linux-kernel - RE: Adjusting further size determinations?

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Message-ID: <063D6719AE5E284EB5DD2968C1650D6DD009ACE3@AcuExch.aculab.com>
Date:   Wed, 18 Oct 2017 12:58:43 +0000
From:   David Laight <David.Laight@...LAB.COM>
To:     'SF Markus Elfring' <elfring@...rs.sourceforge.net>,
        Joe Perches <joe@...ches.com>,
        "linux-integrity@...r.kernel.org" <linux-integrity@...r.kernel.org>,
        "linuxppc-dev@...ts.ozlabs.org" <linuxppc-dev@...ts.ozlabs.org>
CC:     Jason Gunthorpe <jgunthorpe@...idianresearch.com>,
        "kernel-janitors@...r.kernel.org" <kernel-janitors@...r.kernel.org>,
        "Stefan Berger" <stefanb@...ux.vnet.ibm.com>,
        Alexander Steffen <Alexander.Steffen@...ineon.com>,
        Nayna Jain <nayna@...ux.vnet.ibm.com>,
        Jerry Snitselaar <jsnitsel@...hat.com>,
        "linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org" <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>,
        Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@...ux.intel.com>,
        James Bottomley <James.Bottomley@...senPartnership.com>,
        Julia Lawall <julia.lawall@...6.fr>,
        Corentin Labbe <clabbe.montjoie@...il.com>,
        Kenneth Goldman <kgold@...ux.vnet.ibm.com>,
        Paul Mackerras <paulus@...ba.org>,
        Peter Hüwe <PeterHuewe@....de>,
        Andy Shevchenko <andriy.shevchenko@...ux.intel.com>,
        Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@...cle.com>
Subject: RE: Adjusting further size determinations?

From: SF Markus Elfring
> >>>> Unpleasant consequences are possible in both cases.
> >> How much do you care to reduce the failure probability further?
> >
> > Zero.
> 
> I am interested to improve the software situation a bit more here.

There are probably better places to spend your time!

If you want 'security' for kmalloc() then:

#define KMALLOC_TYPE(flags) (type *)kmalloc(sizeof (type), flags)
#define KMALLOC(ptr, flags) *(ptr) = KMALLOC_TYPE(typeof *(ptr), flags)

and change:
	ptr = kmalloc(sizeof *ptr, flags);
to:
	KMALLOC(&ptr, flags);

But it is all churn for churn's sake.

	David