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Message-Id: <1509027463.5886.26.camel@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Date: Thu, 26 Oct 2017 10:17:43 -0400 From: Mimi Zohar <zohar@...ux.vnet.ibm.com> To: joeyli <jlee@...e.com> Cc: David Howells <dhowells@...hat.com>, linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org, gnomes@...rguk.ukuu.org.uk, linux-efi@...r.kernel.org, matthew.garrett@...ula.com, gregkh@...uxfoundation.org, linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org, jforbes@...hat.com Subject: Re: [PATCH 07/27] kexec_file: Disable at runtime if securelevel has been set On Thu, 2017-10-26 at 15:42 +0800, joeyli wrote: > Hi Mimi, > > Thank you for reviewing. > > On Mon, Oct 23, 2017 at 11:54:43AM -0400, Mimi Zohar wrote: > > On Thu, 2017-10-19 at 15:51 +0100, David Howells wrote: > > > From: Chun-Yi Lee <joeyli.kernel@...il.com> > > > > > > When KEXEC_VERIFY_SIG is not enabled, kernel should not loads image > > > through kexec_file systemcall if securelevel has been set. > > > > The patch title and description needs to be updated to refer to > > lockdown, not securelevel. > > > > As previously mentioned the last time these patches were posted, this > > leaves out testing to see if the integrity subsystem is enabled. > > > > Commit 503ceaef8e2e "ima: define a set of appraisal rules requiring > > file signatures" was upstreamed. An additional patch could force > > these rules to be added to the custom policy, if lockdown is enabled. > > This and other patches in this series could then check to see if > > is_ima_appraise_enabled() is true. > > > > Mimi > > > > I have updated the patch title and description, and I also added > is_ima_appraise_enabled() as the following. Is it good to you? Yes, that works. Thanks! Remember is_ima_appraise_enabled() is dependent on the "ima: require secure_boot rules in lockdown mode" patch - http://kernsec.org/pipermail/linux-security-module-archive/201 7-October/003910.html. The IMA "secure_boot" policy can be specified on the boot command line as ima_policy="secure_boot". It requires kernel modules, firmware, kexec kernel image and the IMA custom policy to be signed. In lockdown mode, these rules are enabled by default and added to the custom policy. > On the other hand, I am not good on IMA. I have traced the code path > in kimage_file_prepare_segments(). Looks that the READING_KEXEC_IMAGE > doesn't show in selinux_kernel_read_file(). Where is the exact code > in IMA for checking the signature when loading crash kernel file? kernel_read_file_from_fd() calls the security_kernel_read_file() and security_kernel_post_read_file() hooks, which call ima_read_file() and ima_post_read_file() respectively. Mimi
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