linux-kernel - [PATCH 4.9 55/67] vfs: open() with O_CREAT should not create inodes with unknown ids

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Message-Id: <20171106091307.592990628@linuxfoundation.org>
Date:   Mon,  6 Nov 2017 10:44:18 +0100
From:   Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@...uxfoundation.org>
To:     linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org
Cc:     Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@...uxfoundation.org>,
        stable@...r.kernel.org, Seth Forshee <seth.forshee@...onical.com>,
        "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@...ssion.com>,
        Sasha Levin <alexander.levin@...izon.com>
Subject: [PATCH 4.9 55/67] vfs: open() with O_CREAT should not create inodes with unknown ids

4.9-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Seth Forshee <seth.forshee@...onical.com>


[ Upstream commit 1328c727004d432bbdfba0ffa02a166df04c7305 ]

may_create() rejects creation of inodes with ids which lack a
mapping into s_user_ns. However for O_CREAT may_o_create() is
is used instead. Add a similar check there.

Fixes: 036d523641c6 ("vfs: Don't create inodes with a uid or gid unknown to the vfs")
Signed-off-by: Seth Forshee <seth.forshee@...onical.com>
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@...ssion.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <alexander.levin@...izon.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@...uxfoundation.org>
---
 fs/namei.c |    6 ++++++
 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+)

--- a/fs/namei.c
+++ b/fs/namei.c
@@ -2971,10 +2971,16 @@ static inline int open_to_namei_flags(in
 
 static int may_o_create(const struct path *dir, struct dentry *dentry, umode_t mode)
 {
+	struct user_namespace *s_user_ns;
 	int error = security_path_mknod(dir, dentry, mode, 0);
 	if (error)
 		return error;
 
+	s_user_ns = dir->dentry->d_sb->s_user_ns;
+	if (!kuid_has_mapping(s_user_ns, current_fsuid()) ||
+	    !kgid_has_mapping(s_user_ns, current_fsgid()))
+		return -EOVERFLOW;
+
 	error = inode_permission(dir->dentry->d_inode, MAY_WRITE | MAY_EXEC);
 	if (error)
 		return error;