linux-kernel - [PATCH 4.4 18/46] net: Set sk_prot_creator when cloning sockets to the right proto

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Message-Id: <20171019134846.593403413@linuxfoundation.org>
Date:   Thu, 19 Oct 2017 15:48:54 +0200
From:   Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@...uxfoundation.org>
To:     linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org
Cc:     Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@...uxfoundation.org>,
        stable@...r.kernel.org, Christoph Paasch <cpaasch@...le.com>,
        Eric Dumazet <edumazet@...gle.com>,
        "David S. Miller" <davem@...emloft.net>
Subject: [PATCH 4.4 18/46] net: Set sk_prot_creator when cloning sockets to the right proto

4.4-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Christoph Paasch <cpaasch@...le.com>


[ Upstream commit 9d538fa60bad4f7b23193c89e843797a1cf71ef3 ]

sk->sk_prot and sk->sk_prot_creator can differ when the app uses
IPV6_ADDRFORM (transforming an IPv6-socket to an IPv4-one).
Which is why sk_prot_creator is there to make sure that sk_prot_free()
does the kmem_cache_free() on the right kmem_cache slab.

Now, if such a socket gets transformed back to a listening socket (using
connect() with AF_UNSPEC) we will allocate an IPv4 tcp_sock through
sk_clone_lock() when a new connection comes in. But sk_prot_creator will
still point to the IPv6 kmem_cache (as everything got copied in
sk_clone_lock()). When freeing, we will thus put this
memory back into the IPv6 kmem_cache although it was allocated in the
IPv4 cache. I have seen memory corruption happening because of this.

With slub-debugging and MEMCG_KMEM enabled this gives the warning
	"cache_from_obj: Wrong slab cache. TCPv6 but object is from TCP"

A C-program to trigger this:

void main(void)
{
        int fd = socket(AF_INET6, SOCK_STREAM, IPPROTO_TCP);
        int new_fd, newest_fd, client_fd;
        struct sockaddr_in6 bind_addr;
        struct sockaddr_in bind_addr4, client_addr1, client_addr2;
        struct sockaddr unsp;
        int val;

        memset(&bind_addr, 0, sizeof(bind_addr));
        bind_addr.sin6_family = AF_INET6;
        bind_addr.sin6_port = ntohs(42424);

        memset(&client_addr1, 0, sizeof(client_addr1));
        client_addr1.sin_family = AF_INET;
        client_addr1.sin_port = ntohs(42424);
        client_addr1.sin_addr.s_addr = inet_addr("127.0.0.1");

        memset(&client_addr2, 0, sizeof(client_addr2));
        client_addr2.sin_family = AF_INET;
        client_addr2.sin_port = ntohs(42421);
        client_addr2.sin_addr.s_addr = inet_addr("127.0.0.1");

        memset(&unsp, 0, sizeof(unsp));
        unsp.sa_family = AF_UNSPEC;

        bind(fd, (struct sockaddr *)&bind_addr, sizeof(bind_addr));

        listen(fd, 5);

        client_fd = socket(AF_INET, SOCK_STREAM, IPPROTO_TCP);
        connect(client_fd, (struct sockaddr *)&client_addr1, sizeof(client_addr1));
        new_fd = accept(fd, NULL, NULL);
        close(fd);

        val = AF_INET;
        setsockopt(new_fd, SOL_IPV6, IPV6_ADDRFORM, &val, sizeof(val));

        connect(new_fd, &unsp, sizeof(unsp));

        memset(&bind_addr4, 0, sizeof(bind_addr4));
        bind_addr4.sin_family = AF_INET;
        bind_addr4.sin_port = ntohs(42421);
        bind(new_fd, (struct sockaddr *)&bind_addr4, sizeof(bind_addr4));

        listen(new_fd, 5);

        client_fd = socket(AF_INET, SOCK_STREAM, IPPROTO_TCP);
        connect(client_fd, (struct sockaddr *)&client_addr2, sizeof(client_addr2));

        newest_fd = accept(new_fd, NULL, NULL);
        close(new_fd);

        close(client_fd);
        close(new_fd);
}

As far as I can see, this bug has been there since the beginning of the
git-days.

Signed-off-by: Christoph Paasch <cpaasch@...le.com>
Reviewed-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@...gle.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@...emloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@...uxfoundation.org>
---
 net/core/sock.c |    2 ++
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+)

--- a/net/core/sock.c
+++ b/net/core/sock.c
@@ -1516,6 +1516,8 @@ struct sock *sk_clone_lock(const struct
 
 		sock_copy(newsk, sk);
 
+		newsk->sk_prot_creator = sk->sk_prot;
+
 		/* SANITY */
 		if (likely(newsk->sk_net_refcnt))
 			get_net(sock_net(newsk));