linux-kernel - Re: [RFC PATCH 0/2] arm64: optional paranoid __{get,put}

lists.openwall.net		lists / announce owl-users owl-dev john-users john-dev passwdqc-users yescrypt popa3d-users / oss-security kernel-hardening musl sabotage tlsify passwords / crypt-dev xvendor / Bugtraq Full-Disclosure linux-kernel linux-netdev linux-ext4 linux-hardening linux-cve-announce PHC
Open Source and information security mailing list archives

Hash Suite: Windows password security audit tool. GUI, reports in PDF.

[<prev] [next>] [<thread-prev] [thread-next>] [day] [month] [year] [list]

Date:   Fri, 27 Oct 2017 16:41:13 +0100
From:   Will Deacon <will.deacon@....com>
To:     Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@....com>
Cc:     linux-arm-kernel@...ts.infradead.org, linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org,
        kernel-hardening@...ts.openwall.com,
        Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@....com>,
        Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>,
        Laura Abbott <labbott@...hat.com>
Subject: Re: [RFC PATCH 0/2] arm64: optional paranoid __{get,put}_user checks

On Thu, Oct 26, 2017 at 10:09:40AM +0100, Mark Rutland wrote:
> Hi,
> 
> In Prague, Kees mentioned that it would be nice to have a mechanism to
> catch bad __{get,put}_user uses, such as the recent CVE-2017-5123 [1,2]
> issue with unsafe_put_user() in waitid().
> 
> These patches allow an optional access_ok() check to be dropped in
> arm64's __{get,put}_user() primitives. These will then BUG() if a bad
> user pointer is passed (which should only happen in the absence of an
> earlier access_ok() check).
> 
> The first patch rewrites the arm64 access_ok() check in C. This gives
> the compiler the visibility it needs to elide redundant access_ok()
> checks, so in the common case:
> 
>   get_user()
>     access_ok()
>     __get_user()
>       BUG_ON(!access_ok())
>       <uaccess asm>
> 
> ... the compiler can determine that the second access_ok() must return
> true, and can elide it along with the BUG_ON(), leaving:
> 
>   get_user()
>     access_ok()
>       __get_user()
>         <uaccess asm>
> 
> ... and thus this sanity check can have no cost in the common case.

Probably a stupid question, but why not just move the access_ok check
into __{get,put}_user and remove it from {get,put}_user? We can also
then move the uaccess_{enable,disable}_not_uao calls out from the __
variants so that we can implement user_access_{begin,end}.

Will