linux-kernel - Re: [PATCH v3] scsi: require CAP_SYS_ADMIN to write to procfs interface

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Message-ID: <20171105073121.GB1431@kroah.com>
Date:   Sun, 5 Nov 2017 08:31:21 +0100
From:   Greg KH <greg@...ah.com>
To:     Aleksa Sarai <asarai@...e.de>
Cc:     "James E.J. Bottomley" <jejb@...ux.vnet.ibm.com>,
        "Martin K. Petersen" <martin.petersen@...cle.com>,
        linux-scsi@...r.kernel.org, linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org,
        containers@...ts.linux-foundation.org,
        Valentin Rothberg <vrothberg@...e.com>, cyphar@...har.com,
        stable@...r.kernel.org, "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@...ssion.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v3] scsi: require CAP_SYS_ADMIN to write to procfs
 interface

On Sun, Nov 05, 2017 at 01:56:35PM +1100, Aleksa Sarai wrote:
> Previously, the only capability effectively required to operate on the
> /proc/scsi interface was CAP_DAC_OVERRIDE (or for some other files,
> having an fsuid of GLOBAL_ROOT_UID was enough). This means that
> semi-privileged processes could interfere with core components of a
> system (such as causing a DoS by removing the underlying SCSI device of
> the host's / mount).

Given that the previous patch didn't even compile, I worry that you have
not tested this at all to see what breaks/changes in userspace with this
type of user-visable api change.

What did you do to test this?

thanks,

greg k-h