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Message-ID: <15884.1510005945@warthog.procyon.org.uk>
Date: Mon, 06 Nov 2017 22:05:45 +0000
From: David Howells <dhowells@...hat.com>
To: syzbot
<bot+04b92812698232d15d78c1e4d3bbf6fcc21eeeb1@...kaller.appspotmail.com>
Cc: dhowells@...hat.com, ebiggers3@...il.com, davem@...emloft.net,
herbert@...dor.apana.org.au, keyrings@...r.kernel.org,
linux-crypto@...r.kernel.org, linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org,
syzkaller-bugs@...glegroups.com
Subject: Re: general protection fault in asn1_ber_decoder
syzbot <bot+04b92812698232d15d78c1e4d3bbf6fcc21eeeb1@...kaller.appspotmail.com> wrote:
> syzkaller hit the following crash on 5a3517e009e979f21977d362212b7729c5165d92
> git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/next/linux-next.git/master
> compiler: gcc (GCC) 7.1.1 20170620
> .config is attached
> Raw console output is attached.
> C reproducer is attached
> syzkaller reproducer is attached. See https://goo.gl/kgGztJ
> for information about syzkaller reproducers
Does the attached patch fix it for you?
David
---
commit 41f31a32d918a97dba2ec589d24b52527c8f35b6
Author: David Howells <dhowells@...hat.com>
Date: Mon Nov 6 21:44:00 2017 +0000
asn1: Fix handling of zero-length ASN.1 messages
The ASN.1 parser doesn't correctly handle zero-length ASN.1 data. There
are at least a couple of ways this can be handled. The simplest is just to
reject zero-length messages upfront on the basis that we don't currently
have a grammar that permits such; a more complex way is to expand all the
state variables to 32-bit signed so that the:
if (unlikely(dp >= datalen - 1))
check on line 231 correctly detects underflow when datalen is 0.
For the moment, just choose the simplest option and indicate EBADMSG for a
zero-length message, with a comment indicating what needs to be done if the
check is removed
The bug can be reproduced by:
echo -n | keyctl padd pkcs7_test "" @t
The oops resulting from the bug looks like:
BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at (null)
IP: asn1_ber_decoder+0xe7/0x5fa
...
RIP: 0010:asn1_ber_decoder+0xe7/0x5fa
...
Call Trace:
? pkcs7_parse_message+0x11/0x181
? rcu_read_lock_sched_held+0x5f/0x67
? kmem_cache_alloc_trace+0x275/0x2b1
? pkcs7_parse_message+0x9a/0x181
pkcs7_parse_message+0xd9/0x181
? pkcs7_preparse+0x48/0x48
verify_pkcs7_signature+0x2c/0x107
pkcs7_preparse+0x44/0x48
? pkcs7_preparse+0x48/0x48
key_create_or_update+0x160/0x3d5
SyS_add_key+0x123/0x186
do_syscall_64+0x8a/0x190
entry_SYSCALL64_slow_path+0x25/0x25
...
with the bug falling on line 233 of asn1_decoder.c:
tag = data[dp++];
Fixes: 42d5ec27f873 ("X.509: Add an ASN.1 decoder")
Reported-by: syzkaller@...glegroups.com
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@...hat.com>
diff --git a/lib/asn1_decoder.c b/lib/asn1_decoder.c
index fef5d2e114be..048de2c20ae9 100644
--- a/lib/asn1_decoder.c
+++ b/lib/asn1_decoder.c
@@ -201,6 +201,13 @@ int asn1_ber_decoder(const struct asn1_decoder *decoder,
if (datalen > 65535)
return -EMSGSIZE;
+ /* We don't currently support 0-length messages - the underrun checks
+ * will fail if datalen is 0 because we check against datalen - 1 with
+ * unsigned arithmetic.
+ */
+ if (datalen == 0)
+ return -EBADMSG;
+
next_op:
pr_debug("next_op: pc=\e[32m%zu\e[m/%zu dp=\e[33m%zu\e[m/%zu C=%d J=%d\n",
pc, machlen, dp, datalen, csp, jsp);
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