != 0 &&
+ *xattr_len_ != -ENODATA) {
+ const char *modsig_cause = rc == -EOPNOTSUPP ?
+ "unknown" : "invalid-signature";
+
+ /* First, log that the modsig verification failed. */
+ integrity_audit_msg(AUDIT_INTEGRITY_DATA, inode,
+ filename, op, modsig_cause, rc, 0);
+
+ xattr_len = rc = *xattr_len_;
+ xattr_value = *xattr_value_;
+ appraising_modsig = false;
+
+ if (rc > 0)
+ /* Process xattr contents. */
+ goto retry;
+
+ /* Unexpected error reading xattr. */
+ status = INTEGRITY_UNKNOWN;
+ } else {
+ if (rc == -EOPNOTSUPP)
+ status = INTEGRITY_UNKNOWN;
+ else {
+ cause = "invalid-signature";
+ status = INTEGRITY_FAIL;
+ }
+ }
+ break;
default:
status = INTEGRITY_UNKNOWN;
cause = "unknown-ima-data";
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
index 8e96450e27f5..6a2d960fbd92 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
@@ -243,8 +243,9 @@ static int process_measurement(struct file *file, char *buf, loff_t size,
pathname = ima_d_path(&file->f_path, &pathbuf, filename);
if (rc == 0 && (action & IMA_APPRAISE_SUBMASK))
- rc = ima_appraise_measurement(func, iint, file, pathname,
- xattr_value, xattr_len, opened);
+ rc = ima_appraise_measurement(func, iint, file, buf, size,
+ pathname, &xattr_value,
+ &xattr_len, opened);
if (action & IMA_MEASURE)
ima_store_measurement(iint, file, pathname,
xattr_value, xattr_len, pcr);
@@ -255,7 +256,7 @@ static int process_measurement(struct file *file, char *buf, loff_t size,
if ((mask & MAY_WRITE) && (iint->flags & IMA_DIGSIG) &&
!(iint->flags & IMA_NEW_FILE))
rc = -EACCES;
- kfree(xattr_value);
+ ima_free_xattr_data(xattr_value);
out_free:
if (pathbuf)
__putname(pathbuf);
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